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THE SOCIAL TRANSLATION OF THE GOSPEL *

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THERE is a mediaeval Italian painting which has long been a favorite of mine and of which copies hang in the studies of many men of my profession. It is a picture of St. Jerome translating the scriptures. The miscellaneous assortment of friendly beasts with which the artist has enlivened an otherwise quiet scene at first attracted my childish mind, but now that I have become a man I find the picture still attractive. It is more than an imaginative picture of an historic figure or an historic event or even of a single profession. It is symbolic, and it means something not merely to the student but also to the preacher and the layman.

For every Christian life taken seriously is a task of translation. Not only those who teach Greek and Hebrew, and students thumbing their dictionaries are translators; all teaching and preaching and living is a work of translation. The men who constructed our systems of theology have been rendering history and experience into a different language. The builders of cathedrals were translators of the gospel. The message of good news has been rendered into the plastic speech of character by Christian teachers, and, again, by the unknown, uncalendared saints of all ages and lands. And now for many years there has been a demand for another translation — the social translation of the gospel.

I need not dwell on the urgency of this demand. Before the war the study of the New Testament from the social standpoint

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was one of the two principal new characteristics of the theological study of our generation. The events of the last decade have only intensified this interest. In a world desperately aware of failure and need there is pretty general agreement that the original message of Jesus offers the only cure. It is not only those most friendly to the church who accept the alternative "Christ or chaos." But the Christian church does accept it, and its best minds are engaged in the effort to discover what the social task of the church may be. It is not therefore as something new or as something requiring fresh emphasis that I choose my subject, but rather — at the risk of being trite — I select it as the leading religious question of the day.

What needs emphasis in my title is not the word 'social' but the word 'translation.' That eager expectancy of our age for a social gospel, that blind confidence that Christ can settle all our problems, is not to be discouraged; but it is important for us to realize, above all if we are to teach the Christian religion, that there is a process of translation required which is by no means simple or easy. And it is our business, the especial duty of academic students and teachers, to qualify ourselves for the work of translation. We are altogether too likely to be superficial in this — and superficiality leads to dogmatism. The Christian teacher is expected to know the Christian answer to social problems. Woe to him if he hastily skips the painstaking process of translation.

For we need to be reminded how far the gospel is from our own preconceived requirements. The teaching of Jesus as it is recorded for us in the oldest and most reliable strata of tradition was not primarily social teaching. Too much has recently been read into and out of such a phrase as 'the Kingdom of God' or the word 'Father.' It is doubtful whether wide implications for human society were in Jesus' mind when he used these terms. The gospels are strikingly lacking in much that has become most prominent in our thought and conscience. We miss in them, in the first place, explicit teaching on social institutions. Jesus takes these for granted, — slavery, monogamy, private property, taxation, and the rest. What his teaching involves with regard to these as moral or religious

problems cannot be discovered by merely citing a parable that mentions them or by the absence of specific judgments against them. Search the gospels through, and you will find only one definite social institution on which Jesus seems to pronounce judgment, and that is the restricted question of the re-marriage of divorced persons.

In the second place we miss in the gospels the definition of collective duty. One of the strangest transitions of recent years and one to which Christian preaching has very imperfectly adjusted itself — still less Christian liturgy and hymnody — is the new sense of corporate guilt and corporate duty. The gospels have much to say about sin and repentance for the individual on his own account, but recently personal sin has gone out of style. This is partly due to our natural dislike of unpleasant subjects and partly to a new and baffling sense of corporate responsibility in which the individual easily shirks his part. The Christian world is perhaps no less appalled now with the sense of failure than were the sin-sensitive Puritans of early New England. Certainly Christendom has reason to be aware of its failure, but the gospels do not directly express this kind of corporate guilt. In the old question, What shall I do to be saved? the pronoun has been changed to the plural, What shall *we* do to be saved? The old terminology of personal sin does not suit this religious experience, and it only too easily enables us to get out from under it, by assigning the guilt to others rather than to ourselves. The war, we know now, was not the private misdeed of any one of us; therefore, since personal sin is the only kind we recognize, we put the blame for it entirely on other people. It is true that in Paul's views of the heritage of sin from Adam, Scripture supplies after a sort a sense of solidarity in guilt, and in Satan offers a form of supra-personal wickedness; but neither of these doctrines exactly meets our need. We lack in the gospel that solidarity of guilt, and still more that solidarity in repentance, which is the only hope of a transformed world.

In the third place we miss in the gospel the social motive. Few Christians and even few scholars realize how totally absent from the Synoptic teaching is the appeal to the social motive.

Social acts are often commended, but the motive appealed to is never the need of the neighbor. Even the parable of the Good Samaritan — the classic of modern social ideals — really illustrates this. From the question, Who is my neighbor? Jesus turns to the question, Who acts as neighbor? He emphasizes the evils that fall upon the perpetrator of social wrong. The hater jeopardizes his own soul; the rich man can scarcely enter the kingdom; the censorious and unforgiving suffer a punishment in kind. Not once in his extant teaching does Jesus appeal to the rights of other men, the duties which they may legitimately expect of a Christian. Jesus seemed to be always interested in the subject of a social act, not in the person who was its object. He aimed not directly at a saved society but at a society of savers. Perhaps this is social motive enough, the *noblesse oblige* of a spontaneous Christian conscience. It is possible that we are too much afraid of the motives of reward and punishment and that we lay too much stress on a kind of sentimental altruism as the main-spring of correct social action. But whether for better or worse, the social motive of Jesus, with its apparent individualism, is not the motive we are used to; and it is well to realize that nearly every familiar form of social ideal is conspicuous by its absence from the gospels.

These three illustrations suffice to show how really the gospel of Jesus needs translation if it is to meet the demands of our day. It is not merely that our social problems are different problems, it is that our whole approach is from a different angle. Even were our angle the same, some translation would be needed. In spite of its lack of explicit commands, one feels that the teaching of Jesus has certain principles which are as applicable to the problems of our time as they were to his own. But if we wish to find them out accurately and not merely to accept as Jesus' principles the ready formulas made by other men, that are neither scriptural nor accurate, we must submit to the labor of study and translation.

Let me illustrate with a familiar parallel. In these days of educational superficiality and so-called vocational efficiency, theological seminaries feel the pressure from students for the abandonment of the required study of Greek and Hebrew. Many

men who hope to maintain their self-respect in the ministry are apparently willing to accept the current English translations of the Bible, without knowing a jot or a tittle of the original tongues. On the merits of that controversy I will not speak, but in the matter for which that is a parable, the social translation of the gospel, no educated minister dare evade a study of the underlying basis. He cannot accept second-hand the work of others; he must study the life and teaching of Jesus; he must keep himself constantly qualified to consult the original, and as far as possible must live in its atmosphere and spirit.

Stated in another way the gist of what I am saying is this: — We believe that Jesus' attitude was to the problems of his time as the Christian's attitude should be to the problems of our time. But this is an algebraic proportion of four terms: $a : b = c : x$; and the unknown quantity we are seeking, namely, the true Christian's attitude today, can only be found if the other three terms are known.

So these three are the first objects of study; — the problems of Jesus' time, the attitude of Jesus to them, the problems of our time. Many who attempt to translate the gospel socially are satisfied to study the last of these three, but the other two factors, involving as they do research in ancient history and in the evangelic records, are at least equally important. To leave mathematics for linguistics and return to our metaphor of translation, they are the grammar and dictionary of the original language from which the translation is to be made. And every translator must know that original tongue. Those very modern preachers, who aim to be up to the minute with all the social theories and panaceas, current statistics and predigested propaganda, but have little thought for the problems of Jesus' day and the way he met them, are like one who in translating the Greek Testament into English, or into Hottentot, relies solely on his mastery of the modern language but bungles with the original.

This is not the place to describe that original language, — which is the study of Jesus' life and teaching. It is a very different idiom from our own; it smacks of the patois of Canaan.

It deals with publicans and sinners instead of Republicans and Democrats. One cannot find in the Sermon on the Mount either percentages of wool tariff or percentage of Americanism. But our interest is in these modern things, — in Boston, not in Bethsaida; in the American "legion," not in its Gadarene namesake. It may be well, therefore, to indicate briefly some of the leading factors in the gospel that seem particularly to need social translation, or that seem likely when so translated to help us deal soundly with the perplexing questions of our day.

First, we need to realize the moral earnestness of Jesus. It is perhaps not superfluous to remind you that Jesus' teaching deals not primarily with theology but with conduct. In contrast to the theologians who are called by his name, and unlike the picture they paint of him in their own image, Jesus' mind dealt not with speculative but with moral questions. Both implicitly and explicitly he stands for moral values. The bulk of his teaching deals with character, and in so far as the earliest gospels involve an attitude toward or estimate of himself, that too is moral.

And this same contrast with much of the religious thought of the church also holds between Jesus and the religious thought of his own day. He taught with authority, and not as the scribes, and this impression, made upon his contemporaries, was due to the same moral earnestness. He was marked by a confidence that was not dogmatism, by a sureness of touch that was born of interest in right conduct and of insight into moral values. His authority was the self-evident truth of his position — and it is this authority as tested by men's natural ability to "judge," as he said, "even of themselves what is right," that has given his moral teaching its extraordinary vitality so that after eighteen centuries it can influence men and win their respect.

This moral earnestness is revealed most strikingly in a negative way by the neutrality of Jesus. Not only is he happily silent on the many petty controversies of our day, but even to the issues of his own time he showed an independent, annoying, and even shocking indifference. To the burning ecclesias-

tical controversy on the legitimacy of Jerusalem or Gerizim as a place of worship, he is represented as giving a non-committal reply, which could be understood as 'both' or 'neither.' Similar appears to be his famous answer about tribute to Caesar. When it is a purely political matter—and therefore to the Zealots the most important issue—Jesus reminds them that their first duty is to God. Again when a matter of legal rights is raised, Jesus refuses to arbitrate—and yet how many people think law and rights are the essential factors of social salvation. No, in all these cases Jesus insists on the higher level and declines to debate or decide on the lower basis. Of course these questions involve moral issues, and much more obviously were the publicans and harlots, and the woman taken in adultery, suitable objects for moral decision. But with an independence of judgment that outraged both moral and social standards, Jesus appreciated the truer moral criterion.

I have spoken of this as the higher level, but from the viewpoint of character we must call it the deeper level. In questions of a man's right living the fundamental springs of character alone can be trusted. Jesus knew enough about whitewashed sepulchres and barren fig-trees to demand that men should give deeds as well as words—justice and mercy as well as tithes of garden vegetables, the second mile as well as the minimum of duty or compulsion. Out of the overflow of the heart the mouth speaketh. A change of heart is the only safe guarantee for the moral life.

Familiar as is to us the thoroughness of Jesus' ideal for a good life, we still scarcely recognize its revolutionary character, partly because it is so rarely illustrated in action and partly because it works in such unobtrusive ways. It explains, for example, a puzzle which I have already touched upon, the question why Jesus makes his approach to the individual rather than to the social system. The revolutionary dynamic in the truly converted man (and conversion is merely the religious euphemism for revolution) can move mountains or pull down the mighty from their seats and exalt those of low degree, and destroy and rebuild in three days the temples that forty and

six years have not completed. Those hard sayings in the Sermon on the Mount are neither oriental hyperboles to be explained away nor rules of casuistry to be literally observed. They are hints of the extraordinary effect on men's conduct when Jesus' revolutionary standards are set up and followed.

In the second place, it is of value for us today to realize that Jesus contributes to our social questions a distinctive method. One always finds it difficult to put his finger on the originality of Jesus. Our historians are only too eager to find that some rabbi or oriental sage or Greek philosopher anticipated Jesus in this point or that. But if there was anything original about his teaching it was in the matter of method rather than of aim. His aim was pure and lofty like that of many another, but his method was more perfectly fitted than theirs to that aim.

How many a worthy reform has failed through reliance on unworthy methods. The Jesuits are not the only ones who have yielded to the plea that the good end justifies the evil means. But Jesus, with a far-sightedness that our impatience finds it difficult to imitate, forged for his ends methods that were in harmony with them, and therefore he succeeded where others failed. The story of his temptation — a temptation to vindicate his divine vocation through material means, or through political means, or through showy advertising, is the graphic presentation of his victory over this subtle danger. He resolutely rejected as of Satan the adoption of evil means for good ends, and though it pointed to the way of the Cross, he felt bound to follow God's thoughts rather than men's.

But nothing more clearly reveals the uniqueness of Jesus' method, in comparison with that of other moral codes, both ancient and modern, than his attitude toward evil. No one will accuse Jesus of indifference toward, or compromise with, sin. His aim was as earnest as that of any reformer. His difference was in his treatment of sin's victims.

This method of Jesus in dealing with evil was, in a word, the overcoming of evil with good. Desiring as he did, not the punishment of wrong, nor the defence of right, as we use these terms, but the making right of him who is wrong, he exhibited a strange contrast with the methods of modern law, industry,

and politics. He was able to draw the line in both his teaching and conduct between rebuke and reviling, between judgment and censure. The present-day methods of dealing with evil Jesus habitually eschews. They are forms of *coercion*, by law, by violence, by external moral authority, by propaganda. Jesus relied on forms of *conversion*, by rebuke, by persuasion, by individual and inward conviction, and by love. Love still is the best expression of Jesus' chief social principle, though perhaps a less hackneyed word is reconciliation. His aim was to reconcile men to God, to each other, and to their lot in life. When two quarreling brothers asked him for justice in the settlement of an estate, he seems to be thinking of their reconciliation to each other by the expulsive power of an affection greater than love of money. There is never more hate between white and black in America, between Frenchman and German in Europe, than existed between Zealot and publican in Judea, but Jesus brought Levi the publican and Simon the Zealot to sit down at the same table. And Jesus won men to each other by first winning them to himself. One by one, slowly but irresistibly, he called men to himself; and they rose up and left all and followed him — the unstable Peter, the impetuous James and John, and many another who has not seen but yet has believed. In spite of their fifty theories of atonement, our theologians have never quite obscured the meaning of the cross as Jesus' great appeal to men. Having loved his own he loved them unto the end. Love was his only method. He had no second string to his bow. And in a sense by being lifted up he draws all men unto him.¹

Herein lies the basis of what was said about the thoroughness and the revolutionary effect of Jesus' teaching. This method, not of changing systems but of changing men, has well been called by the familiar term 'direct action.' Jesus aimed directly at the root of evil, the heart of men. He dealt, therefore, not with symptoms but with diseases. Compared with his method, our tinkering with the machinery of society, our coercion of unwilling masses, are but blundering and ineffective gestures. Without reconciliation between men, the evils of

¹ Compare Micklem, *The Galilean*, Chapters III, IV, V.

society will not be cured by political and economic expedients. The form of evil changes, but the evil nature crops out in another form. Slavery suppressed by force only makes way for the race problem. Militarism destroyed in one country by compulsion sows its seeds in other nations. Autocracy in government is succeeded by bolshevism or reappears in forms of industrial autocracy.

Whether Jesus was aware of the difference or not, he can at least teach our generation, if we listen to him, the real nature of our problems; and perhaps in our complex society we need more than anything else a deeper insight into our problems and an appreciation of the appropriate method for undertaking their solution. "People sometimes speak," says a modern writer,² "as if we could solve our international problems by some balancing of armies and navies, some satisfactory arrangements about tariffs and markets, some delimitation of frontiers. It is sometimes represented to us that we can solve our industrial problems by an adjustment of wages and hours and profits, and that the kingdom of heaven could be established on earth by a wise and eloquent law-giver. As well suggest that an unhappy and divided home can be healed by a more equitable division of the cake and an increased arm-chair service! Jesus enables us to see more deeply into things than that. For all these problems of politics and industry and economics are, in the last resort, problems of personal relationships; and there is no solution of them that is not in terms of personal reconciliation and understanding."

In speaking thus of the principles of Jesus, I have taken it for granted that they have some value today. Such an assumption should need no apology; perhaps it does need a word of explanation. I am not unmindful of the fact that there has been a disposition in the Christian world to give to this assumption — the validity of Jesus' ethics — much verbal assent and much virtual denial. I will not put all the blame for this habit of ignoring Jesus' teaching on the concentration of interest upon theological disputes — a phase that I trust is passing — though the new battle-ground of ethics does not promise any

² Micklem, *The Galilean*, p. 115.

easier conflict or any fewer dangers; yet theological orthodoxy certainly makes it easy for men to call Jesus, 'Lord, Lord' and do not the things that he says. The ethical sayings of Jesus are hard sayings, and still harder is the hardness of men's hearts.

I need not refer to the painful moratorium on Jesus' principles declared by Christian nations and many Christians during the war. Even before the war there was a tendency, and that in high theological circles, to evade Jesus' teaching and to evade it not merely in practice but even in theory. The excuse was the eschatology of Jesus, his expectation of the near end of the present age. And it excused us in two ways: either Jesus' teaching was intended for the millennium, giving counsels of perfection which need not be obeyed because the millennium has not yet come, or else his teaching was intended for the brief period supposed by him still to remain before his second coming, and so was not normal or even final, but merely *Interimsethik*.

Now there is little doubt that Jesus and his early followers did hold an expectation of a cataclysm at a near date, an expectation which subsequent events have not literally fulfilled. But I am not sure — and I think theologians are far less sure than they were in 1913 — that this confession invalidates the teaching of Jesus. Certainly they cannot criticize Jesus' ethics on both grounds at the same time. If it was for the interim only, it was not also for the millennium, and we need to protest against the loose thinking that wants to have it both ways at once. And besides, I am not sure that the expectation of a catastrophe necessarily spoils a man's ethics — whether for this age or for the age to come. This war has at least taught us to be a little more sympathetic with the apocalyptic mind. The theory of progress as a slow-moving development — a kind of escalator forever leading us upward — has been badly jolted. It might have been well if, instead of our modern evolutionary optimism, we had shared a little in the apocalyptic forethought and watchful anxiety of him who asked, "When the Son of Man cometh, shall he find faith on the earth?"

I have said that you cannot reject on two contradictory grounds the teaching of Jesus. But you can accept it on two

contradictory grounds, and in a sense both statements made about Jesus' teaching are true; it was meant to be the standard for the future kingdom of God, but (and here is the point which more careful study of the eschatological problem is bringing out) he also intended his followers to live by those principles here and now. He had no illusion about the environment in which they would live. He did not expect the disciples to find life easier in this stubborn world than their master had found it, but he expected them, without waiting for its fuller realization, to be the kind of people of whom the kingdom of God consists. Other people may have other standards, but the Christian is to live as though for him the kingdom of God had come. That is the way Jesus lived, and that is perhaps the sense in which, notwithstanding his usual reference to it as future, he sometimes spoke of the kingdom as already here. It will never be realized in all men until it is realized in some men. To those who lived by its standards it could be said prophetically: The kingdom of God is within you. Its principles are equally valid at all times for those who, like Jesus, look at life *sub specie aeternitatis*. Ethically at least, wherever the battle between good and evil is joined, the kingdom of God has already "come before its time."

Such a standard of conduct will not escape the charge from so-called "practical" men of being utopian, but once more the war has sobered us a little in our criticisms of Jesus as an unpractical idealist. I am not impressed with the good results of the war, but undoubtedly one of its results is an enhanced appreciation of ideals as compared with grape-shot. Life guided by the standards of a better future seems, in the light of large-scale experiments in the reverse, more likely to bring that future than is an accommodation of Christian ethics to the standards of *Weltmacht*. In unexpected quarters men are urging that the principles of Jesus be practised now without waiting for the millennium. Perhaps no startling increase has been made to the number of those, who from the sheer attractiveness of Jesus' program, accept with insight and courage the challenge of the late Professor Rauschenbusch, Dare we be Christians? There are, however, many who out of mere fear for the material

and spiritual benefits of civilization grudgingly admit that we dare not be anything else. And, whatever the motive, we cannot regret that for divers reasons the good news of the kingdom is widely preached.

I have returned now to the thought with which I began — the demand for an application of Jesus' principles to the social problems of today. I have spoken of the moral earnestness of Jesus, his neutrality to controversial issues when an attempt was made to put them on a lower plane, his method of thoroughness and individual approach. I have emphasized the moral harmony between means and end, which in his life and teaching made the method as significant as the aim itself. I should like to have spoken of other features in his career, especially his position as a member of the minority and his martyrdom, and the social translation of these qualities in our age, when it is hard for respectable Christians to be effective minorities and martyrs. But I have said enough to indicate why the task of translating the gospel socially is one that is worthy of exceptional mental powers, exceptional moral earnestness, exceptional fidelity and honesty. Translation in the case of books in foreign languages too often means expurgation, paraphrase, — the watering down of the original to the effete or prudish tastes of our day. The social translation of the gospel must be accurate and unadulterated, true to the spirit of Jesus, and never shrinking to declare the whole counsel of God.

What that translation must be, how literally the original idiom can be reproduced, I have not attempted to declare. I have tried only to emphasize the importance of knowing that original thoroughly and to suggest a few characteristic elements of that idiom which must not be overlooked by any translator. The actual translation is the further task of trained students and teachers, "workmen that need not to be ashamed, rightly handling the word of truth." As title to such a translation, over such a transmuting of the gospel of Jesus into a life of saintliness and perfect social adjustment, the devout Christian may write as a motto the quaint words from the title-page of our English Bible: "Translated out of the original tongues and with the former translations diligently compared and revised."

KING JOHN AND THE NORMAN CHURCH

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No one has ever really doubted the oft-asserted theory that no part of the middle ages can be studied apart from the Christian Church. All-embracing in its influence from the fall of Rome to the Reformation, it is generally conceded to have reached its zenith during the pontificate of Innocent III, not only because of the perfection of its organization at that time but also by reason of its readiness under his leadership to take issue with any or all of the secular powers of Europe over a variety of questions which, in only too many instances, had little obvious connection with the Christian faith. Its ambitions were large but, by methods which were sometimes unscrupulous, they were almost always realized.

At the beginning of the thirteenth century, northwestern Europe was still deeply engrossed in the century-old struggle between France and England for the control of the English lands in France. Under John Lackland, king of England and duke in Normandy, the principal bone of contention between these two great secular powers was Normandy. It was also a potential battleground for the forces of church and state. On the one hand, John had behind him nearly three hundred years of unbroken precedent for the maintenance of his prerogative rights against the claims of the Norman clergy; on the other, Innocent III and his representatives had with them the present power and the future destiny of the church, in addition to the experience gained in many a successful contest of a similar nature in other parts of Europe.¹

Necessarily the two conflicts had many points of contact.² The support of the clergy would have been a material aid in the struggle against Philip Augustus; an undisputed title in his Norman duchy would have put John beyond the reach of his clerical enemies. Indeed it seems clear that by a proper grouping of the various forces which were from time to time

under his control, John might have been victorious against both the French king and the Roman pontiff.³ Neither John nor Philip Augustus, however, fully appreciated the extent of the papal power. The latter was willing to suffer the interdict throughout France rather than arrange his domestic affairs in accordance with the most common rules of morality;⁴ the former continued to exploit financially the clergy, whom he robbed and assaulted with direct violence whenever the occasion presented itself.⁵ Philip Augustus, first to feel the weight of papal censure, was the first to bring himself to formal submission, and, from one point of view, Aquitaine, Maine, Anjou, and Toulouse, as well as Normandy, constituted his reward.⁶ John, on the other hand, having lost in his struggle with Philip, inevitably lost in his struggle with Innocent as well, and in the end held his kingdom as a papal fief, and his crown as a concession from his barons.

Normandy, during the period in which John was its ruler, was the center of both conflicts;⁷ and in both the part played by the clergy was of the utmost importance. They had much to lose in a long-continued military campaign,⁸ but their possessions in England exposed them to reprisals on a large scale on the part of their English overlord. In any case there would be no permanent change of masters in Normandy until they were firmly convinced that such a change would be for their benefit; once that idea was in their minds, there could be no alternative. The growth of that conviction can not be ascribed to any one man or to any one event, but was rather a natural concomitant of the situation in which the Norman Church found itself. It was an institution of a peculiar character, rich and powerful, yet subjected to a very real control by its secular lord, a man who proved himself to be at once faithless, tactless, and exceedingly able.⁹ On the other hand, it was supported in its every assertion of independence by the most powerful pope of the middle ages. Under such circumstances, a survey of the distinctive characteristics of the Norman Church together with an examination of the abilities and careers of some of its more distinguished leaders can not fail to have points of interest not only for the history of the several

political units involved but also for the general problem of church and state.

The Norman clergy, from the time of the council of Lillebonne in the last quarter of the eleventh century, had accustomed themselves to a degree of ducal control not realized elsewhere in Europe in the same period. Because of the fact that the protection of all religious houses and establishments was an exclusive possession of the duke, they had avoided the close dependence upon the feudal lord in the rôle of *avoué* or *vidame* which characterized their colleagues in the rest of Europe, only to bring themselves even more completely under the supervision of their overlord.¹⁰ They could maintain their relations with the pope, whether by means of his legates or by attendance at his councils, only at the ducal discretion. The tradition that the Conqueror had threatened to hang to the highest tree any monk who dared obey a papal legate was still alive after a century and a half.¹¹ Papal legates could not travel through the duchy without ducal permission, much less could they exercise their legatine functions within its borders.¹² On occasion the Norman clergy might be allowed to attend great councils at Rheims and elsewhere, but even then only with the ducal consent, accompanied, it might be, by ducal advice and instructions.¹³

The most important restriction upon the church, however, concerned appointments to ecclesiastical offices. The right of free election existed in name only.¹⁴ In theory the duke proposed, the chapter or monastery elected, and the bishop consecrated; in practice, the clergy ascertained the will of the prince and carried it out.¹⁵ If the theory was allowed to conflict with the practice, a disputed election was the result, and was no infrequent occurrence.¹⁶ In no case, however, did the duke admit the principle involved. Even Henry II, fresh from the spectacular humiliation of Avranches,¹⁷ caused his nominee to be placed upon the archiepiscopal throne.¹⁸ An inquest of the time of Philip Augustus states that the men of that day did not know whether he had acted by right or not, but no one had forgotten the event.¹⁹ Furthermore, the duke claimed the revenues of vacant sees, confiscated the personal property of the

last incumbent, sometimes before breath had left the body, and yielded the regalia to the bishop-elect at his own convenience.²⁰

Taken as a whole, it is hard to see how the Norman Church could have been more completely in the hands of the Norman duke.²¹ In the matter of clerical elections the restrictions were particularly burdensome, although it seems that the duke might well have been considered to have a legitimate interest in them. Here the Norman practice was in direct variance with the theory and even with the fundamental needs of the church. It was to be expected that some one would be found to take up in Normandy the struggle which Gregory VII did not find the opportunity to extend into the Anglo-norman state.

That no outbreak had occurred earlier for the purpose of making the condition of the Norman Church approximate that of the rest of the continent argues well, on the whole, for the wisdom and moderation of her dukes, or, at least, for their ability. Church and state seem to have worked together during a large part of the history of the duchy, and with surprisingly little friction. The two had coöperated in the enforcement of the Truce of God;²² they had settled peacefully, if not with entire mutual satisfaction, the perplexing problem of conflicting jurisdictions, both of person and of subject. The early dukes had called church councils and had enforced their decrees.²³ Even when excessive delay in the clerical courts made ducal interference imperative, care had been taken to protect the financial interests of the clerical officers.²⁴

On the other hand, the Norman Church was a highly privileged institution, however much it might be subjected to ducal control at specific points. Her prelates had always taken a considerable part in the secular affairs of the duchy; their learning, in an illiterate age, made them indispensable for both clerical and legal matters.²⁵ They were in a large measure exempt from military obligations, but not from the feudal payments and military service due from their holdings.²⁶ Church land was held by a special tenure, which was exceedingly advantageous.²⁷ Furthermore, the eight generations which followed the Conqueror had indulged in an ever-increasing stream of benevolent bequests and gifts, each baron striving

with the rest to build for himself and his house an abbey or a church of imposing proportions. With these material gifts came exemptions, valuable financial concessions, special privileges of every kind.²⁸ Crusaders pledged their lands to monastic houses for a modest sum with which to defray the expenses of the voyage and never returned to redeem their possessions, as nearly all of the cartularies of the period will testify. Even the dukes were generous benefactors as well as powerful protectors.

The church, however, was gaining a constitution, as were the contemporaneous monarchical states; the Norman clergy found in the character and activities of John only a convenient occasion for the inevitable struggle. Political causes made the Norman phase of the conflict brief, but it was a phase of great importance not only for the loss of Normandy and for the French monarchy which benefited thereby, but also for England. England saw little else in the decade which followed the loss of the duchy, and the struggle of 1215 was closely connected with it.

Neither Richard nor John, the last of the Anglo-Norman dukes, had any intention of giving up aught of the control which their predecessors had exercised over the Norman clergy, nor did they mean to yield an inch to papal claims which they considered to be incompatible with their honor and with what they were pleased to call the custom of the land.

Richard, although his conduct was far from ideal,²⁹ showed himself more kindly toward the church than did his brother. The most liberal statement of church privileges in Normandy dates from the early years of his reign.³⁰ His gifts,³¹ both in life and in death,³² his crusade, perhaps more than all else his frequent participation in the services of the church,³³ bear witness that he treated it as something more than a mere source of revenue and a quarrelsome neighbor. Still, he treated the clergy upon conquered lands with violence.³⁴ He was not afraid to treat the bishop of Beauvais as a warrior when that prelate abandoned his episcopal character for martial deeds.³⁵ He taxed his own clergy in defiance of established custom.³⁶ When the question of the Norman defence was at stake he

would brook interference from no one. Château Gaillard was built on the land of the church and in the face of clerical opposition.³⁷

John was a different type of man, and he pursued a different policy. At times generous enough,³⁸ he usually looked upon the clergy as a part of the royal demesne, capable of almost unlimited exploitation upon need. He enriched himself from the revenues of vacant sees, and abused his rights of hospitality in the monastic houses.³⁹ Frankly contemptuous of the most sacred of religious rites, he set the key-note of his reign by scoffing at the ceremonies of his investiture; he habitually absented himself from mass.⁴⁰ Innocent III, his patience exhausted by insult heaped upon injury, wrote him a letter fairly bristling with indignation; its contents warrant the belief that John had gone out of his way to humiliate and disgrace his clergy.⁴¹

The question of free elections, as always, was the crucial point. Again and again John insisted upon what he deemed his prerogative, not hesitating to support with violence and a squad of cutthroats demands which he could obtain in no other way. If the conflict had been confined to Normandy, he would undoubtedly have overcome all opposition, for even Walter of Coutances never dared meet his monarch on this point, whether because of a guilty conscience, fear of expulsion from his chair, or other reasons, we know not. The church's contention, however, was a broad one, dear to her heart and fundamental to her very existence. Innocent III was its eager champion.

The essential viciousness of John, the stubborn resistance of the local clergy, the reliance of the provincial church upon the strong arm of the pope, all were clearly revealed time and again in the struggle, but they were displayed most forcibly in the disputed election of Sééz of 1202-03, an event which was at once closely connected with the loss of Normandy and a vivid illustration of the spirit of the Norman clergy which made that event possible. A simple narrative will throw the underlying principles into clear relief.⁴²

Bishop Lisiard of Sééz died in September in the year 1201, and the canons of the cathedral, before notifying the arch-

bishop of Rouen or the duke of his death, agreed among themselves, at a meeting of the chapter called by their prior, to elect as his successor one of their own number. The last two incumbents had alienated a large portion of the wealth of the church of Séez, and the canons thought that some one who had suffered because of the resulting poverty of the chapter would be more apt to bend his efforts toward the conservation of their remaining property than any other person whom they might elect.⁴³ They not only took solemn oath to carry out this decision but swore also to excommunicate any or all who should fail to do so.

These preliminary matters having been settled, the prior and two companions set out for Rouen to notify the archbishop and the duke of the vacancy in the see of Séez. They undoubtedly requested at the same time the usual permission to proceed to an election, but without success. Their return to Séez was followed almost immediately by the arrival of messengers from John with instructions for the chapter to elect the dean of Lisieux as their bishop.⁴⁴ Now the dean of Lisieux was a member of a family which the canons of Séez had reason to consider as their enemy;⁴⁵ the determination to elect their own candidate became even more fixed.

The royal messengers proposed as an alternative that the chapter should nominate six men, three of them to be outside the ranks of the clergy of Séez, the duke to choose one from the group for subsequent election. The chapter met and deliberated upon the proposition, but the five nominees upon whom they fixed were all members of the clergy of Séez and included the prior and Sylvester the archdeacon. In obedience to ducal summons, but with little enthusiasm, the prior and seven of the canons, armed with the full power of the chapter, went to Argentan to meet their sovereign.⁴⁶ The interview, as might have been expected, amounted to nothing. The delegates of the chapter insisted that the bishop-elect should be one of their number; John held out for his first choice, the dean of Lisieux.

It was evident by this time that there was destined to be a trial of strength between duke and chapter. For such a struggle

plenty of precedents were at hand in Norman history, and the annals of this diocese itself could supply several examples.⁴⁷ Five days after the return from Argentan ducal officials arrived with the obvious purpose of forcing the canons by violence to do the royal will. The prior instantly appealed to Rome. John answered by confiscating the cathedral treasure. He quartered his soldiers in the dormitories of the canons, evicted the families and servants of the canons from their dwellings in the vicinity of the chapter house, and took measures whereby the canons themselves could be starved into submission. The prior responded with all the devices at his disposal. He threw the entire diocese under the interdict, left a few canons to guard the cathedral itself, and led the rest, preceded by the cross, to a safe refuge in a neighboring monastery.

Such action was, of course, an insuperable obstacle to John's plans. He therefore instructed the archbishop to cause the canons to return in peace to their cathedral, and said that he had no further interest in the whole matter. The prior met him halfway by raising the interdict which he had placed upon the diocese.

In the early part of 1202, Walter of Coutances, archbishop of Rouen, took a hand in the matter by calling the Séez chapter to Rouen. He offered his advice for the settlement of their difficulties, but was forced to admit that he was unable to absolve them from their own oath. The prior and the larger part of the chapter actually elected R. du Mesle as bishop, but the archbishop either could not or would not confirm the election. The only alternative was an appeal to Rome, and the prior, accompanied by the elect and a few comrades, set out upon the long journey in order that they might plead their case in person before Innocent III.

Before they were beyond the boundaries of France they were overtaken by royal messengers with a new proposal. This time the duke wished them to elect Herbert, son of Ralph Labbé, a man well known to them and to all Normandy because of the high position and the oppressive actions of his father. They paid but scant attention to this final request of their duke and proceeded on their journey. As they were crossing the Alps,

however, the bishop-elect died, whereupon the prior and his companions held an election on the spot, naming this time the archdeacon Sylvester.

Meanwhile John was asserting his rights over the temporalities of the diocese.⁴⁸ In late February he caused the remaining canons to elect as their bishop Herbert, the son of Ralph Labbé.⁴⁹ No attempt was made to obtain archiepiscopal confirmation of the election, but Herbert and his party sent a rival deputation to Rome. At the same time, by threat of reprisals upon Italian merchants at the channel ports, John made it as difficult as possible for the prior and his companions to travel toward their goal.⁵⁰

In June, after some deliberation and a careful examination of the evidence presented, Innocent III decided in favor of the claims of Sylvester and confirmed his election. His opponents within the diocese, even including the rival bishop-elect, accepted this decision and apparently considered the incident closed, but John was in no mood to accept a papal decision, even in a matter which was so clearly within the papal jurisdiction. In August of the same year he still pretended to be ignorant of the pope's confirmation, and was at that time still attempting by threats the intimidation of the remnants of the *Seéz* clergy.⁵¹ He made a direct accusation of immorality against Sylvester, and forbade his prelates to consecrate as bishop a man so surely destined in his eyes to disgrace the entire church.⁵²

A letter from Innocent in the early part of 1203 brought him partially to his senses by recounting his offences against the church and informing him of the penalty which would be visited upon further delay in regard to the bishop of *Sééz*. Even then, however, John would not allow Sylvester to enter his diocese, although he did put a stop to any further persecution of its clergy. Innocent replied with a threat of the interdict over the whole of Normandy if within the space of one month Sylvester were not given his full rights. This did not produce immediate results, but in August Sylvester received a safe-conduct for a conference with the archbishop.⁵³ In October, with bad grace and admitting nothing, John at last

directed his seneschal that Sylvester should be admitted to the see in which he had long since been confirmed by the pope.⁵⁴ A more cogent reason, however, for abandoning the Sééz affair than the threats of Innocent III was the outbreak of war with Philip Augustus. Indeed it is not at all sure that Sylvester actually succeeded in taking over the rights and duties of his office until the catastrophe of 1203-04 had made the duchy French.⁵⁵ At any rate, John gave the necessary orders; whether or not they were executed in the troublous days between October 1203 and the spring of 1204 is problematical.⁵⁶

The whole incident shows clearly the firm determination of John to submit to no interference in what he deemed his prerogative rights in regard to clerical elections. Here he was following the precedents of his ancestors.⁵⁷ It also shows the lengths to which he was willing to go in order to carry out his ideas. More important, it shows the character of the opposition that he was sure to meet. The Norman clergy not only had a lofty conception of their rights and privileges, but were ready to take up the fight in their own defence even if the archbishop was not. Experience had taught them that they could at least depend upon the constant support of the pope; they were as ready as he to use the final arguments of the church, interdict and excommunication, against the persecution of the secular authority. In 1104-05 the Norman clergy was of considerable aid in making the duchy English;⁵⁸ they saw no reason to exert themselves a century later to prevent it from becoming French.

A separate discussion might well be devoted to the theory and practice of the papacy, as exemplified by Innocent III and his relations with John and the Norman clergy. Tireless in his energy, no detail of church organization seems to have been small enough to escape his attention, while on the other hand he was engrossed in secular affairs with a thoroughness which would have required the exclusive attention of a man of lesser ability. It is a commonplace of historical knowledge that Innocent III had world-wide interests and that his voice was listened to with obedience in all parts of Christendom, but only the study of a collection of his correspondence can convey any

adequate idea of the extent of his activities and the minute detail of which his chancery was capable.⁵⁹

In the first place, he took an active part in the management of the province of Rouen, now directing the archbishop to extend his powers, now urging him to stand firm against his opponents. Sometimes it was the relation of bishop and chapter toward which he directed his attention;⁶⁰ again, it was the relative power of bishop and archbishop;⁶¹ at another time, it was the question of the general customs and efficiency of the church.⁶² Whatever the occasion, he always supported the clerical claims and power in the highest forms of their expression,⁶³ striving at the same time to maintain the episcopal system on which his own influence depended,⁶⁴ and to keep a watchful eye on the daily life and routine of the clergy.

In the second place, he endeavored to keep France and England at peace as long as possible, bending all available energy toward the restoration of peace the moment war actually broke out. In this connection he used the full power of the church, both for the purpose of making his own wishes known and in order to obtain a respectful hearing for his legates.⁶⁵ In attempting to settle the disputes of Philip and John and to prevent impending war between them, he made a sharp distinction between feudal law and a higher code of right and wrong, of which he considered himself the supreme administrator.⁶⁶ He nearly succeeded in establishing the papacy as an international tribunal by which the natural laws of justice might be administered for the growing states of Europe. With a few striking successes in the art of peace-making, Innocent III could have clothed his large concept of his office with a compelling reality which able successors to the papal throne could have made permanent. As it was, the experience of England showed the possibilities of papal interference in national affairs in the decade following the loss of Normandy. In connection with Anglo-French rivalry in Normandy, however, it can not be said that his efforts were followed by great results. War was in the air and neither of the secular princes concerned had any illusions as to the necessity of obeying the dictates of

Rome in such matters. Still the influence of Innocent was not negligible, and it was solidly for peace.

Finally, he was keenly interested in the prevention of secular oppression of ecclesiastical foundations and in the restoration to the church of the right of free election to ecclesiastical offices.⁶⁷

The relations between Innocent III and John were, on the whole, cordial,⁶⁸ whether because he loved John more or Philip Augustus less is not quite clear. He undoubtedly preferred to see John retain the possession of his hereditary lands on the continent. On at least one occasion he protected John's tenure by visiting ecclesiastical penalties upon all rebels.⁶⁹ In 1203, however, when the question became critical, the need of enlisting John's aid against the recalcitrant Philip was for the time being removed.⁷⁰ Furthermore, John's actions in the years immediately preceding had given too many indications of the sort of treatment at his hands which the church must continue to expect. By this time Innocent's letters to John had changed their tone. In the beginning they had been entirely friendly; later they became the admonitions of a father to a wayward son; by 1202-03, they were, as has been shown in the Sécz dispute, direct demands accompanied by threats.

When the crisis actually came, the mind of Innocent was apparently still open. He was content that the Norman clergy should let forces already in action take their normal course. The matter of secular allegiance may have seemed small to a man whose rule knew neither political nor geographical boundaries;⁷¹ possibly he saw in the French solution of the Norman question the only avenue to peace.⁷² He wrote to the Norman clergy in answer to their request for advice as to the situation which confronted them, but the letter was wholly lacking in the decisiveness which habitually characterized his correspondence.⁷³ He professed inability to advise them concerning their allegiance, and left their future action to their own initiative. Perhaps he thought he could go no farther, in view of his recent support of John; at any rate he laid the burden of the decision upon the persons who alone could make it intelligently, men who were at the same time in such a position that he could not

effectively combat their judgment. No more striking indication of John's loss of prestige in the eyes of his clergy could be given than is contained in what appears to have been a complete and immediate change of loyalty on the part of a body of men who should have formed the most conservative element in the duchy. It is of additional significance that this action was carried out without the leadership upon which these same men were accustomed to rely.

A man whose connection with the Norman clergy and their royal master was even more intimate is to be found in Walter of Coutances, archbishop of Rouen.⁷⁴ Certainly the most able Norman prelate of the Plantagenet period, he had to be reckoned with in both church and state during the generation or more in which he occupied the archiepiscopal chair. English in origin,⁷⁵ he rose rapidly in the favor of the English kings and in the ranks of the clergy. Canon at Rouen, a clerk for both Henrys, chaplain and archdeacon in England, treasurer at Rouen, bishop of Lincoln, archbishop of Rouen, he was also upon occasion an envoy of his sovereign,⁷⁶ a crusader, a confounder of heresy,⁷⁷ and for three years chief justiciar⁷⁸ and acting chancellor of England. Furthermore, he was a scholar and a man of letters of more than ordinary distinction.⁷⁹

If he resembled Thomas Becket in his relations with the English king and in the zeal he displayed in the administration of his province,⁸⁰ he differed notably from that unfortunate prelate in his moderation at critical moments and in the success which seems always to have crowned his efforts. He allowed Richard to address him with a tone of authority that Becket would not have tolerated,⁸¹ yet he resisted the encroachments of both Philip Augustus and Richard, powerful kings as they were, with all the resources at his command.⁸² The circumstances in which he found himself may offer a partial explanation. On the one hand, Innocent III was always at his elbow with advice and encouragement.⁸³ Every assertion of his ecclesiastical power, every protest against secular aggression brought a confirmatory, if not an immediate, response from the pope.⁸⁴ On the other hand, inasmuch as Philip Augustus and Richard were continuously either at war or on the point of war, there

was always an opportunity for the exercise of skillful statesmanship, in the course of which the church might gain something. He did not hesitate to seek safety in flight when the forces of the opposition united, but he generally succeeded in exacting indemnities from both parties at a later date.

As primate of Normandy⁸⁵ he exacted unquestioning obedience from his suffragans,⁸⁶ held his canons to a strict accounting,⁸⁷ and dealt effectively with the unruly burgesses of his cathedral city.⁸⁸ He allowed ducal supervision of his court when it held pleas of the sword, and apparently without protest,⁸⁹ but he secured from the duke in 1190 the most liberal statement of the privileges of the church to be found in this period.⁹⁰ With the pope his relations were not always pleasant, but their only real difference was over the question of the transfer of a certain bishop-elect from one diocese to another, a question upon which the church law had never been determined.⁹¹ In this episode he shared both the guilt and the punishment with the archbishop of Tours.

The relations between archbishop and duke were, on the whole, friendly.⁹² He supported Richard against the intrigues of his brother, and was an active agent in the collection of Richard's ransom during the German captivity of that prince. His will reveals the fact that he himself contributed heavily to the necessary funds.⁹³ He excommunicated the enemies of John after the latter's accession,⁹⁴ though he assumed a neutral position in the final struggle.

On two occasions, however, he stoutly resisted what he deemed to be unlawful abridgment of his ecclesiastical functions. When he returned from Germany in 1195 he found that the document containing the terms of a peace just concluded between Richard and Philip Augustus awaited his seal.⁹⁵ On examining its contents, he found a clause which would subject his further use of the interdict to the approval of a commission of four priests or deacons appointed for that purpose.⁹⁶ It was an ingenious scheme, and similar to one which Walter himself approved in connection with the episcopal control of cathedral chapters,⁹⁷ but it fell through. Walter would have nothing to do with the treaty, excommunicated all who had

any part in it, and retired to voluntary exile at Cambrai, with which church the church at Rouen had an agreement with a mutual provision for hospitality in such cases.⁹⁸ Both monarchs eventually gave up the scheme to which he objected, called him back virtually on his own terms, and granted him, with what grace they could muster, the indemnities which he demanded.⁹⁹

The other important occasion upon which Walter came into unpleasant relations with his ducal master concerned the erection of Château Gaillard.¹⁰⁰ The rock of Le Grand Andeli was situated upon an archiepiscopal manor. Because of its fortification by Richard, Walter threw all of Normandy under the interdict and appealed to Rome. He even went to Rome in person to plead his case.¹⁰¹ The pope, however, Celestine III, grasped more clearly than Walter the elements of the dispute. He held that Richard was justified in erecting necessary fortifications within the boundaries of his realm and advised Walter to settle the matter by arbitration.¹⁰² The pope removed the interdict and Walter proceeded to the most favorable bargain possible with Richard. He exchanged the rock of Le Grand Andeli for other lands which were distinctly more valuable, gaining nearly five hundred livres of revenue by the transaction.¹⁰³ Later, under John, the whole affair was reopened. John eventually confirmed the original grant and included the settlement of various minor differences between himself and Walter.¹⁰⁴ In both documents Walter gained more than he lost; in the latter case he was himself immensely pleased with the result.¹⁰⁵

The force of his defeat in the affair of Château Gaillard was considerably broken by an episode connected with it. The Norman clergy had supported Richard from the beginning, and Walter, upon his return from Rome, reckoned with them separately. They gave back their mitres and did penance for having refused to enforce the interdict which Walter had proclaimed. In the end he restored them to their sees in the midst of much pomp and ceremony and forgave their offence.¹⁰⁶

The activities of Walter of Coutances were everywhere accompanied by a liberal use of ecclesiastical penalties, especially

the interdict and excommunication. In this matter he can hardly be said to have exceeded his authority or to have differed from his colleagues in other parts of Europe, but the statistics are nevertheless impressive.¹⁰⁷ Indeed, the enforcement of the interdict tended always to be spasmodic and far from thorough. Even for the clergy its terms had to be somewhat relaxed; they celebrated mass in their empty churches, behind closed doors, with hushed voices, and with stilled bells.¹⁰⁸ This weapon was the most powerful in the papal arsenal; to use it frequently was almost inevitably to abuse it.¹⁰⁹ The history of England from 1204 to 1215 affords ample proof that it still retained force, but the loss of Normandy marks the formation of national states, and against the national state, even in its comparatively undeveloped thirteenth-century form, the interdict was destined to prove ineffective. The excessive use of this weapon by Walter of Coutances does not indicate lack of wisdom or squandering of the resources of the church;¹¹⁰ it does reveal the relationship then fast springing up between the church and the national states into which its territory was being divided.

In the great crisis of Norman history Walter does not seem to have been vitally interested or much disturbed.¹¹¹ A true mediaeval churchman, statesman, and scholar, a skilled administrator and a clever politician, despite the fact that his life had been the chief source of whatever unity the duchy possessed in the last two decades of English rule,¹¹² he took no active part in the event which must have appeared, even to him, a turning point in the fortunes of the land in which he lived. Having avoided nearly all connection with the Séz dispute, he may have thought it unnecessary to take issue with John in the events which accompanied it. The pope and the Norman clergy were sufficiently aroused, and he may well have preferred the rôle of the neutral observer. On the other hand, he can not have been insensible to the issues at stake, and at bottom his sympathies were sure to be solidly with his clergy. He offered no opposition to the change. In any event the transfer of allegiance from one king to another can have assumed little importance in the eyes of a man who had defied each in turn, who already owed allegiance to both by the law

of the land, and by the custom of the church little real service to either.¹¹³

There is no evidence that the clergy of Normandy looked to Philip Augustus as a protector, but they could hardly fail to see that his professed attitude toward the church was infinitely superior to that taken by John. The actual treatment of the clergy by Philip in the conquered portions of Normandy may well have set them thinking.¹¹⁴ Normandy could have been saved only by a struggle, and the clergy saw no reason to exert influence in that direction. Even Innocent III saw that he could no longer guard John's continental dominions for him. His letter to the Norman clergy in connection with the loss of Normandy was devised to acknowledge a *fait accompli* without appearing to change front.¹¹⁵ He postulates in it a state of mind in the Norman clergy which was, if not favorable to Philip Augustus, at least highly antagonistic to John. One can assert with confidence that the Norman Church was an important factor in the complex situation which made the loss of Normandy inevitable; at the very least, the Norman Church willingly permitted that event to take place.

NOTES

1. The principal sources for the history of the Norman Church under Richard and John are to be found among the following: Appropriate volumes of the *Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France*, ed. Martin Bouquet, new edition by L. Delisle, Paris, 1869-1904 (cited as *H. F.*); *Gallia Christiana*, ed. P. Piolin, xi (Rouen), Paris, 1874; *Sacrorum Conciliorum Nova Collectio*, ed. J. D. Mansi, xxii, Venice, 1778; C.-J. Hefele, *Histoire des conciles d'après les documents originaux*, ed. H. Leclercq, Paris, 1915, v, 2; *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, ed. R. Jaffé, Berlin, 1851, also A. Potthast, Berlin, 1873, i; *Concilia Rotomagensis Provinciae*, ed. Bessin, Rouen, 1717; *Patrologiae Cursus Completus*, ed. J.-P. Migne, ccxiv-ccxvii (Letters of Innocent III); *Le cartulaire normand de Philippe-Auguste*, etc., ed. L. Delisle, in *Mémoires de la société des antiquaires de Normandie*, xvi, Paris, 1852; English chancery rolls, patent rolls, charter rolls, etc., see C. Gross, *The Sources and Literature of English History*, London, 1915; *Calendar of documents preserved in France illustrative of the history of Great Britain and Ireland*, ed. J. H. Round, i, *Rolls series*, London, 1899; *Historiae Normannorum Scriptores Antiquae*, ed. A. Duchesne, Paris, 1619; *Antiquus Cartularius Ecclesiae Baiocensis*, ed. V. Bourrienne, Paris, 1902-03 (cited as *Livre Noir*); and elsewhere, notably in the unpublished cartularies of Normandy, see H. Stein, *Bibliographie générale des cartulaires français*, Paris, 1907, for descriptions and repositories.

The Norman Church in the years immediately preceding 1204 has never been adequately studied. Incidental and scattered material may be found in F. M. Powicke, *The Loss of Normandy*, Manchester, 1913; Professor Haskins has dealt thoroughly with the Norman Church in the time of Henry II in his *Norman Institutions*, Cambridge, 1918, and has constructed a guide to the archive materials for the history of ducal Normandy (Appendix A) which is indispensable for all subsequent investigation. The *Histoire littéraire de la France*, Paris, 1733-1914, abounds in biographical material. One may also consult especially the following: A. Luchaire, *Innocent III, les royautés vasales du Saint-Siège*, Paris, 1908; H. Böhmer, *Kirche und Staat*, Leipzig, 1899; E. B. Krehbiel, *The Interdict*, Washington, 1909; K. Norgate, *John Lackland*, London, 1902; F. M. Powicke, "Archbishop of Rouen and Philip Augustus," *English Historical Review*, xxvii.

The relations of church and state in Normandy which arose from the special problem of the administration of justice have been separately studied in connection with the judicial institutions of the duchy on the eve of the French conquest, and are not dealt with in the present paper.

2. Powicke, 266, for the problem of ducal and archiepiscopal boundaries which did not coincide. The complications in time of hostilities, either secular or ecclesiastical, may be imagined.

3. This would have involved friendly relations with Innocent III, at whatever cost, and the rallying of the Norman baronage and church to the fight against the Frenchman by concessions and by popular leaders. It would have been a costly procedure for John, but both barons and clergy took as much or more by force a little later. The financial and military problems could not have been solved by this method, but their logical consequences could have been delayed.

4. A. Cartellieri, *Philipp II. August*, iii, Paris, 1910, pp. 57 ff.; R. Davidsohn, *Philipp II. August von Frankreich und Ingeborg*, Stuttgart, 1888.

5. Matthew Paris, *Chronica Majora*, *Rolls series*, 1874, ii, 484; *infra*, pp. 38 ff.

6. Philip Augustus could hardly have held these lands in the face of a concerted opposition on the part of both clergy and pope.

7. England did not become involved in the struggle with the pope until the disputed election at Canterbury in 1205, after the loss of the duchy.

8. Powicke, 169, for the sufferings of the church due to the Anglo-French wars in Normandy; also Round, No. 67; *Ymagines historiarum*, Ralph de Diceto, *Rolls series*, London, 1876, ii, 144, for effect of the wars upon Rouen. L. Delisle, *Étude sur l'agriculture et la classe agricole en Normandie*, Évreux, 1851, p. 631, asserts that war had been continuous in Normandy since the time of Stephen, the reigns of Richard and John being by far the worst; R. Genestal, *Rôle des monastères comme établissements de crédit; étudié en Normandie*, Paris, 1901, p. 196, for the sufferings of the abbeys as seen in their activities as credit agents.

9. John's interest in the business of government and his skill as an administrator are everywhere patent in the chronicles and chancery enrollments, yet both contemporaries and modern scholars have differed radically in their judgement of his ability as a ruler. Matthew Paris, ii, 478-479, *H. F.*, xvii, 260 ff., *H. F.*, xxiv, 761-762, and *Chronicon Anglicanum*, Ralph of Coggeshall, *Rolls series*, London, 1875, pp. 37-38, should be compared with Matthew Paris, ii, 481-482, 489, and Gervase of Canterbury, ii, 96, *Rolls series*. W. Stubbs, *Historical Introductions to the Rolls Series*, ed. A. Hassall, London, 1902, p. 251, for the classical denunciation of John; cf. J. R. Green, *History of the English People*, i, London, 1881, p. 230, for the opposing view. All will agree that he was essentially a poor leader.

10. Haskins, 189, 36 and note; cf. F. Senn, *L'institution des avoueries ecclésiastiques en France*, Paris, 1903, pp. 98-99; also F. Senn, *L'institution des vidamies en France*, Paris, 1907, pp. 96-99; A. Luchaire, *Manuel des institutions françaises, période des Capétiens directs*, Paris, 1892, p. 505. *Bibliothèque municipale de Rouen*, Ms. 1227, Cartulary of St. George of Boscher-ville, f. 82, gives a description of an impressive ceremony at the abbey on the occasion of the knighting of young William of the house of Tancarville. One suspects that the young knight may have considered himself as the especial protector of the family altar and the monastery which contained it.

11. *Historiae Ecclesiasticae*, Ordericus Vitalis, ed. A. Le Prévost, Paris, 1835-55, ii, 84.

12. Haskins, 154; Stubbs, *Introductions*, 251, Normandy was placed under the interdict in 1191 because the steward of the archbishop, his master being in England, would not admit papal legates without the royal consent.

13. Ordericus Vitalis, iv, 373. Henry I instructed the Norman clergy who were about to attend a council at Rheims not to bring any innovations into his lands.

14. Luchaire, *Manuel*, 274. Mansi, xxii, col. 591, for the clerical view of the right of free election; *Rotuli de Liberate*, ed. T. D. Hardy, London, 1844, p. 72, for the ducal view. Cf. P. Viollet, *Histoire des institutions politiques et administratives de la France*, Paris, 1890-1903, ii, 340-341.

15. Ordericus Vitalis, iv, 433-438, for a typical election of an abbot "with the consent" of the duke; J. F. Pommeraye, *Histoire des archevêques de Rouen*, Rouen, 1667, p. 375, for an election of 1183 "by order of the king"; *Rotuli Normanniae*, ed. T. D. Hardy, London, 1835, pp. 23-24, for direct orders in chancery for minor elections.

16. Haskins, 153; Luchaire, *Les royautés vassales*, 182 ff.; *Gallia Christiana*, xi, 483; Migne, ccxiv, col. 419.

17. Most historians have neglected to point out the importance of this event. Cf. Green, *History of the English People*, i, 178, with the contemporaneous account in the *Gesta Regis Henrici Secundi*, *Rolls series*, London, 1867, i, 31-32, and in the *Materials for the history of Thomas Becket*, *Rolls series*, London, 1885, vii, 513-516. The stage-setting was superb, as any visitor at Avranches even to-day will testify.

18. Pommeraye, *Archevêques*, 376; P. Chesnel, *Le Cotentin et l'Avranchin sous les ducs de Normandie, 911-1204*, Caen, 1912, pp. 59-63, 179-180.

19. Duchesne, 1056; N. Brussel, *Nouvel examen de l'usage générale des fiefs en France*, Paris, 1727, i, 282-283.

20. Ordericus Vitalis, iii, 312-314, iv, 448; Viollet, *Institutions*, ii, 345-349. The ducal possession of the regalia of the archbishop of Rouen, together with the clerical counter-claims, is of some interest; Duchesne, 1056; Pommeraye, *Archevêques*, 377-388; Brussel, i, 282-283; *Cartulaire normand*, No. 166; Bessin, ii, 33; Luchaire, *Manuel*, 49, 50.

21. William the Conqueror had degraded an archbishop of Rouen, Ordericus Vitalis, i, 184; members of the ducal household could not be excommunicated without the knowledge of the duke, Duchesne, 1060; Round, No. 1318.

22. Haskins, 37-38; Powicke, 93-98; E. Semichon, *La paix et la trêve de Dieu*, Paris, 1851, i, *passim*; Round, Nos. 290, 1318; A. Canel, *Le combat judiciaire en Normandie, Mémoires de la société des antiquaires de Normandie*, xxii, 579; Pollock and Maitland, *The History of the English Law*, Cambridge, 1898, i, 52.

23. Haskins, 35-36, 170-171, for Lillebonne; more generally, Ordericus Vitalis, ii, 306, 228; *Chronica*, Robert of Torigny, ed. L. Delisle, Rouen, 1872-73, i, 59, 64. All excommunicated persons were in the mercy of the duke for a year and a day, *Coutumiers de Normandie*, ed. E.-J. Tardif, Rouen, 1881, i, I, *Le Très Ancien Coutumier de Normandie*, c. 2.

24. Tardif, cc. 5-6; some cases were taken out of the ecclesiastical courts, especially cases in regard to dowry rights, mainly because of the complicated system of appeals in the clerical courts which delayed justice. Also Tardif, c. 2; L. Valin, *Le duc de Normandie et sa cour, 912-1204*, Paris, 1910, *pièces justificatives*, No. 281.

25. *Rotuli chartarum*, 1199-1216, ed. T. D. Hardy, London, 1837, p. 15; E. A. Pigeon, *Le diocèse d'Avranches*, Coutances, 1888, ii, 324; E.-J. Tardif, *Étude sur les sources de l'ancien droit normand*, *Extrait du Congrès du Millénaire Normand*, Rouen, 1911, p. 5; A. Coville, *Les états de Normandie*, Paris, 1894, pp. 10-16, 247-256; Valin, 101, 104; the later difficulties of the French kings with the Norman bishops may have been due in part to this tradition of secular activity, C. Petit-Dutaillis, *Étude sur la vie et le règne de Louis VIII*, Paris, 1894, p. 408.

26. *Cartulaire normand*, No. 132; *H. F.* xxiii, 694; *Magni Rotuli Scaccarii Normanniae*, London, 1840-44, ed. T. Stapleton, ii, 296, 476, 547; some lands were not granted to churchmen on account of the kind of service required, Tardif, c. 48; the tendency to limit ecclesiastical exemptions can be seen in a document of 1204, Bessin, 102; the exemption was often of little use in an emergency, *H. F.* xxiv, *Preuves*, No. 22.

27. M. Rabasse, *Du régime des fiefs en Normandie au moyen-âge*, Paris, 1905, pp. 56-69; Chesnel, 205-206.

28. The ducal officers even paid tithes and fixed charges granted by barons on tolls which had subsequently come into the hands of the duke, Stapleton, i, pp. lxiv, cxviii, 8, 14, 17, 82; *Dialogus de Scaccario*, ed. A. Hughes, C. G. Crump, C. Johnson, Oxford, 1902, ii, c. 10. Typical gifts and exemptions: *Bibliothèque du chapitre de Bayeux*, Ms. No. 163, f. 19; exemption from the tallage of the king for the churches of Évreux, Archives of the Eure, G 123, No. 456; the acquisition of land by an abbey by paying a nominal sum to a Jewish creditor of the grantee, *ibid.* H 490; *ibid.* H 506; Bessin, 100; *Cartulaire normand*, Nos. 31, 46-47, etc.

29. His personal morals were typical of those of his father and brothers and will not bear investigation, Pigeon, *Avranches*, ii, 319-320.

30. Bessin, 90 ff.; Pollock and Maitland, i, 111; H. Brunner, *Die Entstehung der Schwurgerichte*, Berlin, 1872, p. 250.

31. Archives of the Calvados, H 2; *Cartulaire normand*, Nos. 31, 46-47; *Livre noir*, i, No. 20; Ms. Latin n. a. 1244 (*Bibliothèque nationale*), ff. 94, 101, 158, 163, 190, 214, 218, 278, 292, 390, 434; Ms. Lat. 1105, f. 26.

32. *Foedera, Conventiones, Litterae, etc.*, ed. T. Rymer, Record Commission, 1816, i, 74, for his testament.

33. Stubbs, *Introductions*, 320; Powicke, 157.

34. Migne, ccxiv, col. 415 (1198), col. 595 (1199); *Chronica*, Roger of Hoveden, *Rolls series*, London, 1868-71, iv, 19 (1197).

35. *H. F.* xvii, 178 (*Philippis*); Coggeshall, 77; Hoveden, iv, 21, 23, 40-42, 78-79; Cartellieri, iii, 18-19.

36. Viollet, *Institutions*, ii, 402-403.

37. *Infra*, p. 29. Diceto, ii, 111, for the not uncertain manner in which he informs the archbishop that royal writs are to be obeyed.

38. *Rotuli Chartarum*, 75-76, 100; Round, No. 257; Ms. Latin n. a. 1244, f. 160; Ms. Latin n. a. 1428, No. 66; Archives of the Eure, H 1264; Archives of the Manche, H 188; *ibid.* *Cartulary of Savigny*, f. 147; Archives of the Orne, H 928, No. cclxx; *Cartulaire de l'abbaye royale de Notre Dame de Bon-Port*, ed. J. Andrieux, Évreux, 1862, pp. 29-30.

39. Stapleton, ii, 547; *Rotuli Normanniae*, 34; R. N. Sauvage, *L'abbaye de Saint-Martin de Troarn*, Caen, 1911, pp. 64-65. He disregarded the compromise of 1190 (Diceto, ii, 86-88) and imposed a tallage upon ecclesiastical property, *Rotuli Normanniae*, 65.

40. Norgate, *John Lackland*, 62, 66; *Magna Vita S. Hugonis Episcopi Lincolnensis*, *Rolls series*, London, 1864, pp. 288-294.

41. Migne, ccxiv, cols. 1175-77: a list of John's offences as drawn up by Innocent III follows:

Preventing papal legates from travelling in Normandy.

Expulsion of the bishop of Limoges and seizure of his revenues.

Destruction of the church at Poitiers.

Prevention of elections in order to get the revenue of vacant sees.

Oppression of the canons of Séez and the continued non-admission of their bishop to the diocese.

That which you did at Coutances which you think we do not know.

The exile of the archbishop of York.

42. The best source for the whole affair of the disputed election of Séez of 1201-03 is the letter of Innocent III to the prior and canons of Séez in 1202, Migne, ccxiv, col. 1038 ff. This should be supplemented by various entries in the patent rolls, many of which are printed together as *pièces justificatives* for the only secondary account of any importance, Dom L. Guilloureau, *Revue catholique de Normandie*, xxv, (1916), 423 ff. This article is almost a literal translation of the principal documents; no attempt is made to put the events in their historical setting. Also see *Gallia Christiana*, xi, 691-692; Brussel, i, 285-286.

43. *Rev. cath. de Normandie*, xxv, 423, for list of alienations; *Gallia Christiana*, xi, 169, for list of possessions as confirmed by Innocent III in 1199. For documents concerning Lisiard, see Ms. Latin 11055, f. 119; Ms. Latin 11058, ff. 34-35, 43; *Bibliothèque municipale d'Alençon*, Ms. 190, *passim*; Archives of the Orne, H 1773. For donations to the church of Séez in the years 1190-1220, see Ms. Latin 11059, ff. 24-215, especially ff. 55-79; Ms. Latin 11058, *passim*. The successor to Lisiard made some alienations, Ms. Latin 5424, f. 119.

44. *Rotuli Litterarum Patentium*, ed. T. D. Hardy, London, 1835, p. 8.

45. Migne, ccxiv, col. 1041.

46. *Rot. Litt. Pat.* 6, for the safe-conduct of the prior and seven canons.

47. Chesnel, 168-180, lists the precedents; Luchaire, *Manuel*, 32, for the case of 1144 when ducal officials mutilated the bishop-elect at the instigation of Geoffrey.

48. *Rot. Litt. Pat.* 7.

49. *Ibid.*, 6, 8.

50. *Ibid.*, 8.

51. *Ibid.*, 16.

52. *Ibid.*, 13, 22, John writes to Rouen and Sens telling them of the measures taken against the clergy who tried to aid Sylvester. The last two letters are printed in the *Rev. cath. de Normandie*, xxv, 437, Nos. 7-8, but with erroneous dates.

53. *Rot. Litt. Pat.* 33.

54. *Rotuli de Liberate*, ed. T. D. Hardy, 1844, p. 72. The text of the writ is not without its interest. "Audivimus dici S. Sagiensem archidiaconum electum esse et consecratum non requisito assensu nostro, quod est contra dignitatem et libertatem nostram et terre nostre." He then provides that Sylvester shall be admitted within the diocese and for the indemnification of his clergy. "Nos siquidem loco et tempore domino Pape jus nostrum significabimus sicut alia vice significavimus et ab eo nobis justiciam fieri super hoc postulabimus secundum jus et dignitas nostra et antiqua et approbata nostri ducatus exigit consuetudo." John was not through with Innocent III at this point by any means. England was under the interdict in 1208; John was excommunicated in 1209; he surrendered to the pope in 1213.

55. We have several documents which Sylvester sealed as bishop in 1203, e.g. Ms. Latin, 11059, f. 90. *Inventaire sommaire des archives départementales, Orne, Série H*, ii (Alençon, 1894), ii, H 2162, mentions Sylvester as a bishop in the summary of a document of 1200. The real date of the document is 1205.

56. For the activities of Sylvester as bishop, see Ms. Latin 11059, ff. 24-215; Ms. Latin 10065, f. 79; Archives of the Calvados, H 117; Delisle, *Recueil de jugements de l'échiquier de Normandie*, Paris, 1864, pp. 263-264.

57. *Supra*, Nos. 12-15; Viollet, *Institutions*, ii, 341-342, for a similar contest of Louis VII and the chapter of Bourges; C. W. David, *Robert Curthose*, Cambridge, 1920, 154-155.

58. C. W. David, *Robert Curthose*, 156-157.

59. Migne, ccxiv-ccxvii; R. L. Poole, *Lectures on the History of the Papal Chancery down to the Time of Innocent III*, Cambridge, 1915.

60. Migne, ccxv, col. 1480; *ibid.*, ccxiv, col. 549; *ibid.*, ccxv, col. 254, where five canons are to mediate between bishop and chapter. The latter sounds very much like the four priests of the treaty of 1195, *infra*, p. 28.

61. Bessin, 101.

62. Migne, ccxiv, cols. 222, 497, 868, 180; *ibid.*, ccxv, col. 269; *Livre noir*, ii, No. 327; Bessin, ii, 39.

63. Migne, ccxiv, col. 352; the *Livre noir* abounds in papal directions to the clergy of Bayeux to keep up their claims, e.g., Nos. clviii, clxii, clxiii, clxiv, clxv, cxcii, cxcv, cxcviii.

64. For instructions to bishops, Migne, ccxiv, cols. 196, 222, 195; Bessin, 101, "ab uno episcopo excommunicatus, ab aliis pariter est vitandus; et ad episcopum suum remitti absolvendus." For letters upholding the powers of a bishop, see Bessin, ii, 525-526.

65. A whole group of letters is devoted to the affairs of the various peace embassies, of which that of the abbot of Casamare in 1203-04 was the most important; Migne, ccxv, cols. 176, 181, 182, 329, 425; Hefele, v, 2, pp. 1230-1231; Mansi, xxii, 745-750.

66. Migne, ccxv, col. 182, and *ibid.*, col. 176, where he claims to settle the disputes of John and Philip Augustus, not "de jure," but "de peccato." Also see Viollet, *Institutions*, ii, 278-279; J. N. Figgis, *Studies of Political Thought from Gerson to Grotius*, Cambridge, 1907, pp. 4, 230; *Magna Carta Commemoration Essays*, 1917, pp. xxvii-xxviii, 26 ff. (G. B. Adams, *Innocent III and the Great Charter*).

67. Migne, ccxv, cols. 562, 831, 839, 1043-44, 1048, 1208.

68. Innocent also befriended Richard, Cartellieri, iii, 171; he saw to it that his widow got her dowry from John (no trivial accomplishment), Migne, ccxv, cols. 220, 1537.

69. Migne, ccxiv, col. 984.

70. French bishops were present in Rome in 1203-04 to plead the cause of Philip Augustus; neither English nor Norman prelates were sent to present John's case, Hefele, v, 2, pp. 1230-1231.

71. Philip Augustus seems to have been the only participant in the events of 1203-04 who properly appreciated their importance.

72. He was under no illusions as to the suffering of the church in time of war, Migne, ccxv, col. 64.

73. *Ibid.*, ccxv, col. 564.

74. For the importance of the archbishop in Norman history, H. Prentout, *La Normandie*, Paris, 1914, p. 58; Tardif, *Sources*, 26.

75. Pommeraye, *Archevesques*, 373; L. Delisle, *Recueil des actes de Henri II*, Paris, 1909, introduction, 106; cf. *Histoire Littéraire*, xvi, 536, which argues for French origin.

76. *Histoire Littéraire*, xvi, 541-544; *Gallia Christiana*, xi, 52-54; Diceto, ii, 125 (the great friendship of Walter and the emperor), 112, 158.

77. *Histoire Littéraire*, xvi, 541.

78. Diceto, ii, 90, 112; he also held pleas in Wiltshire as late as 1203-04, Public Record Office, Pipe Roll No. 50 (1203-04), membrane 19. Stubbs, *Introductions*, 246, does not estimate the abilities of Walter very highly; see also Delisle, *Henri II*, 106 ff. for his activities in England.

79. *Histoire Littéraire*, xvi, 555-560, for a list of his writings. For additional biographical material, see *Dictionary of National Biography*; Pommeraye, *Archevesques*, 373-438; T. Bonnin, *Cartulaire de Louviers*, i, 13, Nos. 5 ff. (Paris, 1870-83).

80. Powicke, 175, suggests that Walter was one of the founders of the Gallican liberties. The comparison with Becket cannot be pushed too far.

81. Ms. Latin n. a. 1244, f. 398, Richard tells him that he will evict him from his lands and take over all his revenue if the archbishop will not consent to act as a pledge for his peace with Philip Augustus; see also Diceto, ii, 111.

82. Yet the "Stabilimentum" of 1205 (Duchesne, 1059-61) shows Walter allowing ducal restrictions upon the courts Christian which should have caused the opposition of a less energetic man. Cf. W. Stubbs, *Select Charters*, Oxford, 1913, p. 161, c. 3 (Constitutions of Clarendon). This seems to reopen the old question as to just what Becket objected to in the latter document and with what right.

83. Migne, ccxiv, cols. 93, 195, 205, 219, 222; Mansi, xxii, 620; *Gallia Christiana*, xi, 58; Archives of the Seine-Inférieure, G 1119.

84. Migne, ccxiv, col. 219, where the reply was delayed some two years.

85. Archives of the Seine-Inférieure, G 3593, for bull of Eugenius III confirming the primacy of Normandy to Rouen; cf. Viollet, *Institutions*, ii, 320.

86. *Histoire Littéraire*, xvi, 551; Krehbiel, *Interdict*, 20-21.

87. Archives of the Seine-Inférieure, G 3706, a letter to the canons thanking them for their aid in the defence of the property of the cathedral.

88. A. Cheruel, *Histoire de Rouen*, Rouen, 1843, i, 40-54; *Gallia Christiana*, xi, 53-54; Round, Nos. 64, 65, 67.

89. *Rotuli Normanniae*, 3; cf. *supra*, note No. 82.

90. Mansi, xxii, 582-586, and elsewhere with varying dates; Pommeraye, *Archevesques*, 384-388, gives 29 canons in place of the usual 32.

91. The question was that of the transference of a bishop-elect from one diocese to another, a right which the pope claimed as his exclusive privilege at this time; Bessin, ii, 368; *H. F.* xix, 361-374; Pigeon, *Avranches*, ii, 332; Luchaire, *Manuel*, 47.

92. Walter was able to place some of his relatives in high office; *Gallia Christiana*, xi, 146, for Sanson, abbot of Caen and continuously in charge of the exchequer in this period.

93. *H. F.* xix, 334-335.

94. Migne, ccxiv, col. 984.

95. *Gallia Christiana*, xi, 54; Diceto, ii, 135-137; *Epistolae*, Peter of Blois, ed. J. A. Giles, Oxford, 1846-47, Nos. 124-125; Cartellieri, iii, 124-125.

96. Powicke has put a great deal of emphasis upon this episode in an article in the *English Historical Review* (xxvii) under title 'Philip Augustus and the Archbishop of Rouen,' but the same material may be found in the *Histoire Littéraire*, xvi, 545-546.

97. Migne, ccxv, col. 255.

98. *Gallia Christiana*, xi, 55; Cheruel, *Rouen*, i, 52; Archives of the Seine-Inférieure, G 3678; cf. Round, No. 389.

99. Migne, ccvii, col. 369; Peter of Blois, *Epistolae*, No. 138.

100. *Rotuli Normanniae*, 1-2; *Rotuli Chartarum*, 59, 69; Diceto, ii, 148-158; Hoveden, iv, 16-19, 125; *Cartulaire Normand*, Nos. 45-46; also Powicke, 172-173, for the literature of the subject.

101. Matthew Paris, ii, 120.

102. Hoveden, iv, 17-18.

103. Pommeraye, *Archevêques*, 425, gives the text of the inscriptions which Walter had placed upon the crosses set up to mark the new boundaries of his lands. It begins with the phrase "Vicisti, Galtère, tui sunt signa triumphi," and then proceeds to a metrical enumeration.

104. Great care was taken in the drawing up of these documents. Walter, Richard, John, Philip Augustus, Celestine III, and Innocent III all sealed the final document. John's confirmation gives up to Walter the disputed points in a number of minor differences between them, but he retained judicial rights, especially the control of the pleas of the sword when held in the primate's court. This confirmation is at once one of the most important and one of the most puzzling of our sources of information concerning the administration of justice in the duchy in this period.

105. Diceto, ii, 157.

106. Peter of Blois, *Epistolae*, No. 138, for a letter of congratulation elicited by the event.

107. Krehbiel, *The Interdict*, 86 ff. There were twenty-seven threats of the interdict between 1198 and 1216, and seven of them concerned John. There were seventy-five local general interdicts between the fourth century and 1159 and fifty-seven between 1198 and 1216. The secular powers had some protection against the indiscriminate use of the interdict and of excommunication. Mansi, xxii, 620; *H. F.* xvii, 51.

108. Mansi, xxii, 616; Ms. Latin 5423; f. 61, ". . . clausis januis, exclusis excommunicatis et interdictis, non pulsatis campanis, suppressa voce, . . ."

109. The enforcement of the interdict could be real enough on occasion, Hoveden, iv, 16.

110. Other prelates in Normandy also used the interdict rather widely; Archives of the Orne, H 2162, for Sylvester of Séez; *ibid.*, H 2156; other examples may be found in the other dioceses, e.g., Archives of the Manche, H 429; Archives of the Eure, G 122; Archives of the Seine-Inférieure, G 1118; *Cartulaire de Bon-Port*, ed. Andrieux, 44, No. xliii.

111. A. Poignant, *Histoire de la conquête de la Normandie par Philippe Auguste en 1204*, Paris, 1854, pp. 112-113, 158, thinks that Walter was not in Rouen when the city capitulated in 1204.

112. Walter occupied the archiepiscopal chair for twenty-two years.

113. After 1204 Walter makes few appearances in the records. He invested Philip Augustus with the duchy, his third performance of that ceremony. He made no objection to the inquest of 1205, although a clause was included which prohibited the excommunication of members of the ducal household without ducal consent; Henry II and Becket had fought over a similar clause forty years before. In 1207 he asked Philip Augustus for a new procedure for the determination of the ownership of presentations, and received it. He died in 1207. Peter of Blois, *Epistolae*, No. 448 and *Histoire Littéraire*, xvi, 554-555, for eulogies: Pommeraye, *Archevesques*, 438, prints some of the inscriptions inspired by his death.

114. *Cartulaire normand*, Nos. 1066, 1068-69, 59, 64-65, for gifts of new privileges to the Norman clergy; Powicke, 385, for their effect upon Rouen. *Cartulaire normand*, Nos. 1064, 55, 61, 294-295, for specific grants of the right of free election, but see Petit-Dutaillis, *Louis VIII*, 406, who thinks that he merely meant that elections should take place in accordance with the usual forms. The whole question of the relations between Philip and the Norman clergy in the year of the conquest and in the years immediately following needs further investigation.

115. Migne, ccxv, col. 564.

INTERMEDIARIES IN JEWISH THEOLOGY

MEMRA, SHEKINAH, METATRON

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I. MEMRA, SHEKINAH

THE Christian interpretation of the Old Testament was early set upon finding in it a figure corresponding to the Son, or the Word (Logos), in the New Testament, a divine being, intermediary between God the Father and the world in creation, revelation, and redemption. For Christian theology, with its philosophical presumptions, a God who visibly and audibly manifested himself to men in human form and action was necessarily such a being; the Supreme God, in his supramundane exaltation or his metaphysical transcendence, could not be imagined thus immediately to intervene in mundane affairs. In this assumption and to a considerable extent in their particular interpretations the Fathers had a precursor in the Jewish theologian Philo. One of the chief ends of their apologetic was to demonstrate to Jews — or against them — *first*, that their own Scriptures made the existence of such a being undeniable; and *second*, that — incarnate, crucified, risen, enthroned at the right hand of God, presently to come in judgment — he was no other than the Messiah whom the Jews had rejected and the Lord whom the Christians worshipped as Saviour.

From apologetic this passed into the tradition of both exegesis and dogmatics, and was to Christian consciousness so self-evident that no other understanding of the Old Testament seemed possible. Accordingly, when argument with Jews was revived in the thirteenth century it was assumed that ancient and unprejudiced Jewish students of the Scriptures must have understood them in the same way, however their successors, in the exigencies of controversy, might dissimulate the fact.

On this presumption Christian scholars searched the earlier Jewish literature, the Targums,¹ Talmuds, and Midrash, for Christian doctrine, or at least adumbrations of it. Such research continued in the succeeding centuries down to the eighteenth; a vast mass of testimony was uncritically accumulated, and conclusions drawn which obtained general assent and continue to be accepted in some quarters to the present time. In the Memra of the Targums, the Word (Logos) was recognized, so to speak, in his own name and character; the Shekinah was sometimes taken for the Second Person of the Trinity, sometimes for the Third; after cabalistic studies came into vogue, the mysterious Metatron joined the ranks of the intermediaries.²

As was pointed out in a former article in this Review,³ the material that was diligently collected to prove that Jewish theology made a place for a being (or beings) of divine nature through whose mediation the ends of the Supreme God were effectuated in the world of nature and of men as they were in Christian theology by the Son and Spirit has more recently been appropriated to prove that Jewish theology, *unlike* Christian, interposed intermediaries between God and the world, rendered necessary by its 'transcendent' idea of God, of which error, conversely, the invention of such intermediaries is the proof. Christian investigation and discussion of the terms Memra and Shekinah have thus in all stages been inspired and directed by a theological motive, and the results come around in a circle to the theological prepossessions from which they set out.

Jewish discussion of the subject has generally approached it as a phase of the problem of the anthropomorphisms of Scripture.⁴ Maimonides, in particular, who combated the notion that God had body or form not only as irrational but as a deadly heresy, and expended much ingenuity at the very beginning of his *Moreh* in interpreting the seemingly anthropomorphic expressions of Scripture as metaphors or otherwise rendering them innocuous, claimed the authority of Onkelos for this principle and procedure. 'Onkelos, the proselyte, perfectly versed in Hebrew and Aramaic, takes all pains to remove the

ascription of corporeity (to God), and whenever the Scripture employs an expression that suggests corporeity, he interprets it according to its (true) meaning.' 'Onkelos avoids the ascription of corporeity (to God), and everything that might in the remotest way suggest it.' ⁵ Such, indeed, according to Maimonides, must be the endeavor of every intelligent man.

Maimonides' own Arab-Aristotelian metaphysic prescribed to him the idea of God as simple Unity in so rigorous a sense as to exclude not only all likeness to man, bodily or mental, but all attributes, whether defined as essential, accessory, or relative, and led him to regard the ascription of any attributes as only a subtler form of the anthropomorphism which attributed to him organs or actions. Of the latter, motion was peculiarly objectionable, since it put God in space; and rest, because it implied motion as its opposite. Onkelos seemed to him to share this objection, for he regularly paraphrases passages in which God is said to go or come, to ascend or descend, etc., sometimes by the introduction of *memra*, sometimes of *yekara*, most frequently of *shekinta*. In so doing, he believed that Onkelos had given the true meaning, whilst the letter of Scripture was levelled to the apprehension of the common man. The Glory or the Presence of God, as he conceived it, was not a reverent circumlocution for God, but a created light by which God's invisible presence was manifest to men; and similarly the voice, or the word, of God was a created sound.⁶ In thus describing them Maimonides excludes personality and participation in the divine nature. His *Memra* and *Shekinah* may be called intermediary agencies, not intermediate beings, if there be any profit in labelling them at all. His contemporary, R. Moses ben Nahman, in his commentary on Gen. 46, 4 (a verse with which Maimonides had to wrestle as an apparent exception in Onkelos), and on Exod. 20, 16, contests the adequacy of the principle Maimonides ascribes to Onkelos to account for the phenomena, as well as the validity of his explanation. How the critic himself conceived the *Shekinah* and the rest is not made clear. None of these writers subjected the usage of Onkelos to a comprehensive analysis; the discussion turned chiefly about a few striking verses in the Pentateuch.

A sounder method of investigation is adopted by modern Jewish scholars who have dealt with the question. First among these stands Samuel David Luzzatto, with his *אורח נר* (Philoxenus), published in 1830. Luzzatto minutely analyses the changes Onkelos makes in his translation, and classifies them by the reasons for them. More than this, he put investigation on the right track by laying down at the outset the proposition, 'The Targum was not made for scholars, but for the unlettered masses' (p. 1) — a proposition which was, he was well aware, as revolutionary as it is sound. Luzzatto's own discussion of *memra*, *yekara*, and *shekinta* is brief, and he fortifies himself with the authority of a long quotation from Isaac Arama, who treats them as respectful circumlocutions. A special investigation, largely occupied with these particular terms, was made by Siegmund Maybaum, 'Die Anthropomorphien und Anthropopathien bei Onkelos und den späteren Targumim (Breslau, 1870), which is a comprehensive — for *memra* in Onkelos an exhaustive — mustering and classification of the relevant passages by the side of the Hebrew original with explanatory comment. The most thorough investigation of the whole subject is that of M. Ginsburger, 'Die Anthropomorphismen in den Thargumim,' in the *Jahrbücher für protestantische Theologie*, XVII (1891), pp. 262–280 and 430–458, which contains by far the most comprehensive collection of examples, and is of especial importance for its full presentation of the usage of the Palestinian Targums, which his predecessors had adduced only casually, devoting their attention almost solely to Onkelos. In the second part of his study the usage of the Targums on the Hagiographa is also set forth.

A re-examination of the subject from a philological point of view is the purpose of the present article, in which no attempt is made to record the very extensive literature or the history of interpretation.⁷ For a complete understanding of the motive of the translators in using these particular terms it would be necessary to consider them in the larger connection of the whole usage of the Targums in their substitutions and paraphrases, but this is much too extensive a subject to be entered upon here. The English reader may profitably acquaint himself with

Luzzatto's exhibition of this usage as summarized by E. Deutsch in Smith's Dictionary of the Bible, American Edition, Vol. IV, pp. 3404-3407.

It may not be superfluous to correct at the outset any notion that Onkelos and the others in their versions systematically, if not altogether consistently, eliminate or neutralize the anthropomorphisms of the original. Assertions of this sort are indeed still found in books that the layman naturally takes for authorities.⁸ The same erroneous impression may be acquired from works which deal methodically with the procedure of the translators in this matter. The attention of the author and the reader is there concentrated on the cases and occasions in which expressions are modified that, at least in the vernacular, sounded irreverent or undignified, and circumlocutions introduced where a literal rendering literally understood might fortify the common man's imagination of a God who behaved too much like himself. The complement of this one-sided impression, namely the limited range of such paraphrases and the wide extent in which the Targums leave the anthropomorphisms of the original untouched, can only come by continuous reading of the Targums, and only in the same way can the peculiarities of the several Targums be learned. Any one, however, who will take the trouble to read the Targum of Onkelos on the story of the Garden of Eden in Gen. 2-3, or on God's visit to Abraham in Gen. 18, will be disabused of the notion that the translator shrinks from a literal rendering of even the most palpable anthropomorphisms. On the other hand, circumlocutions and buffer-words are introduced with a good deal of consistency in places that seem to us much more harmless.

This is strikingly true of the uses of *memra*, generally translated 'word,' and frequently printed with a question-begging capital, 'the Word.' To dispel misunderstandings at the outset we may begin by showing when and how *memra* is *not* used. First, then, 'the *memra* of the Lord' in the Targums is not employed as the Aramaic equivalent of 'the word of the Lord' (דבר יהיה) in the Hebrew Scriptures. The Hebrew *dabar*, in all senses and uses, is customarily rendered in the Targums by

pitgama. The 'word of the Lord,' or 'of God,' is *pitgama de-Y*. (e.g. Gen. 15, 1), not *memra de-Y*.;⁹ and similarly in 'my word,' 'thy word,' 'his word,' when the pronouns refer to God. The word of the Lord to a prophet is *pitgam nebu'a*, a word of prophecy, e.g. Hosea 1, 2, 'the word of prophecy from before Y. which was with Hosea.' See also 1 Kings 12, 22; Jer. 1, 2, 4, 11, 13; 2, 1, etc. It is idle to multiply examples of a uniform usage. It holds in the cases which seem to approach most nearly to a personification of the 'word of the Lord,' such as Isa. 40, 8, 'The grass withereth, the flower fadeth, but the word of our God abideth forever'; Targum, 'The wicked man dies and his plans perish, but the word of our God (*pitgama de-elahana*) abideth forever; Isa. 55, 11 (*pitgam tubi*); Jer. 23, 29 (*kol pitgamai*, cf. 5, 14 *pitgame nebuati*). The Targum on the Psalms is too late to be taken in evidence here, but it may be observed that, although *memra* occurs frequently in it, when it comes to translate Psalm 33, 6, 'By the word of the Lord (LXX τῷ λόγῳ τοῦ κυρίου) were the heavens made, and all the host of them by the breath of his mouth,' it renders 'word' not by *memra*, but by the common *milla*.¹⁰ It may be added that *memra* is not employed, as seems sometimes to be imagined, as a standing circumlocution for 'God said,' or 'God spoke'; the Targums have no scruples about translating these phrases literally.¹¹

Thus, wherever the 'word of the Lord' is the medium or instrumentality of revelation, or of communication to men, in Greek λόγος or ῥῆμα, the term employed for this medium in the Targums is not *memra*, but *pitgama*, or (seldom), as in the example cited above from Psalm 33, 6, *milla*.

Further, where the creative activity of God is spoken of in the Scriptures, the Targums do not represent this activity as mediated by his *memra*. Isa. 45, 12 is an apparent exception of the kind which in the proper sense of the dictum *probat regulam*. See also Deut. 33, 27, in a midrashic interpretation of the difficult words translated in our Bibles, 'underneath are the everlasting arms,' where Onkelos has, 'By his word (*memra*, fiat) the world was created.' The full importance of these observations will appear in the sequel, when we come to consider

the supposed relation of *memra* in the Targums to the Logos in Philo.¹²

With so much by way of introduction, we may turn to an examination of the meaning and use of *memra*.

Memar (definite, *memra*) is the Aramaic counterpart of the late Hebrew *ma'amar*, from *amar*, 'say.' The nouns signify something that is said, *dictum*, in the widest sense of the term. If what is said has authority behind it, it acquires from the context the connotation of command ('edict'). So the 'ten words' (*debarim*) of Exod. 34, 28, become for us the Ten Commandments; the world was created by ten commands (*ma'amerim*, 'fiats,' in Gen. 1), Aboth 5, 1, cf. Megillah 21b. In this sense *memar* is used in the Targums to interpret the Hebrew *peh* ('mouth') in idiomatic phrases, e.g. Gen. 45, 21, על פי פִּרְעָה, Targ. 'al *memra de-Par'oh*; the English versions, 'according to the commandment (edict) of Pharaoh.' The accounts of the tabernacle were rendered 'by order of Moses' ('al *memra de-Mosheh*, Exod. 38, 21); 'at the order of Aaron ('al *memar Aharon*) and his sons shall be all the service of the Gershonites,' (Num. 4, 27). 'Moses . . . died there in the land of Moab by the command of God' ('al *memra de-Y.*, Deut. 34, 5). *Memra* is used to render other expressions which imply command; for example, in Gen. 41, 44, Pharaoh says to Joseph, 'I am Pharaoh, and without thee (ובלעריך) shall no man lift up hand or foot in all the land of Egypt.' Onkelos renders, 'without thy command' (בר מְמִירָךְ) shall no man raise his hand to lay hold of a weapon,' etc.

When men disobey the command (literally 'mouth') of God (*pi Yahweh*), or refuse obedience to it,¹³ the Targum renders by *memra*; e.g. Deut. 1, 26, 'Ye refused to go up, and rebelled against the command (*memra*) of God.'¹⁴ Similarly, when they are said to transgress the commandment of God;¹⁵ e.g. Num. 14, 41, 'Ye transgress the commandment of God'; Onkelos, 'Ye transgress the decree of the edict of God' (*gezerat memra de-Y.*)¹⁶ So also with other verbs.¹⁷ Num. 11, 20, 'Ye spurned the Lord who is in the midst of you'; 'Ye spurned the word (*memra*) of Y. whose presence (*shekinta*) abode among you.' Num. 21, 5, 'The people spoke against God and against

Moses'; 'The people murmured against the word (*memra*) of Y., and contended against Moses.' Deut. 32, 51, 'Because ye proved false to me in the midst of the Israelites'; 'Because ye proved false to my word' (*memri*).

On the other hand, to hearken to God, or to his voice, is in the Targums regularly to receive (implying, 'obey') the command (*memra*) of God; e.g. Lev. 26, 14, 'If ye do not hearken unto me,' etc.; Onkelos renders, 'If ye do not receive my command' (*memri*); Deut. 28, 15, 'If ye do not hearken to the voice (*qol*) of the Lord your God, by observing and doing all his commandments'; Onkelos, 'If you do not receive the command' (*memra*), etc. As the latter example shows, the Hebrew *qol*, 'voice,' when it implies a command, is rendered by *memra*; when this implication is not present, it is interpreted *qal memra*; e.g. Gen. 3, 8, Adam and Eve 'heard the voice of the Lord'; Onkelos, 'heard the sound of the word (*qal memra*) of Y. (the sound of Y. speaking), who was walking in the garden' (cf. 23, 10). So also Deut. 5, 21, 'We have heard his voice out of the midst of the fire'; Onkelos, *qal memreh*; and likewise in verses 25 and 26; cf. Deut. 4, 36, 'From heaven he made thee hear his voice'; Onkelos again, *qal memreh*.

In the phrase last quoted *memra* is not understood to imply command, and this is the case in a large number of passages to a consideration of which we now proceed. Notice may be directed first to places where the Bible narrates that God came to some one and spoke to him. Thus in Gen. 20, 3, 'God came to Abimelech in a dream of the night, and said to him'; Onkelos renders, 'A word (*memar*) from before Y. came to Abimelech in a dream of the night, and said to him.' Precisely so to Laban (Gen. 31, 24), and to Balaam (Num. 22, 9, with no mention of a dream). The paraphrase is natural; and there is additional reason for it in the fact that the recipients of these visits of God are not Israelites. Still stronger reason for paraphrase is given in Num. 23, 3, where Balaam bids Balak stand by his sacrifice, 'and I will go; perhaps the Lord will come to meet me,' and verse 4, 'The Lord met Balaam, and he said to Him, I have prepared the seven altars,' etc. Onkelos renders, 'Perhaps an oracle from before Y. (*memar min qadam*

Y.) will come to meet me, and the word (*pitgama*) that he shall show me, I will disclose to thee'; and in verse 4, 'And an oracle (*memar*) from before Y. met Balaam,' etc. In connection with this, verse 5 must be noted: 'Y. put the word (*pitgama*) in Balaam's mouth.'

Similar caution is evident, however, where God says that he will meet with the Israelites at the Tabernacle on stated occasions. Exod. 25, 22f., Onkelos, 'I will cause my word (*memri*, oracle) to meet thee there, and I will speak with thee from above the place of atonement (*kapporeth*), from between the two cherubs,' etc.; Exod. 29, 42, 43, Onkelos, 'I will cause my oracle (*memri*) to meet with you there, to speak with thee there; and I will cause my oracle to meet with the Israelites, and it (the Tabernacle) shall be sanctified by my glory.' In Exod. 19, 17, 'Moses brought the people out of the camp to meet God'; Onkelos, 'towards the oracle (*memra*) of God.' In these cases the paraphrase is natural, since in the first two the text and in the last the context make the revealing of the will of God the object of the meeting; but in both the motive for paraphrasing at all is plainly to avoid the imagination of a meeting between men and God in *propria persona*. For this there was explicit warrant in Deut. 4, 12: 'Y. spoke to you out of the midst of the fire; ye heard the sound of words (*qal pitgamin*), but a form ye did not see, only the sound (voice).' In Exod. 3, 18, where the Hebrew is, 'Say unto him (Pharaoh), The Lord, the God of the Hebrews, met us,' Onkelos has, 'appeared to us' (cf. vs. 16); see also 5, 3.¹⁸ Note further Exod. 4, 12 (cf. 15), God says to Moses 'I will be with thy mouth, and teach thee what thou shalt speak'; Onkelos, 'my word (*memri*) shall be with thy mouth,' etc.

Here may perhaps most appropriately be introduced the scene between Jacob and Laban, Gen. 31, 49 f.: 'The Lord be on the lookout between me and thee when we are out of one another's sight. . . . God is witness between me and thee'; Onkelos in both verses, 'the word (*memra*) of Y.'

Natural paraphrase is to be seen also in such cases as Gen. 15, 6, Abraham 'believed in (put confidence in) God, and it was reckoned to him for righteousness'; Onkelos, 'He be-

lieved in the oracle (*memra*) of Y.,' namely, the promise contained in verses 1-5. Exod. 14, 31, When the Israelites saw the great work the Lord did on the Egyptians, they feared the Lord, 'and believed in the Lord and in his servant Moses'; Onkelos, 'in the oracle (*memra*) of Y. and in the prophecy of Moses his servant'; see also Num. 20, 12; Deut. 1, 32.

Where the Hebrew is literally, 'God said in his heart (mind),' that is, said to himself, Onkelos renders 'said in (or, by) his word' (*bememreh*; *dixit in dicto suo*); see Gen. 8, 21; cf. 6, 6. In the same way Onkelos interprets the enigmatic 'and God knew' of Exod. 2, 25, 'God said in his word to deliver them,' i.e. conceived the purpose. When God swears by himself, as in Gen. 22, 16, Onkelos has, 'by my word (*bememri*) I have established.'¹⁹ So in Exod. 6, 8, 'I will bring you into the land which I lifted up my hand (swore) to give to Abraham,' etc.; cf. Num. 14, 30. The same formula is used when a man adjures another by God. Places in which it is said that God 'repented' (was sorry, changed his mind) are treated in various ways, according to the context. An instance of the use of *memra* is Gen. 6, 6, 'God repented that he had made man'; Onkelos, 'Y. turned in his word (*memreh*, thought, we should say) that he had made man.' Correspondingly in vs. 7. So also 1 Sam. 15, 11 and 35; Zech. 8, 14, Targum, 'my word (thought, *memri*) did not turn.'

Passages in which it is said that God will fight for the Israelites are paraphrased; e.g. Deut. 3, 22, 'For the Lord your God, he it is that fighteth for you'; Onkelos, 'For Y. your God, his word (*memreh*) fights for you'; cf. Deut. 1, 30. An interesting class of passages which seem to fall into the same category are those in which God promises to be with some one, or it is said that he was with some one. Thus in Exod. 3, 12, God says to Moses, 'I will be with thee'; Onkelos, 'My word (*memri*) will be in thy support.'²⁰ So in Gen. 21, 20, 'God will be with the lad' (Ishmael); Onkelos, 'the *memra* of Y. will be in the support of the lad.'²¹ In such passages *memra* is probably the effective word which gives victory or protection with no need of such personal intervention as the phraseology of the original suggests. So also in punishment, e.g. Deut. 18, 19, Onkelos,

'the man who does not receive (obey) my word (*pitgami*) which he (the prophet) shall speak in my name, my word (*memri*, Heb. 'I') will demand satisfaction of him.' Compare also Deut. 4, 24, 'The Lord our God is a devouring fire'; 'Y. our God, his word (*memreh*) is a devouring fire'; cf. Deut. 9, 3.

Cognate in a measure to these are passages in which *memra* is put for the protecting 'hand' of God. Thus Exod. 33, 22, God says to Moses, 'I will cover my hand over thee till I have passed by'; Onkelos, 'I will extend protection by my word over thee.' The command of God, his expressed will, suffices for protection.²² So also Num. 11, 23, 'Is the Lord's hand become short?' so that he is unable to provide food for the vast host of Israelites in the desert, as Moses in the preceding speech seems to imply; Onkelos, 'Is the word (*memra*, fiat) of God restrained,' hindered from effecting his purpose? With this compare the rendering of the same figure in Targum Isa. 50, 21, 'Is my might (*geburathi*) shrunken?' See also 59, 1.

Finally, attention should be directed to the introduction of *memra* when God speaks of a covenant between himself and men. Thus Gen. 9, 12, 'This is the sign of the covenant which I make between Me and you'; the Targum, 'between my word (*ben memri*) and you' (cf. vss. 13, 15, 16, 17); 17, 7, 'I establish my covenant between my word and thee' (cf. 17, 10); see also Exod. 31, 13, 17; Lev. 26, 46. Here 'the word' seems to serve only the purpose of a buffer, to avoid the impression that God enters into a covenant with men, so to speak, on equal terms. In so far as the promise or the requirement that is the subject of the covenant is expressed in the context, it is a not inappropriate buffer.

A different explanation is given by Maybaum, who regards *memri* in these cases, and in many of those adduced above under other heads, as equivalent to a reflexive pronoun, 'myself.' That *memar* was used in this way, especially in the late Targums on the Hagiographa, was remarked long ago by Buxtorf, who cites from a haggadic amplification in Targ. Ruth 3, 8: 'Paltiel bar Laish (2 Sam. 3, 15) was a pious man, who stuck a sword between himself (*ben memreh*) and Michal'; and adds 'Sic de Deo saepissime.' Similarly the Targum on

Job 7, 8, 'Thine eyes are upon me (*memri*, my person), and I am gone.' Other examples are cited by Lightfoot, *Horae Hebraicae*, on John 1, 1. Maybaum quotes from the so-called Targum Jonathan ben Uzziel on Gen. 9, 17: 'This is the sign of the covenant which I have established between me and all flesh that is upon the earth'; Jonathan, *ben memri uben memar kol bisra*, 'between myself (my person, we might say) and the person of every man.' The one known manuscript of this Targum²³ agrees with the printed editions in reading thus; but the expression is unparalleled, so that Ginsburger's suspicion of a blunder by a copyist does not seem an excess of scepticism. In any case an isolated phrase in this Targum is no key to the usage of the older Targums with which we are here concerned. Undoubtedly, if we had to translate idiomatically many of the passages in which *memra* is used, we should say 'myself, himself,' and the like; but inasmuch as the whole motive of the paraphrase is to avoid bringing God 'himself' into such immediate relation to the act or circumstance, it can hardly be supposed that the translator deliberately introduced a word which would be understood by his hearers to emphasize the relation. If he did not like to say simply that God did so and so, he would be still less inclined to say that God *himself* did it.

We have now surveyed the various uses of *memra* in the Targums on the Pentateuch and the Prophets. Instances might be multiplied under almost all the heads specified, but no class of cases has been passed over. Most of the uses of the word are easily explicable in their contexts in the light of the ends and methods of the synagogue interpretation. If analogy, or some subtlety of interpretation that escapes us, has sometimes introduced it on less obvious occasions, these are exceptions which need cause us neither surprise nor perplexity. The inquiry must set out from the common and plain uses; and our conclusions must be drawn from them, not from the residuum, if there be such, of unexplained occurrences. Proceeding in this way we find that God's *memra*²⁴ has sometimes the connotation of command — we might in imitation of the etymology say 'edict' — the expression of his will which is an effective force in nature and providence; sometimes it might

best be translated 'oracle,' the revelation of his will or purpose (not, however, a specific word of prophecy); sometimes it is the resolution of a metaphor for God's power, his protection, and the like. In many instances it is clearly introduced as a verbal buffer — one of many such in the Targums ²⁵ — to keep God from seeming to come to too close quarters with men and things; but it is always a buffer-word, not a buffer-idea; still less a buffer-person.

This would come out still more plainly if it were possible here to direct special attention to the singular phraseology of many of the passages in which *memra* comes in as a euphemism or as what I have called a buffer. In the context the translator habitually keeps as close as possible to the original, without adapting it to the new situation he has created by the introduction of his *memra*, and the result is often awkward and unidiomatic. It may be surmised that, as in the case of similar euphemisms and buffers introduced into the Hebrew text itself or the masoretic punctuation, the Targumists intentionally left the matter so that readers or hearers educated in the Scriptures would recognize the original expression or meaning through the veil cast over it. Such phenomena cannot, however, be exhibited in translation — in the translations above they are indeed frequently effaced in the interest of intelligible English — nor would they, even with explanation, show what they are except to readers familiar with both unsophisticated Aramaic diction and idiom and with the peculiarities of the translation-Aramaic of the Targums. To such readers, however, these phenomena must be among the most convincing evidence of the real character and motive of the *memra* passages.

The sum of the whole matter is that nowhere in these Targums is *memra* a 'being' of any kind or in any sense, whether conceived personally as an angel employed in communication with men, or as a philosophically impersonal created potency, as in Maimonides' theory; or God himself in certain modes of self-manifestation, which has been thought to be the opinion of R. Moses ben Nahman. The appearance of personality which in many places attaches to the *memra* is due solely to the fact that the phrase 'the *memra* of Y.,' or, with pronouns

referring to God, My, Thy, His, *memra*, is a circumlocution for 'God,' 'the Lord,' or the like, introduced out of motives of reverence precisely where God is personally active in the affairs of men; and the personal character of this activity necessarily adheres to the periphrasis. The very question whether the *memra* is personal or impersonal implies, from the philological point of view, a misunderstanding of the whole phenomenon; and every answer to a false question is by that very fact false.

These conclusions are strongly confirmed by the fact that *memra* is found only in the Targums; not in such Aramaic texts as are preserved in the Midrashim, nor in the voluminous Aramaic parts of the Talmuds, nor, so far as I am aware, in the Zohar. In other words, it is a phenomenon of translation, not a creature of speculation.²⁶

The error is magnified to immensity when *memra* is connected with the Logos of Philo, whether it be supposed, as by Gfroerer, that the Palestinian mystical theology represented in the Targums (!) borrowed its intermediary being, Memra, from the Logos of Alexandrian 'theosophy,' or, contrariwise, that the Logos was derived and developed by the Alexandrians from the Palestinian Memra. The former theory involves a complete misunderstanding of what the Targums are and what they were made for, as well as a misinterpretation of the *memra* in them; the latter, besides a similar misinterpretation of *memra* in the Targums, involves a fundamental misunderstanding of what the Logos is in Philo, and what it is for.

It has been pointed out above (page 45f.) that in the Targums *memra* is not the term employed where the 'word of the Lord' is the medium or instrumentality of revelation, and that it is not the creative word in the cosmogony of Genesis or reminiscences of it.²⁷ It is needless to add that is not the divine reason in the universe, nor the reason akin to the divine that is in every man. Since these things are exactly what the Logos is and does in Philo, the only *tertium comparationis* that would seem to be left is that the Greek λόγος is often properly understood and translated 'word,' and that *memra* also is commonly so translated.

It is an error of equal dimensions, when, by association with the Christian doctrine of the Logos and by abuse of a technical term of Christian theology, the Memra is described as 'an hypostasis.' For the modern reader 'hypostasis' has no use or meaning except that which it acquired in the controversies of the third and fourth centuries over the ontological relation of the Logos-Son to the Father; and to employ this term, with its denotation and all its trinitarian connotations, of the supposed personal, or quasi-personal, 'Memra' of the Targums, is by implication to attribute to the rabbis corresponding metaphysical speculations on the nature of the Godhead. But of speculation on that subject there is no trace either in the exoteric teaching of Judaism or in anything we know of its esoteric, theosophic, adventures into the divine mysteries.

Another paraphrastic expression upon which for our present purpose it is unnecessary to dwell is *yekara*, 'glory, majesty'.²⁸ One example out of many must suffice. In Exod. 24, 10, Moses and his companions, with the seventy elders of Israel, 'saw the God of Israel'; Onkelos, 'saw the glory (*yekar*) of the God of Israel.' The same interpretative periphrasis is used in Exod. 16, 17; Isa. 6, 1. Similarly, Gen. 17, 22, God ascended from Abraham; 'The glory of God ascended.' Exod. 20, 17, God has come to prove you; 'The glory of Y. has appeared to you.'²⁹

Shekinah is another such word, properly Hebrew, but used in the Aramaic of the Targums as a borrowed word with Aramaic endings. The large part it has played in Christian discussion renders a brief statement of the usage necessary. Its origin and primitive significance are best seen where it paraphrases the verb (*shakan*; 'dwell, reside, abide') from which it is derived. Thus in Exod. 25, 8 God says, 'Let them make me a sanctuary that I may dwell among them'; the Targum has it, 'I will cause my presence (*shekinti*) to abide (or reside) among them.' Exod. 34, 6, 'And the Lord passed before him'; Targum, 'The Lord caused his presence (*shekinteh*) to pass before him.' In general, when God is said to be in a place or among his people, Onkelos makes it 'his presence' there; in

Deut. 12, 5; 11, 21, it is 'his presence' not 'his name' that God causes to abide in the place he chooses for a sanctuary. Contrariwise, when he leaves a place, he 'causes his presence to ascend' (to heaven, and depart from men); Hos, 5, 6; etc. Deut. 32, 19.

While *memra*, as has been observed above, is found only in the Targums, *shekinah* is very common in the Talmud and Midrash also. Often it is a mere metonymy for 'God,' as when R. Jose ben Halafta says: 'Never did the Presence (*shekinah*) descend to earth, nor did Moses and Elijah ascend to heaven; for it is written the heavens are the Lord's heavens, and the earth he has given to the children of men' (Psalm 115, 16).³⁰ Inasmuch as the same Rabbi elsewhere says that God is not in any place, perhaps this is his meaning here. It has also been suggested that the words are meant by inference to contradict Christian teaching on the incarnation and the resurrection (Bacher, *Agada der Tannaiten*, II, 185). In the parallel in the Mekilta, *kabod*, 'glory,' is used where the Talmud has *shekinah*. The doctrine of R. Jose seemed so paradoxical in the face of such explicit texts as Exod. 19, 20; Zech. 14, 4, on the one hand, and Exod. 19, 3; 2 Kings 2, 11, on the other, that some ingenuity had to be exercised to save it.

Where the omnipresence of God is asserted, the word used is 'the Presence' (*shekinah*). The Lord was revealed in the thorn bush to teach that there is no place on earth void of the Presence; it is the Presence which, like the sea flooding the cave, filled the tabernacle with its radiance, while the world outside was no less full of it. Successive sins of mankind beginning with Adam caused the Presence to be taken up from earth and from one heaven to another to the seventh and most remote; a succession of righteous men from Abraham to Moses brought it down again, stage by stage, to earth once more.³¹ In a later work ten descents of the Presence to the world are enumerated, from the first in the Garden of Eden to the last, still future, in the days of Gog and Magog; the Scripture proofs alleged are all verses in which God or (the Lord) comes down to earth (Gen. 11, 5, etc.), or is upon the earth, as in Gen. 3, 8; Zech. 14, 4.³²

In a special sense God dwelt in the tabernacle and later in

the temple. When he took up his abode in them a cloud enveloped the tabernacle, or filled the temple, and thus veiled the glory of the Lord, too deadly bright for mortal eyes, which filled them.³³ The association of the presence of God with a manifestation of his glory and of the latter with light led to the conception of the Presence (*shekinah*) as light.

All worship demands a *praesens numen*, and however men may entertain the idea of the omnipresence of God, they find it difficult to realize his specific presence in the particular place where they gather for religious service without some aid to faith or imagination. This is the origin and meaning of the teaching that wherever ten men (the quorum of the synagogue) are met for prayer, there is the Presence.³⁴ How many 'Presences' are there then? a caviller asked. R. Gamaliel (II) answered by asking a slave, How does the sun get into that man's house? The sun shines, he replied, on all the world. If the sun, one of the millions of suns that are before the blessed God, shines on all the earth, how much more the Presence of God! (Sanhedrin 39a.)

R. Isaac, a pupil of Johanan and a favorite homilist of the third century, says: 'Whenever Israelites prolong their stay in the synagogues and schools, God makes his Presence stay with them.'³⁵ The following is also handed down from Isaac: 'Whence do we learn that God is found in the synagogue building?' Because it is said, 'God standeth in the congregation of God' (Psalm 82, 1). And whence that when ten are praying together the Presence is with them? Because it is said, 'God standeth in the congregation of God' (*ibid.*).³⁶ And whence that when three are sitting as judges the Presence is with them? Because it is written, 'In the midst of the judges (*elohim*) he will judge' (Psalm 82, 1b). And whence that when two are sitting and studying the Law the Presence is with them? Because it is written, 'Then those who fear the Lord spoke one to the other, and the Lord hearkened and heard,' etc. (Mal. 3, 16). And whence that even when one is sitting and studying the Law the Presence is with him? Because it is written, 'In every place where I cause mention to be made of my name, I will come unto thee and bless thee' (Exod. 20, 21).³⁷

In all these cases the Presence (*shekinah*) is not something that takes the place of God, but a more reverent way of saying 'God.' Similarly Christians speak of God's being present in their religious assemblies or of the presence of the Holy Spirit, without intending any difference of meaning, notwithstanding the personality of the Holy Spirit, and indeed without reflection at all. This use of the phrase 'the Holy Spirit,' ultimately derived from the Old Testament, was, it should be remembered, long established in Christian speech and literature before the dawn of hypostatic speculations.

In Jewish literature, also, 'the Holy Spirit' frequently occurs in connections in which 'the Presence' is elsewhere employed, without any apparent difference of meaning; but the fact that the words are within a certain range interchangeable is far from warranting the inference that the *shekinah* and the *ruh ha-godesh* were identified in thought. Thus it is said in the Tanhuma (ed. Buber, Shemoth 10, f. 3a) that until the temple was destroyed the *shekinah* was placed in the temple ('The Lord is in his holy temple,' Psalm 11, 4); after the destruction of the temple, the *shekinah* ascended to heaven ('The Lord, in heaven is his throne,' *ibid.*). With this compare Koheleth Rabbah on Eccl. 12, 7 (end): 'When Jeremiah saw that Jerusalem was destroyed, and the temple burned, and Israel gone into exile, and the Holy Spirit taken up,' etc. The interchange is especially frequent in reference to persons to whom the Spirit or the Presence comes, or on whom it rests. A good example is Tos. Sotah 13, 3 compared with Bab. Sotah 48b; Sanhedrin 11a. In the former the voice from heaven declares that one of the company is worthy to have the Holy Spirit rest upon him; the Talmud has 'the *shekinah*.' On the other hand, revelation, or inspiration, the chief function of the Holy Spirit in Judaism, is, so far as I know, never attributed to the Presence (*shekinah*). Among the five things which were in the first temple but were lacking in the second, Yoma 21b includes both the Shekinah and the Holy Spirit. This list is evidently padded and confused. What seems to be the soundest form of the tradition counts the five things: the fire (that was kindled from heaven), the ark, the priestly oracle (Urim and Thum-

mim), the anointing oil, and the Holy Spirit (the spirit of prophecy). So Jer. Taanith ii, 1, f. 65a; Jer. Makkoth ii, 7, f. 32a; cf. Jer. Horaioth iii, 2, f. 47c end. The 'Shekinah' in Bab. Yoma *l. c.* is intrusive, perhaps a doublet to the Holy Spirit. It does not seem to be found in any of the parallels in the Midrashim (Shir ha-Shirim Rabbah 8 (on verse 9); Tanhuma ed. Buber, Behealotka 11 (f. 25b, top); Bemidbar Rabbah 15, 10, etc.

Like *memra*, *shekinah* acquires what semblance of personality it has solely by being a circumlocution for God in contexts where personal states or actions are attributed to him.

NOTES. — I. MEMRA

1. The Targums were generally supposed to represent a traditional exegesis older than the Christian era.

2. For a single example, M. Kähler, 'Christologie, Schriftlehre,' Protestantische Real-Encyclopædie, 3 ed. iv, 7: Eigentümlich ist dem nachkanonischen Judentum die Umsetzung der anschaulichen Ausdrücke für das Walten Gottes in der Welt, namentlich auch seines offenbaren Wirkens, in gewissermassen selbstständige Werkzeuge Gottes; das schöpferische und offenbarende Wort wird im Memra hypostasiert, die Gnadengegenwart Gottes bei seinem Volk in der Schechina; dazu kommt bei den Rabbinen noch der Metatron; alle diese Mittelwesen gleichen den Engeln und sind, wie auch der Geist Gottes, geschaffen.

3. 'Christian Writers on Judaism,' Vol. XIV (1921), pp. 227, 233, and elsewhere.

4. See L. Ginzberg, 'Anthropomorphism,' Jewish Encyclopedia I, 621-625, and the literature there noted.

5. Moreh Nebukim, Part i, cc. 27-28.

6. Nor created *ad hoc*. All miraculous events that occur at a given moment of time seemingly at variance with the order of nature were really constituted part of that order at the creation of the world. 'The Eight Chapters,' c. 8 (ed. J. I. Gorfinkle, New York, 1912, p. 46, and *ibid.* translation, pp. 90 f., with the references there given in a note); Maimonides, Commentary on Mishnah, Aboth 5, 6; Moreh, Part ii, c. 29. Cf. Munk, *Le Guide des Égarés*, I, p. 296 n.

7. For brevity and simplicity I have restricted myself to examples from Onkelos and the Targums on the Prophets, which had an authority not conceded to the rest. Whatever peculiarities the Palestinian Targums present, Ginsburger's investigation proves that in them also there is no personification of *memra* or *shekinta*, to say nothing of 'hypostasis.' In the transliteration of Hebrew and Aramaic I have not marked the quantity of the vowels. Readers who know the language do not need this assistance any more than in Latin; those who do not will be none the wiser for it.

8. 'In the Targums anthropomorphic expressions are put aside altogether.' Oesterley and Box, *Religion and Worship of the Synagogue*, p. 153.

9. In translating from the Targums, I employ 'Y.' where they have the customary abbreviation for the name.

10. *Milla* sometimes stands in the Palestinian Targums where Onkelos has *pitgama*. The variation has no significance.

11. 'The *memra* of Y. said,' and the like, occurs only in Palestinian Targums, and apparently with especial frequency in the Fragmentary Targum. See Ginsburger, p. 267f.

12. See below, p. 54.

13. מר. את פי יהוה. English versions often, 'rebel against the commandment of the Lord.'

14. See also 1 Sam. 12, 14, 15; 1 Kings 13, 21, 26, etc.

15. עבר את פי יהוה.

16. Num. 22, 18; 24, 13; 1 Sam. 15, 24, etc. For the expression cf. the Targum on Isa. 40, 5; 58, 14, 'for by the edict (*memra*) of Y. it is thus decreed' (*gezir ken*). See also Num. 14, 35.

17. מעל, רבר ב', מאס.

18. Compare the shifts of the Greek and Latin versions in Exod. 3, 18 and 5, 3. They translate קרא, 'call.'

19. From motives of reverence Onkelos uses this verb for the oath of God; when men swear he employs the usual Aramaic verb.

20. בסערך, with a buffer preposition.

21. See also Gen. 21, 22, 23; 26, 28; 28, 20; 31, 5, 42; 39, 21, 23, etc.

22. A more drastic figure is similarly paraphrased in Ezek. 16, 8, 'I spread my skirt over thee'; Targum, 'I extended protection by my word (*memri*) over thee.'

23. Edited by M. Ginsburger, Pseudo-Jonathan . . . nach der Londoner Handschrift (Brit. Mus. add. 27,031). Berlin, 1903.

24. It is to be observed that *memra* does not occur without a genitive — 'the word of the Lord,' 'my word,' etc., or a circumlocution for the genitive, 'a *memar* from before the Lord.' 'The *Memra*,' 'the Word,' is not found in the Targums, notwithstanding all that is written about it by authors who have not read them.

25. The commonest — and in many phrases awkwardest — of these is קדם, 'before, in front of.' For examples see Ginsburger, pp. 278–280, or the Lexicons.

26. For this reason alone the attempt to elucidate *memra* by the *dibbur* of the Midrash is out of place, even if the usage of *dibbur* were not misstated.

27. Consequently, the theory that derives the Logos-Word of John 1, 1–5 straight from the Palestinian *memra* is fallacious.

28. *Yekar* is elsewhere the ordinary translation of the Hebrew *kabod*, in Greek δόξα.

29. For other examples, see Maybaum, p. 49 f, Ginsburger, p. 277 f. In similar cases Onkelos sometimes has *memra*, sometimes *shekintia*.

30. Bar. Sukkah 5a (top); cf. Mekilta on Exod. 19, 20 (ed. Friedmann f. 65b).

31. Bereshit Rabbah 19, 7 and parallels.

32. Aboth de-R. Nathan 34, 5.

33. Exod. 29, 34 f., 1 Kings 8, 10 f., cf. Isa. 6, 1–4.

34. Sanhedrin 39a.

35. Pesikta ed. Buber, Shemini Asereth, f. 193a–b; Pesikta Rabbathi ed. Friedmann (Supplement), f. 202b. For the exegetical derivation see the editors' notes, and Bacher, Agada der paläst. Amoräer II, 220 f. n. To the same homilist Song of Songs 2, 8 f. suggests God's springing from synagogue to synagogue and from school to school to bless the Israelites (Pesikta Rabbathi, f. 72a; less complete text, Pesikta ed. Buber f. 48b).

36. אלהים נצב בעדת אל. In the first deduction עדת אל is taken in the sense of מעדתי אל in Psalm 74, 8; the second takes עדה as 'congregation,' which consists of at least ten men (general rule based on Num. 14, 27). See Bacher, Agada der paläst. Amoräer II, 221.

37. Berakot 6a. On Exod. 20, 21 cf. Onkelos, 'In every place where I make my presence (*shekinti*) to rest, thither will I send my blessing unto thee and will bless thee.'

II. METATRON

In the foregoing there is nothing novel either in the facts or the conclusions, and the only reason for working over the ground again and presenting the results here is that the scholars whom it most concerns to know about the subject almost universally ignore the previous investigations, and are content to take their facts and opinions directly or indirectly from Gfroerer and Weber. In the case of Metatron, on the other hand, there appeared to be room for a new philological and historical study of the whole problem, such as will occupy the rest of this article.

Christian attention was first directed to Metatron by cabalistic studies, and it was from the Cabala and commentators who interpreted the Old Testament in the spirit and sense of the Cabala that Christian theologians got the notions about him with which subsequent investigation has generally set out. Metatron was for them an angel of the highest order, or a mysterious being of higher than angelic rank, who was in a peculiar sense a mediator and intercessor with God. Hermann Witsius (d. 1708) was tempted to surmise that even the name Metatron itself might be a deflected form of the Latin *mediator*, 'nam qui Mediatoris sunt, ea huic Angelo adtribuere solent.'¹ If, instead of starting with cabalistic mysteries, or mystifications, the investigation begins at the other end, there will be a better prospect of finding out who or what manner of thing Metatron was.

The oldest occurrence of the word is in Sifrè on Deut. 32, 49 (§ 338), that is, in a Palestinian work the final redaction of which falls early in the third century, but which in this part is a Midrash of the school of Ishmael three quarters of a century earlier.² Moses is bidden to ascend Mount Nebo in the land of Moab opposite Jericho, 'and see the land of Canaan, which I am going to give the Israelites as a possession.' On this R. Eliezer comments: 'With his finger he (God) was a *metatron* to Moses³ and showed him the whole land of Israel; so far the boundaries of Ephraim; so far the boundaries of Manasseh.'⁴ According to R. Joshua, Moses saw it for himself; God gave

him such powerful eyesight that he saw from one end of the world to the other.⁵ The word *meṭaṭron* was explained by R. Moses ben Naḥman and Eshtori Parḥi as 'one who shows the way,' a guide, and a corresponding gloss has found its way into the text of Sifrè.⁶

Another occurrence in a Palestinian Midrash is in Bereshith Rabbah 5, 4 (on Gen. 1, 9): 'R. Levi said, Some interpreters interpret with Ben Azzai and Ben Zoma,⁷ that the voice of God was made a *meṭaṭron*⁸ over the waters, according to the words, 'The voice of the Lord was over the waters' (Psalm 29, 3). The question, as appears from the preceding context, was how the waters found their way into the ocean when God gathered them together in one place; the answer, The voice of the Lord guided them. The interpretation of Ben Azzai is cited (independently of Bereshith Rabbah) by R. Berechiah in Midrash Tehillim on Psalm 93, 3 (§ 5, end); 'The voice of God was a *meṭaṭor* before them.' The Aruk⁹ quotes from Midrash Yelammedenu on Deut. 2, 31 (Behold I have begun to deliver Sihon and his land before thee): 'If that gives thee concern, I am thy *meṭaṭor*. Do not wonder at these words; am I not hereafter going to be made a *meṭaṭor* before an uncircumcised man, Cyrus, as it is written, 'I will go before thee, and make the crooked places straight,' etc. (Isa. 45, 2); I am going to go before a woman, before Deborah and Barak, as it is said, 'Is not the Lord gone out before thee' (Judges 4, 14).

Besides this passage, which is not preserved in our recensions of the Midrash Tanḥuma, the Aruk cites in this sense, from the same source at the end of the Parashah Ki Tissa (on Exod. 34, 27), where, in answer to the intercession of Moses for the people after the sin of the golden calf, God recounts his ill-requited goodness to Israel: 'And not only that, but in the desert I go before them as *meṭaṭor*—'The Lord goeth before them by day' (Exod. 13, 21)—levelling down for them the heights and levelling up the depressions' (cf. Isa. 40, 3 f.).¹⁰ In the same sense, and with the same Scripture reference, we find in a later Midrash on Exod. 23, 20, 'Behold, I send an angel,' etc.:¹¹ 'God said to Israel, When you were worthy of it, I myself was made a messenger (*shalih*) for you, as I did for you in the

desert, as it is said, The Lord went before them by day (Exod. 13, 21); but now that ye are not worthy, I turn you over to a messenger (*shalih*), as it is said, Behold, I send an angel,' etc. (Exod. 23, 20.).¹² At the plea of Moses (Exod. 33, 12 ff.), however, the captain (*sar*, cf. Josh. 5, 4, and below, p. 65) did not actually assume authority over them till the death of Moses. Here God going before Israel in the desert is called *shalih*, precisely as in the passage first quoted from the Tanhuma (Yelammedenu) he is called *meṭaṭor*; the two words are equivalent in sense. A third example given in the Aruk, also from Yelammedenu, is from the Parashah Balak (on Num. 22, 36: Balak heard that Balaam was come), 'Showing that they had sent *meṭaṭorin* (plur.) before him.'¹³ From these passages R. Nathan gathers that the idea in *meṭaṭor* is, 'preceding, going on before.'¹⁴ The substitution in our texts of the Tanhuma on Num. 1. c. of *sheluhim* (lit., persons sent on a mission or with a message, the Hebrew word represented in the New Testament by ἀπόστολος) is a correct interpretation from the context. In all the passages thus far cited *meṭaṭron* or *meṭaṭor* — the forms interchange in parallels and variants — is an appellative; and except in the last it is God himself (or his finger or his voice) that is the *meṭaṭron* or *meṭaṭor*. In all the context requires some such general sense as 'one who leads or shows the way, one who goes in advance.'¹⁵

In the Babylonian Talmud *Meṭaṭron* is an angel. The passages in which he appears are few, and it will not take us too far to examine them all. In the first of these (Sanhedrin 38b) R. Naḥman (ben Isaac) narrates a controversy between R. Idi (probably a Palestinian teacher of that name in the latter part of the fourth century) and a heretic (*min*), as an example of the right way to answer such cavils. The heretic quoted Exod. 24, 1, 'And to Moses he said, Ascend unto the Lord,' etc. Why not, Ascend unto Me? The Rabbi replied: It means *Meṭaṭron*,¹⁶ whose name is like the name of his master,¹⁷ as the Scripture says, 'for My name is in him.' 'If that is so, you should worship him.'¹⁸ 'It is written, Do not exchange me for him.' 'What does it mean then by the words, 'He will not pardon your transgression?''¹⁹ 'In solemn truth! we did not

accept him even as a precursor,²⁰ for it is written, 'And he (Moses) said to Him, If Thy presence (פניך) go not (with us), lead us not up hence' (Exod. 33, 15). Metatron is here identified with the angel whom God proposed to send before the Israelites to watch over and protect them in the desert and lead them to the place God had prepared for them (Exod. 23, 1-4; 32, 34), but whose offices Moses declined — unless God personally accompanied the expedition, he was unwilling to set out on it. That Moses did thus refuse to set out under the conduct of an angel is deduced in the Tanhuma from the same texts. The same angel was later sent to Joshua (Josh. 5, 13 ff.); he announces himself as the captain of the Lord's host (ibid. vs. 14), and says: 'Twice have I come to bring Israel into its inheritance. It was I who came in the days of Moses thy master, and he rejected me, and was not willing that I should go; now I am come again.'²¹ Substantially the same is repeated in later compilations;²² see also Bereshith Rabbah 97, 3.

From this survey of the usage of *meṭaṭor* and *meṭatron* we may proceed to the question of etymology. That מטטור is nothing but the Latin word *metator* written in Hebrew letters was recognized long ago by both Jewish and Christian scholars, and *meṭatron* was rightly taken to be only another form of the same word.²³ Thus R. Moses ben Nahman (d. ca. 1270), in his latest and greatest work, the commentary on the Penta-teuch, on Exod. 12, 12, identifies the envoy (*shalih*) from God to accomplish all that God did in the land of Canaan, with 'the great angel who on that account (*sc.* as being an envoy) is called *meṭatron*; for the meaning of the latter word is 'one who shows the way,' as we read in Sifrè, (etc. adducing the passages from Sifrè and Yelammedenu quoted above), and so in many places. And I have heard that 'messenger' in Latin is *metator*.'²⁴ The same derivation is given by Elias Levita in his glossary entitled 'Tisbe' (1542): 'I have heard from the cardinal, my pupil,²⁵ that *metator* in Latin is a messenger (*shalih*), and this is perhaps the explanation.' More exactly, Benjamin Mussafia, in a supplementary note to the article in the Aruk (ed. Amsterdam, 1655), from his own knowl-

edge of Latin, writes: '*Metator* in Latin is an officer who goes in advance of an army to select for the soldiers a halting place and quarters for the night.' Similarly another learned lexicographer, David Cohen de Lara, in his '*Ir David*,'²⁶ a glossary of the foreign words found in rabbinical writings. He defines *metator* in Hebrew and Latin as a military 'quarter-master' (its meaning in Roman law), and adds the Spanish equivalent, '*aposentador*.'

This was also the common opinion of the learned among Christians in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The most complete exposition of this, with an almost exhaustive array of the evidence, is given by Danz, where also other theories are discussed.²⁷

Danz presented at length the use and meaning of *metator* in Latin.²⁹ Thus Vegetius gives the military definition: '*Metator dicitur, qui praecedens locum castris deligit*.' Another writer on the military art describes *metatores* as '*Antegestores, qui ante agmen eunt, et loca castris metandis idonea deligunt, et viam, qua duci exercitus commode possit, vident*.' From Christian authors³⁰ are quoted Optatus, *Contra Donatistas*, iii: *Cum ante venturos milites metatores, ut fieri adsolet, mitterentur*. Cyprian, *Epist.* 6, 4, exhorts his readers to follow the courageous example of the presbyter and confessor Rogatianus, qui . . . *primum hospitium in carcere prae-paravit et metator quodammodo vester nunc quoque vos antecedit*. See also Cyprian, *Epist.* 22, 1: *Nam tu Deo volente ipsum anguem majorem metatorem Antichristi . . . deteruisiti*. Ambrose, *Exameron* v, 10: *Quis imperator piscibus praeceptum dedit, quis doctor hanc tribuit disciplinam, qui metatores itinera disponunt, qui duces iter dirigunt, ut nullius desit occursus?*³¹

Metator thus had an evolution closely parallel to the English 'harbinger';³² 'One sent on before to purvey lodgings for an army, a royal train, etc.; . . . a pioneer who prepares the way. One that goes before and announces the approach of some one; a forerunner.'³³ And if 'harbinger' were not in modern English so bookish and so predominately figurative, it would be the best rendering for the Hebrew *meṭaṭor*, *meṭaṭron*.

The latest authors to deal with the subject at length, Oesterley and Box, 'cannot agree with the writer on this subject in the Jewish Encyclopedia [Ludwig Blau] when he says that 'the derivation from the Latin *metator* (= 'guide') is doubtless correct.' They have two objections: *First*, it is Elisha ben Abuyah who first refers to Metatron under this name; the belief regarding Metatron must consequently have been much earlier than his time (first half of the second century); so early a date makes it improbable that the word is derived from the Latin, for Roman influence upon Jewish literature is not likely to have been strong enough to lead Jewish teachers to adopt a Latin word; a Latin derivation is all the less likely because the word first occurs in the Babylonian Talmud. *Second*, in Latin *metator* means 'divider,' or 'measurer,'³⁴ not 'guide.' 'It would be difficult to point to any instance of the Latin word being used in this sense.' As regards the latter point it is sufficient to refer to the 'instances' quoted above, which are not 'difficult to point to,' inasmuch as since the end of the seventeenth century they, with others, e.g. from the codes and the civil lawyers, have stood in the dictionary to which a scholar would first go with such a question, and are all cited in full by Danz. The first objection is equally baseless. That 'it is Elisha ben Abuyah who first refers to Metatron under this name,' is a complication of errors.³⁵ The story about the origin of Elisha's heresy will be discussed later. Suffice it here to say that in that story Elisha does not 'refer to Metatron under this name' at all. That the occurrence of the word in a Babylonian story of uncertain date *about* Elisha is proof that the word and idea were current in the age and environment of the hero of the story³⁶ is a kind of inference that might have curious results: for example, the translated Enoch is called Metatron, therefore the word and the idea are older than the flood. And finally, the probability or improbability of Latin words having found their way into rabbinical Hebrew or the vernacular Aramaic is not to be decided by what the authors deem antecedently probable, but by reading the literature; in default of which the special glossaries to words borrowed from Greek and Latin might profitably be consulted — Krauss,

for example. In the particular case before us it should be observed that from the time of the Roman occupation of Syria Latin military terms — and such *metator* is — for which there was no exact equivalent in Hebrew or Aramaic were adopted with especial frequency. The authors must have forgotten that in the Gospels not only Jesus but the poor demoniac use the Latin *legio*.

The derivation from the Latin *metator* did not yield a sense that seemed adequate to the rank and functions of Metatron in mystical and cabalistic writings; and, assuming that the name must have been coined to express his exalted station in that literature, scholars sought for etymologies corresponding to their interpretation of the figure.³⁷

In cabalistic vein R. Bahya ben Asher (Behai) in his commentary on Exod. 23, 21,³⁸ finds in the word Metatron two meanings, 'lord' and 'messenger,' deriving the former from the rabbinical (really Latin) *matrona*³⁹ and the latter from the Greek, in which a messenger is called *mentator* (sic!).⁴⁰ For good measure, he offers a third derivation for a piece of the word: *maṭrat* stands in the Targum for Hebrew *shemirah* ('keeping, protection'), 'and because he is the keeper of the world he is called the keeper of Israel.' By inverting the process, he deduces circularly from the etymology that Metatron is the lord of all beings of lower rank, for all the host above and below are in his authority and under his power; and he is an envoy (messenger) of Him who is over him, and higher than he is He who gave him dominion over the universe and appointed him lord of His house and manager of all His possessions (cf. Gen. 24, 2). The ם in the middle of his name are numerically 18, and thus equivalent to ן ('living'). It is no wonder that Christian scholars found in Bahya's Metatron all they were looking for.

The etymology which in recent times has enjoyed the most approbation derives the name from *μετά* and *θρόνος*. The merit — whatever it is — of being the inventor of this pun is frequently attributed to some modern who has repeated it without due credit to his predecessors.⁴¹ The first to propose it, so far as I know, was J. H. Maius, Professor at Giessen, in

his *Synopsis Theologiae Judaicae* (1698), p. 72. He submits it to the judgment of the learned as a modest conjecture, 'an non commodius longe ac vulgo fit (*sc.* from *metator*) ex Graecis vocibus μετά et θρόνον deduci queat, ut innuatur Angelus σύνθρονος Dei, seu ejusdem throni, majestatis et gloriae cum Deo Patre participi,' etc. Hengstenberg⁴² cites Maius, and, of more recent authors, Joh. Fried. Meyer, 'Blätter für höhere Wahrheit' (Sammlung iv (1822), p. 168).⁴³ Hengstenberg rejects the derivation for the very good reason that μετάθρονος is not even a Greek word. Gfroerer, however, into whose Alexandrian theosophy in Palestine such a divine assessor fitted as well as into the old orthodoxy, and who was not deterred by philological scruples, accepted the etymology; Metatron is the being who is μετά τὸν θρόνον θεοῦ. Inasmuch as the rabbis adopted into their vocabulary both πάρεδρος and συγκάθεδρος, and if these did not satisfy them, could as easily have borrowed σύνθρονος, it is not clear why they should have taken the trouble to invent μετάθρονος. Modern authors who maintain this derivation are bound to attempt some explanation of the second *τ* in *metatron* — for Greek *theta* in that age we should expect Hebrew *tau*.

The last named difficulty is escaped by another etymological figment; *metatron* is μετά + τύραννος (*μετατύραννον*), a factitious word which is defined, 'one who stands next in rank to the ruler.'⁴⁴ It is a further objection — if any other is needed — that in Hebrew the borrowed words τύραννος, τυραννία seem to be uniformly spelled מִיִּר.

Another etymology, about the priority in which there seems to be some rivalry, discovers in מיטטרון (pronounce, Mittron) the name of the god Mithra. Its most notable advocate was Alexander Kohut.⁴⁵ Hamburger (*Real-Encyclopaedie für Bibel und Talmud*, II, 781) enumerates several predecessors, beginning with Fried. Nork,⁴⁶ 'Brahminen und Rabbinen,' 1836. The honor seems to belong, however, to a Christian scholar, Heinrich Ed. Schmieder, who propounded the theory in an excursus to his 'Nova Interpretatio loci Paulini Galat. iii. 19-20' (1826; pp. 41-48).⁴⁷ Schmieder briefly recites and despatches the older attempts on the word as he found them

in Danz, as well as Meyer's *μετάθρονος*, and then proposes his own solution: Mittron or Mettron is Mithras. He tries to show that the Jews were capable of disguising the name in so remarkable a manner — which, in view of other achievements, can not be unqualifiedly denied — but is chiefly moved by the remarkable agreement he finds between the character and functions of Mithras and the Jewish 'Mittron,' dwelling particularly, as might be expected, on Mithras as *μεσίτης*,⁴⁸ 'mediator,' on which aspect of his nature Creuzer had expatiated. Schmieder then develops with considerable ingenuity the theory that these Persian doctrines were introduced and cultivated among the Jews by the Essenes, comparing the teachings and observances of the latter as described by Philo and Josephus with accounts of Persian customs.

Retracing our steps from this excursion into the vagaries of etymology, two passages in the Babylonian Talmud remain to be examined. One of these is the story about Elisha ben Abuyah to which allusion has already been made. A second century tradition (*baraita*) preserved in both Talmuds,⁴⁹ tells, in a few obscure words, of four eminent teachers of theosophical leanings in the generation before Hadrian — Ben Azzai, Ben Zoma, 'Aḥer' (Elisha ben Abuyah), and Akiba — who 'entered Paradise,'⁵⁰ and of the disastrous effect what they saw there had on the first three: one of them gazed and died; another gazed and was stricken with madness; Aḥer gazed and 'cut down the plants'; Akiba alone came off unscathed. The cryptic phrase, 'cut down the plants,' is explained in the Jerusalem Talmud as meaning that he visited the schools and persuaded youths to abandon the study of the law, and take to such trades as those of builders, carpenters, hunters, tailors. The 'plants' are thus the young scholars in the rabbinical seminaries. In the Babylonian Talmud a different story is told: 'Aḥer saw (in Paradise) Metatron, to whom permission had been given to be seated while he recorded the good deserts of Israelites. Whereupon Aḥer exclaimed, We have been taught that in heaven no one (except God) sits Can it be that there are two supreme powers!' Metatron was chastised with sixty lashes of fire⁵¹ for having given occasion for such an error by

not rising; he was directed to erase from the record the good deeds of Aḥer; and a heavenly voice was heard saying, 'Return (repent), ye apostate children (Jer. 3, 14) — except Aḥer!' ⁵²

The remaining mention of Metatron in the Babylonian Talmud is in Abodah Zarah 3b, according to which among God's regular occupations in heaven is to give religious instruction for three hours — the last quarter of the day — to children whose early death has deprived them of opportunity to study the Torah on earth.⁵³ If it be asked, Who teaches them in the earlier part of the day? it may be answered, Metatron. In both these places Metatron has a special office in heaven in relation to Israelites, the recorder of their good works, the teacher of children who died in infancy. These are offices that might be performed by any angel appointed to them, and there is nothing in either context to suggest that Metatron was a being of a different nature or one who stood in a peculiar relation to God; nor that he was in any sense a 'mediator' between God and Israel. An examination of these passages — the only places where the name occurs — shows that the beginnings of the Metatron mythology, if so it should be called, in the Babylonian Talmud are extremely modest.⁵⁴

A higher rank and larger functions are attributed to Metatron by recent writers on the subject on the ground of certain titles which are said to be given him. Thus Weber: 'In Hullin 60a and Yebamot 16b he bears the name שר העולם, Prince of the World; he represents God's sovereignty (*Herrscherstellung*) in the world.' Oesterley and Box, confidently following Weber, refer to 'two passages, one from the Babylonian and one from the Jerusalem Talmud, in which Metatron bears the title of Prince of the World; a title which more probably implies that he is the representative of God in the world.'⁵⁵ As I pointed out in a former article (Vol. XIV, p. 237), Weber apparently fell into his error by a careless reading of Levy, Chaldäisches Wörterbuch II, 231, who refers to the Tosafot on the two places cited, where is found, however, not an identification of the *sar ha-'olam* with Metatron, but a discussion of a difficulty which Rabbenu Tam (d. 1171) discovered in certain

inconsistent expressions about Metatron in two mediaeval synagogue hymns. The question is, how could Metatron, according to one of them the translated Enoch who from flesh was turned to fire, be the *sar ha-'olam* with whom the other seems to identify him, when according to Hullin *l.c.* the *sar ha-'olam* sounded the praises of God at the creation (Psalm 104, 31), generations before Enoch was born? The outcome does not concern us; the important thing is that if there had been any Talmudic authority for the identification of the *sar ha-'olam* with Metatron there would have been no room for the discussion. It may be observed also that in Sanhedrin 94a, *sar ha-'olam* is interpreted by Rashi simply as an angel to whom the whole world is committed, without any hint of identification. The Responsum quoted below (note 73) identifies the angel of Gen. 48, 16 and Isa. 63, 9 with Metatron 'whom the rabbis call the prince of the presence,' but makes no mention of the greater title, 'prince of the world.'

Sar ha-panim, a frequent title of Metatron in post-Talmudic literature, is most simply explained as a breviloquence, the prince, or chief, of the class who are called 'angels of the presence,' that is those who have immediate access to God's presence, like the principal ministers of a monarch who customarily attend in his presence. Cabalistic speculation, however, made it 'the prince who *is* the Presence' and taught that this is meant in Exod. 33, 14, 'My Presence shall go with thee'; so also in 'the angel of His Presence delivered them' — the angel who is His Presence.⁵⁷

Metator, Metatron, was, as has been shown, originally an appellative, in meaning and use corresponding closely to the English 'harbinger.' In the three places where it is found in the Babylonian Talmud it is the name of an angel. It is, however, a name of unusual type,⁵⁸ for the names of angels are generally compounds containing the word *el*, 'God,' after the pattern of the biblical Gabriel and Michael. It is therefore a pertinent question whether the angel who is designated in the Midrash by the appellative and named in the Talmud by the appropriated appellative — if it be the same angel — is one who is otherwise known to us under a proper name.

We have seen that R. Idi,⁵⁹ in his answer to the heretic, declares with emphasis that so far from worshipping Metatron, the Israelites would not accept him even as a 'precursor' when God offered to send him before them to guard them on their way and guide them to the place prepared for them (Exod. 23, 20). It was this angel, who after the death of Moses appeared to Joshua (Josh. 5, 13 ff.).⁶⁰ As 'the captain of the Lord's host,' he was identified by mediaeval commentators⁶¹ with Michael who is 'one of the chief princes,' 'your prince' (Dan. 10, 13, 21), 'the great prince' (*ibid.* 12, 1), the champion of the Jews.⁶² According to others, it was Michael who led the Israelites through the desert.

At an earlier point in the same discussion Rabbi Idi answers the question, Who is the subject in the words, 'Unto Moses he said, Ascend unto the Lord'? by saying, 'The speaker is Metatron, whose name is like the name of his master.' The same exegetical difficulty is discovered by the Palestinian Targum on Exod. 24, 1, and resolved: 'Unto Moses, Michael, the prince of wisdom, said, on the seventh day of the month, Go up before (into the presence of) the Lord.'⁶³ At the death of Moses, when God is lamenting his loss, asking who now will intercede for Israel when they sin, Metatron came and fell on his face, and said, Lord of the World, in his life Moses was Thine and in his death he is Thine.'⁶⁴ In the parallel narrative in Midrash Mishle, 'Michael came and prostrated himself before God, and said, Lord of the World, in his life he was Thine, and in his death he is Thine.'⁶⁵

Metatron appears in a somewhat similar rôle in one of the collections of proems, or introductions, for the use of synagogue preachers which are prefixed to the old Palestinian Midrash on Lamentations. God was mourning over the destruction of the temple; he had no longer a dwelling place on earth.⁶⁶ 'In that hour Metatron came and fell upon his face and said, 'Lord of the World, I will weep, but Thou shalt not weep.' God replied, 'If thou do not let me weep now I will enter into a place into which thou art not permitted to enter, and will weep (there), as it is written, 'If ye will not hear it, My soul shall weep in secret for your pride' (Jer. 13, 17).'⁶⁷

Even in late mystical texts the same functions are attributed to Metatron and to Michael. The most striking example of this is the presenting offerings in the celestial sanctuary. In the Talmud this is the office of Michael — 'Michael the great prince stands and offers upon the altar.'⁶⁸ In one recension of the Seder Gan Eden, a mediaeval work, we read that in the highest heaven (Araboth) the great prince Michael stands, with an altar before him, and offers upon the altar the souls of the righteous.⁶⁹ In another mediaeval Midrash this office is performed by Metatron. 'R. Simeon said, In the hour when God bade Israel to erect the tabernacle he made a sign to the ministering angels that they should make a tabernacle, and at the time when it was erected below, it was erected above.'⁷⁰ This is the tabernacle of the Youth whose name is Metatron in which he offers the souls of the righteous to atone for Israel in the days of their exile.'⁷¹

In various places, particularly in Palestinian sources, we thus find the name Michael where parallel passages have Metatron. In explanation of this fact the following hypothesis may be advanced. The word *meṭaṭor*, or *meṭaṭron*, as an appellation, meaning one who leads the way, was first used of God himself, particularly in reference to the migration of Israel from Egypt to Canaan, or of the angel whom he commissioned to guard and guide them in the way and bring them to their destination — whether it was thought that he actually led them through the desert, or that at Moses' petition his commission was suspended, so that he did not assume his leadership until after the death of Moses, when he announced himself to Joshua before Jericho as the captain of the Lord's host. If it was asked who this angel leader was, the inevitable answer would be Michael, the captain ('prince') whom God had appointed over his people, their champion and protector.⁷²

All the offices and function of the angel Metatron in the older sources, and even in the Babylonian Talmud, are such as might naturally be ascribed to the guardian angel of the Jews.⁷³ The Metatron whom Elisha ben Abuyah saw in heaven was sitting (by special privilege) and recording the good deserts of Israelites, an appropriate occupation for their special patron; and

no other angel could more appropriately share with God himself the task of instructing in religion the little souls whose early death had deprived them of human teachers. So again, when God would weep over the destruction of the temple, the words, 'I will weep, but do not thou weep,' have a fitness and a force in the mouth of the angel to whom Israel was committed as his peculiar charge; while they lack this point altogether if supposed to be spoken by some mythical associate divinity. Similarly, when God, bewailing the death of Moses, asks who now will stand between the people and His righteous indignation, it is most fitly the angelic advocate of Israel who reminds Him that Moses is still His; that is, I take it, that Moses may intercede for Israel in heaven as he had done on earth. Even in a late apocalyptic book, the *Sefer Zerubbabel*, Metatron says: 'I am the angel who led Abraham in all the land of Canaan; it was I who ransomed Isaac and wrestled with Jacob at the ford of Jabbok; and I that led Israel in the wilderness forty years in the name of the Lord; I who appeared to Joshua at Gilgal. I am he whose name is like the name of his master, and his name is in me.'⁷⁴ These are things that are regularly ascribed to Michael, and in the text itself the name Michael slips in for the angel who makes the revelation to Zerubbabel and is otherwise consistently called Metatron.⁷⁵ Metator was a foreign word; the precise technical meaning which so well suited the earlier contexts in which we find it used easily passed in ordinary apprehension into the vaguer sense of 'one who leads, or shows, the way,' which is current in Jewish commentators and lexicographers. In Babylonia especially, where Roman military terms were not familiar as they were in Palestine, it was naturally taken for a proper name instead of an appellative, the proper name of an angel; though even there the association with Michael was not wholly forgotten.⁷⁶

Detached from the original connection with the exodus, Metatron became more exclusively a celestial figure, such as he is in the story of Elisha ben Abuyah's fall, or when he is the teacher of children in the school of heaven. This is as far as the Babylonian Talmud goes. As *sar ha-panim* he is the chief of the 'angels of the presence' who have immediate access to

God. In the succeeding Gaonic period, however, there was a notable revival of curiosity about the mysteries of heaven and earth such as at a much earlier time gave origin to apocalypses like Enoch, with a corresponding recurrence to apocalyptic tours through the heavens under angelic conduct; and, as in the earlier time, with its mystery of creation and its chariot speculation, a theosophic motive enters into these adventures — it is one of the main sources of the older Cabala.

In this literature, which, characteristically enough, produced new Enoch books and descriptions by the mystical travellers of the heavens that rise one above another to the highest and the throne of God itself, with the angelic hierarchy that inhabits them, Metatron has a prominent place. It does not fall within the scope of our present investigation to accompany Metatron through this literature, much less to pursue him into the later Cabala. On one point, however, a word must be said. It has been argued above that the angel Metatron was originally Michael. In the writings now under consideration Metatron is commonly the translated Enoch.⁷⁷ What led to this identification can only be conjectured. The most probable hypothesis is perhaps that it originated in the occupation of Metatron in the story of Elisha ben Abuyah, where he appears as a recording angel;⁷⁸ for a similar function is attributed to Enoch in the Book of Jubilees 4, 23: 'He was taken away from among men, and we conducted him into the Garden of Eden (Paradise) with majesty and honor, and behold he writes there the judgment and the sentence upon the world, and all the evil deeds of mankind.'⁷⁹ So also Enoch (in heaven) is addressed, 'Enoch, thou scribe of righteousness' (Enoch 12, 4; 15, 1). To the same office the Palestinian Targum on Gen. 5, 24 probably refers: 'Enoch worshipped in truth before the Lord, and he was not found among the inhabitants of the earth, for he was rapt away and ascended to the firmament by the word of God, and his name was called Mitatron, the great scribe.'⁸⁰

Inasmuch as flesh and blood have no place in that upper world, God transformed Enoch's body into the fiery matter of which angels are made.⁸¹ He prepared him a throne just like

His own, covered with similar tapestry, and caused to be proclaimed that He had appointed him prince and chief of all the princes of His kingdom and all the celestial beings except the eight honored and revered princes who are called Ihvh, by His own eternal name. Every angel who has anything to communicate with God is to come to Metatron and speak to him, and whatever he bids them in God's name they shall observe and do, because he is the prince of wisdom and of intelligence, which minister to him and instruct him in heavenly and earthly wisdom, the wisdom of this world and the mystery of the world to come. He is also appointed over all of the temple on high, and over all the storehouses of life in the highest heavens. Metatron-Enoch has seventy names corresponding to the seventy languages of earth, but God himself calls him 'Youth' (נער).

This name, Youth, is explained by Metatron himself: it was given him by the ministering angels over whom he was set, because he was a junior among them and a youth (in comparison with the angels of the original creation).⁸² It is this late assumption into the angelic ranks that is urged in the Tosafot against the identification of Metatron-Enoch with the Talmudic *sar ha-'olam*.⁸³ If a modern conjecture, at variance with the explanation above put into the mouth of Metatron, is legitimate, the suggestion may be ventured that 'Enoch, the Youth,' has no more recondite origin than a purely verbal association with Prov. 22, 6 (חנך לנער על פי דרכו). It is easy to see how convenient these lucubrations were to Christian scholars in search of a Jewish counterpart to the Second Person of the Trinity. By way of the equivalence of the uncreated Metatron and Shekinah which the cabalists offered them, they found what they required; and the more concrete Metatron answered their purpose even better than the (etymologically) abstract Shekinah.⁸⁴

By a similar equation they found the Messiah in Metatron. The Jews recognized Metatron in Jacob's angel 'redeemer' (Gen. 48, 16), the 'angel of His presence' who saved God's people (Isa. 63, 9), the 'angel of the covenant' who was suddenly to come to his temple (Mal. 3, 1), and, in general, in the

Angel of the Lord, whose personality so often seems to merge into that of the Lord himself. Christians identified this angel with Christ in his office under the old dispensation — the Messiah designate, we might say. Thus, by the axiom that things which are equal to the same thing are equal to each other, it was proved that Metatron was the Messiah.

The Christian authors who maintain this deceive themselves by a fallacy of equivocation. There is no evidence that the Jews associated either the Angel of the Lord or Metatron with the Messiah. Hengstenberg, indeed, avers that 'the identity of the Angel of Jehovah, or Metatron, with the Messiah was recognized even by the later Jews'; but, besides the fact that in the New Testament this 'is assumed to be universally accepted,' he adduces only a single passage from the Zohar (through Sommer, p. 35),⁸⁵ where there is nothing whatever about the Messiah, but in which he finds a prediction of the incarnation of Metatron in a mother's womb⁸⁶ — certainly a singular mark by which to recognize a Jewish reference to the Messiah!

To summarize the results of this wide-ranging and in part intricate investigation: 1. *Meṭaṭron* (*meṭaṭron*) is originally an appellative, the Latin *metator*, borrowed and first used in its proper, almost technical, sense, an officer who goes in advance of an army to choose and mark out the site of a camp, and to explore and indicate the route by which the halting place is to be reached. Israel's *metator* in the desert was God himself, or an angel assigned and commissioned by him to this task; this office was most naturally filled by Michael, the champion of the Jews. 2. In two passages in the Babylonian Talmud Metatron is the proper name of an angel whose office in heaven indicates a peculiar relation to Israel and interest in them; and in this stage the same offices, notably the ministry at the celestial altar with the offering of the souls of the righteous, and the same predicates, are assigned in different sources, now to Michael, now to Metatron. 3. In the revived apocalyptic and cabalistic literature of the Gaonic period and after, the translated Enoch becomes Metatron; his earthly body is transmuted into fire, and he takes his place among the angels, over whom

he is advanced to the first rank and supreme rule, thus taking the place held in the older angelology by Michael. Theosophic speculation seizes upon this angelic mythology, and elevates Metatron to a still higher eminence, until as we have seen, he—more properly, it—is identified with the Shekinah; it is an emanation, not a creature; and, as the ‘middle column,’ unites the four worlds that are superimposed in stages (the worlds of emanations, of creative ideas, of creative formations, and of creative matter),⁸⁷ etc.

In all this, from the metaphor in which he begins to the metaphysical myth in which he ends, whatever else Metatron may be or do, whether he is an individual created angel or an emanation from the Absolute, he is neither in function, nor in essence an ‘intermediary,’ or ‘mediator,’ in the sense in which that word is generally understood and in which it is intended by those who write about him in that category. As if the cabalistic myths were not fantastic enough, Christian theologians have added to them their own, at first to claim him for their Christology, latterly to discredit Judaism with him.

NOTES — II. METATRON

1. *Miscellanea Sacra*, lib. i, c. 17, § 7. For a modern instance, see p. 70, and below, n. 71.

2. See D. Hoffmann, *Zur Einleitung in die halachischen Midraschim*, 1887.

3. Another reading is, 'The finger of God was made a *metaṭron*,' etc. So quoted by R. Moses ben Naḥman on Exod. 12, 12; Eshtori Parḥi, Kaftor u-Perah, f. 49b (ed. Berlin, 1852, f. 34b).

4. Compare R. Akiba (Sifrè on Num. 27, 12, § 136), 'God showed Moses all the divisions (lit., compartments) of the land of Israel like a table laid out.'

5. The Rabbis named, Eliezer ben Hyrcanus and his most frequent opponent Joshua ben Hananiah, were disciples of Johanan ben Zakkai and flourished in the generation after the fall of Jerusalem. In Sifrè on Num. 27, 12 (§ 136) it is the latter interpretation that is ascribed to Eliezer. See Bacher, *Agada der Tannaiten*, I, 2 ed. 148.

6. Compare also Yalkut *in loc.* (§ 949). See the explanation in Pesikta Zutarta cited in Friedmann's note on Sifrè, Deut. *loc. cit.*

7. Contemporaries of Akiba, in the first third of the second century. See below, p. 70.

8. כַּמְטָרוֹן. Variants (Theodor, p. 34): מִטְטָרוֹר, מִטְטָרוֹר, *al.* In the editio princeps and those that follow it: R. Levi said, Some interpreters interpret with Ben Azzai and Ben Zoma, The voice of God was made a *metaṭron* to Moses in the hour when He said to him, Go up to Mount Abarim (Deut. 32, 49)—it guided him to the unknown spot where he was to die and be buried). The voice of God was made a *metaṭron* over the waters, etc.

9. The first great lexicon of the language of the Talmud and Midrash, compiled by Nathan ben Jehiel of Rome (d. 1106). This lexicon contains many quotations from works no longer extant, and many readings in extant works representing an earlier and often better text than our editions.

10. Tanḥuma, Ki Tissa, *loc.*

11. On this passage, which is often referred to in the following pages, there is a learned monograph by Joh. Jac. Cramer, *Custos Israelis, seu Dissertatio philologico-theologica in Exodi cap. xxiii. v. 20, 21, 22, 23, qua Angelum Israelis tutorem unigenitum Dei filium, et verum aeternumque Deum esse solide, etiam ex Hebraeorum consensu demonstratur*. 1705. Cf. also his *Dissert. in Exod. xxxiii. 1-6; 12 ff., xxxiv. 5-10*.

12. Shemoth Rabbah on Exod. 23, 20 (edit. Wilna, 1884, c. 32, 2, f. 60b).

13. So Aruk, edit. prin. (see Kohut, *s. v.*); later editions, *metaṭor* (sing.). Tanḥuma, Balak § 10: 'Showing that he (Balak) had sent messengers (*sheluḥim*) to apprise him' (of Balaam's approach); ed. Buber, § 14, 'messengers to Balak to apprise him.'

14. He suggests a possible etymology in a different sense, from Aram. נָטַר, 'keep, protect,' equivalent to Hebrew שָׁמַר (cf. Exod. 23, 20).

15. See also Yalkut, Gen. § 44 (from Midrash Abkir): 'God despatched *Metaṭron* as a messenger (*shaliḥ*) to Shemḥazai,' one of the angels who fell. It is possible that *shaliḥ* is a gloss. Cf. Jellinek, *Bet ha-Midrash IV*, 127 f., and the *Book of Enoch*, 12, 4 ff.

16. The words are ambiguous: Was it the Lord who bade Moses ascend to Metatron, or Metatron who bade him ascend to the Lord? The cabalists were divided on this question (Recanati, quoted by Danz, pp. 735 f.); modern scholars equally. Bacher takes the former alternative; Kohut the latter.

17. See below, n. 72.

18. I.e. do not exchange (confound) me with him; taking אל תמירני בו 'do not rebel against him' as אל תמירני בו (cf. Jer. 2, 11). The same explanation is given in Shemoth Rabbah 32, 4. where a commentator correctly remarks, 'Do not imagine that he is God.'

19. The heretic's argument is that 'he will not' implies that he has the power to do so, a power that is a divine prerogative.

20. פרוונקא, a Persian word found elsewhere in the Talmud in the sense of 'precursor, courier, messenger,' corresponding thus in general sense with *metator*, *metatron*, in the Palestinian sources discussed above. R. Hananel (on Sanh. loc.) interprets תייר ('scout').

21. Tanḥuma, Mishpatim, § 18 init.; ed. Buber § 10.

22. See especially Agadath Bereshith 32 (ed. Buber, p. 64 f.).

23. The ending *on* is appended to many foreign words where it does not properly belong. See S. Krauss, Griechische und Lateinische Lehnwörter, I, 192. With the doublet compare סנינור and סנינורן (*συνήγορος*).

24. 'The language of Javan,' might be Greek or Latin. These Rabbis seem to make no difference. The words of Ramban are translated in full by Danz, pp. 723 f.

25. Egidio of Viterbo, general of the Augustinian order, in whose house in Rome Elias lived for thirteen years (1513-27), as the cardinal's teacher, especially in the Cabala.

26. Subtitle (Latin): Sive de convenientia vocabulorum rabbinicorum cum Graecis et quibusdam aliis linguis Europaeis (1638).

27. J. A. Danz, Schekina cum piis cohabitans ad Joh. xiv, 23, Progr. iii-iv. (In Meuschen, Novum Testamentum ex Talmude illustratum (1736), pp. 721 ff.) Cf. also Joh. Jac. Cramer, Dissert. in Exod. xxiii, 20-23, pp. 103 ff. (1705).

29. Largely drawn — with due credit — from Du Cange, Glossarium ad scriptores mediae et infimae Latinitatis (1678).

30. These are the examples cited by Du Cange and from him by Danz. What I have done is to take the text from modern critical editions, and, where it seemed to conduce to the understanding of the passage, to quote a larger context.

31. Peter Chrysologus calls John the Baptist, Metator Domini.

32. Related to German 'Herberge,' originally, 'army quarters.'

33. Murray, New English Dictionary, s. v.

34. The authors evidently imagine that *metator* is derived from *metiri*!

35. The Jewish Encyclopedia (VIII, 519 — Ludwig Blau), which is alleged as authority for the statement, gives no excuse for the misunderstanding, nor does Hagigah 15a (not '15b'), which the authors cite but have evidently not read.

36. That the word is really as old as the beginning of the second century appears from the Palestinian sources quoted above. Why if, as the authors tell us, Elisha ben Abuyah (a Palestinian) used the word, a Latin derivation

is more improbable because the story as told in the Babylonian Talmud is inscrutable.

37. The propensity of dilettanti for displaying their ingenuity and their acquaintance with foreign dictionaries in combinations which justify the ancient jibe, 'Etymology is a science in which vowels count for nothing and consonants for very little,' is to be taken into account.

38. In ed. Amsterdam 1726, which I have used, f. 114a.

39. *Matrona*, *Matronita*, is a contribution from the *Cabala*. By a similar etymological path Levi ben Gerson (d. 1344), on Prov. 1, 8, 'Forsake not the teaching of thy mother,' identifies *metatron* with the *sekel ha-po'el* (active intellect) of his Aristotelian philosophy.

40. I.e. Latin *metator*. The *n* is Bahya's own addition to the confusion. Ramban, whom he is copying, has correctly *metator*. Buxtorf, who quotes the passage at length in his lexicon, makes the impossible conjecture that the author was thinking of *μηνύτωρ* (poetic for *μηνυτής*), which he renders by *nuncius*; in reality it means an informer (*delator*). Gfroerer charges this etymological juggling to Bahya. Danz guessed *mandatarius*!

41. Oesterley and Box express themselves as if this explanation originated with Weber.

42. *Christologie*, 2d ed. III. 2, p. 79.

43. 'Mitatron ist nämlich der Mitthroner Gottes, ὁ μέτοχος τοῦ θρόνου, ὁ σύνθρονος, oder der Herr, der zur Rechten des Herrn sitzt (Ps. cx. 1), der Sohn, der mit dem Vater auf seinem Throne sitzt (Apoc. iii, 21).'

44. Oesterley and Box, who, after Weber, give their readers the choice of *Metathronos* and *Metatyrranos*, remark: 'We cannot, however, follow Weber when he speaks of the analogy of the Crown Prince,' etc. This 'analogy' is not Weber's; it is a gratuitous ineptitude of Schnedermann in the second edition, who to Weber's 'der nächste nach dem Herrscher' adds '(gleichsam dem Kronprinz).'

45. 'Ueber die jüdische Angelologie und Dämonologie' (in *Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, IV. 3 (1866), and separately, pp. 36-42. Also in his *Aruch Completum*, V (1889), 119 f.

46. Pseudonym of Selig Korn.

47. An anniversary publication of Schul-Pforta, in which Schmieder was a professor. To this rather rare pamphlet I was directed by a reference in Hengstenberg.

48. Plutarch, *De Iside et Osiride*, 46. Many others have been captivated by the word *μεσίτης*, ignoring Plutarch's own interpretation, a middle thing between God and the Devil, or between light and darkness, or putting conjectures of their own in its place.

49. Tos. Hagigah 2, 3; Hagigah 14b-15; Jer. Hagigah, ii, 1 (f. 77b).

50. In a rapture (cf. Paul's account of such an experience, 2 Cor. 12, 1-4: he was 'rapt into Paradise and heard unutterable things, which it is not permitted a man to speak'). Such experiences are meant to be understood literally.

51. Since the bodies of angels are constituted of fire, this is the natural form of castigation.

52. On this passage see L. Ginzberg in the *Jewish Encyclopedia*, V, 138 f.; also Tosafot on Hag. 14b.

53. Deduced from Isa. 28, 9.

54. In the Jerusalem Talmud there is none of it.

55. *Op. cit.* p. 172. And on the next page (with the same references, Hullin 60a; Yebamot 16b): 'His function of representing God is perhaps seen most distinctly in the title that is given him of the 'Prince of the World' (*sar ha-'olam*), which shows that he was thought of as the ruler of the world.' That one of these passages in the Jerusalem Talmud is an original discovery. All that is said about the *sar ha-'olam* in the places cited is that he uttered certain verses of Scripture on certain occasions. In Hullin, when God said, 'after its kind,' of the trees (Gen. 1, 11), the *sar ha-'olam* said, 'May the glory of the Lord be forever; let the Lord rejoice in his works' (Psalm 104, 31). What prompted him to this ejaculation was that the grasses and herbs, notwithstanding that God did not say of them 'after its kind,' argue a fortiori that he could not mean them to be all mixed up, and accordingly appeared by species like the rest (vs. 12). In Yebamot the words of Psalm 37, 25, 'I have been young and now am old (yet have I not seen the righteous forsaken,' etc.), were uttered by the *sar ha-'olam*, upon occasion of the calamities described in Lam. 5, 11, 'They have ravished the women in Zion, the maidens in the cities of Judah.' In neither place does the name Metatron occur, nor anything that remotely suggests him. Neither has the *sar ha-'olam* here any symptom of a ruler of the world, or 'a kind of demiurge' (Levy). Rashi's laconic gloss in 'an angel.'

56. Glosses by mediaeval French rabbis after Rashi. See on Yebamot 16b (פסוק); Hullin 60a (same catchword).

57. Thus, for example, Bahya ben Asher on Exod. 23, 21; cf. on Exod. 33, 14.

58. Sandalphon (συνάδελφος) is similar, but occurs only in one place in the Talmud (Hagigah 13b); elsewhere only in late writings, and never in Palestinian literature.

59. Above, p. 64 f.

60. Above, p. 65.

61. So Rashi (taking 'the Lord's host' as Israel), and others.

62. The Hebrew word translated 'captain' and 'prince' is the same (*sar*).

63. Cf. the same Targum on Deut. 34, 6, where Metatron and three others are the four 'princes of wisdom.'

64. Tanḥuma, Weethanan § 6 (ed. Buber, f. 7a). So also Grūnhut, Liqqutim V, 105a (from Yelammedenu).

65. Midrash Mishle on 14, 34 (ed. Buber, f. 39b). A manuscript in the library of the Jewish Theological Seminary in New York has here Metatron instead of Michael (Jewish Encyclopedia, X, 231).

66. Cf. Berakot 3a, below.

67. Ekah Rabbati, Proem 24 (ed. Wilna f. 6d, top). On the secret place (μυστήριον) which God has, whither to retire and weep, see Hagigah 5b (on Jer. l.c.).

68. Hagigah 12b; Zebahim 62a; Menahot 110a. The formulation is consistent. See Lueken, Michael, pp. 30 f.

69. Jellinek, Bet ha-Midrash, III, 137.

70. So far, Tanḥuma, Naso, 18.

71. Bemidbar Rabbah, 12, 12 (ed. Wilna 1884, f. 49a), cf. Rev. 5, 8; 8, 3 (Psalm 141, 2). Oesterley and Box (p. 175) assert that in this place 'the term 'Mediator' is directly applied to Metatron, and, what is more significant, he is represented as the reconciler between God and the Chosen People.' The whole passage is quoted above in a literal translation. There is no word in the context, far and wide, which could remotely suggest 'Mediator,' to say nothing about being 'directly applied' to Metatron. (See this Review, XIV, 249). Weber, from whom the authors have their (blind) reference (without acknowledgment) renders the passage correctly. In so late a Midrash it is probable that the 'Youth whose name is Metatron' is meant to be the translated Enoch, of whom more is to be said hereafter; but the attribution of Michael's function to Metatron is independent of this identification.

72. It is possible that the meaning of the mysterious words 'for my name is in him,' was found in the name Michael. The words are usually paraphrased 'whose name is like the name of his master.' Etymological midrash found in מִי כַמֶּכָּה a compound of מִי כַמֶּכָּה (Exod. 15, 11) 'Who is like Thee?' and אֵין כָּאֵל (Deut. 33, 26) 'There is none like God.' 'My name is in him,' would then be the name אֵל, 'God,' not, as the cabalists imagined, the proper name יהוה, so that they even call him יהוה הקטן 'Jahveh Minor' (or 'Junior'), e.g. Jellinek, Bet ha-Midrash V, 175. Hence a Moslem polemic speaks of 'the little God' whom the Jews call Mitatron (Mas'udi, quoted by Schreiner, Zeitschrift der deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, XLII, 598). The Moslem puts into the mouth of Metatron the lamentation which in Ekah Rabbathi, Proem. 24 (cf. Berakot 3a) is uttered by God.

73. In a Response of the Gaons Sherira and Hai (dated 992), it is said: Jacob said, 'The angel who redeemed me,' etc. (Gen. 48, 16), and Isaiah, 'The angel of His presence saved them.' This is the Prince of the Presence (*sar ha-panim*) of whom our Rabbis speak, Metatron. And we see how the Merciful (God) extols him, and makes known to Moses his honor and his greatness, as it is written, 'Behold I send,' etc., 'Beware of him,' etc. — A. Harkavy, Responsen der Geonim (1887), No. 173, p. 189.

74. Jellinek, Bet ha-Midrash II, 55.

75. L.c. p. 56, l. 11 from below. In another manuscript also at an earlier point (p. 55, below). The inconsistency is doubtless to be attributed to copyists; but testifies to the persistent survival of the identification.

76. The intercourse between Palestine and Babylonia and the study of Palestinian Midrash in Babylonia sufficiently explain this.

77. An angel who stands with Metatron in the highest rank, and sometimes takes precedence of him, is Sandalphon (*συνάδελφος*, sc. of Metatron), whom later cabalists identify with the translated Elijah.

78. The angelic scribe, Ezek. 9, 2 ff.; Enoch 89, 61 ff.; 90, 14, 22. In these places in Enoch probably Michael, as the guardian angel of Israel.

79. Not quite the same, for Metatron writes down the good deserts of Israelites; Enoch the judgment and sentence upon the world and all the evil deeds of mankind. It is the generation before the flood.

80. In the Midrash Elle Ezkere (Jellinek, Bet ha-Midrash II, 66): 'Metatron the great scribe' (or secretary) writes down and seals the decree of God against Edom (Rome).

81. With the assumption of Enoch and his ascent through the heavens compare the Ascension of Isaiah 7-11.

82. Jellinek, *Bet ha-Midrash*, V, 172.

83. See above, p. 72.

84. A summary of the doctrine of Metatron in the Zohar and appendixes with references to the sources may be found in *Eshel Abraham* by Abraham Rovigo (Fürth, 1701), f. 9 c. See also Danz, p. 735 (b) f. He is the first of the creations of God; to him God gave dominion over all his hosts; servant of God, the senior of his house, ruling over all; his name is like his master's, he is created in his image and likeness. He is a priest of the Most High; he takes the souls of the righteous up (to heaven) every night. In more distinctively cabalistic conception Metatron unites (or connects) the stages (דרגות) of the four-story universe, from top to bottom and bottom to top. He is the 'middle column' (עמודא דאמצעיתא) reaching up and down to both extremities, like the 'middle bar' in the tabernacle, which passed through from end to end (Exod. 26, 28). It is in Metatron that the Lord is revealed in his Shekinah, e.g. to Ezekiel. Metatron, who is called *sar hapanim*, is as it were a vesture enveloping Metatron who is called Shaddai; the Lord and his Shekinah are in the midst of the latter. Later cabalists found the distinction between two Metatrons intimated in the spelling of the word: מטטרון is the Shekinah; מטטרק is the angel of the Shekinah, an envoy or minister (Tikkune Zohar, and Cordovero, *Pardes Rimmonim*, quoted by Danz, 735 (b), 736 (c); more fully, Sommer, *Theologia Soharica*, pp. 36 f.). The *Eshel Abraham* is innocent of this refinement. In the *Yalkut Rubeni* the doctrine is even more explicitly stated. The author finds in the Zohar two Metatrons, Major and Minor; the latter is a created being, a messenger; the Great Metatron is an emanation (Danz, 737 (d)). It is perhaps not superfluous to call particular attention in the foregoing to the phrase 'the middle column,' with its context and explanation, since, especially in the Latin *columna medietatis*, it is exposed to the misunderstanding that some kind of an intermediary, or 'mediatorial,' place and function is attributed to Metatron.

85. The servant of God, the senior of his house, etc. is Metatron, of whom we have said: (Gen. 24, 2).

86. Sommer: 'Futurus sit ut conjugatur corpori in utero materno.' *Similia legimus de Christo* Psalm lx, 7-9. — Sommer has apparently forgotten that *ὁῶμα δὲ κατηρτίσω μοι* is LXX (and N. T.), but not in the Hebrew text. If the language of the Zohar is rightly understood, it would only be one of many evidences of the influence of Christian ideas, or a desire to match them, in late developments of the Cabala.

87. Ašilut, Beriyah, Yešira, 'Asiyah. Ginsberg, 'Cabala,' *Jewish Encyclopedia*, III, 475.

SOME RECENT STUDIES ON THE IRANIAN RELIGIONS

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It is curious, and perhaps significant, that the two most important volumes on the Iranian religions which have appeared within the last decade should have been written by scholars who were not professed Iranists. Professor James Hope Moulton, the author of the Hibbert Lectures on *Early Zoroastrianism* (London, 1913), was a theologian and a hellenist; Professor Raffaele Pettazzoni, who has just given us his *La Religione di Zarathustra* (Bologna, 1920),¹ is a student of comparative religion of the finest and sanest type. Pettazzoni seems not to have had the advantage of consulting Moulton's volume; but while from one point of view this may be regrettable, from another it has worked for good, since two scholars have reached independently results which, when combined, put the genesis of Iranism in an entirely new light and go far toward the solution of many perplexing problems, if, indeed, they may not have solved the riddle as a whole. Of Moulton's work I have expressed an opinion elsewhere,² and subsequent reflection has only confirmed that judgement.

I can conceive no higher praise for both these scholars than to say that the work of either is comparable only with that of the other. Each is, however, distinctly individual; *Early Zoroastrianism* treats solely of pre-zoroastrian Iranism and the Gāthās, while *La Religione di Zarathustra* surveys the system from its beginnings to the present day.

Pettazzoni's volume is divided into eight chapters: 'The Problem of Zoroastrianism,' 'Pre-zarathustrian "Paganism"' and the Religious Reform of Zarathustra,' 'Origin and Early

¹ Vol. i of the *Storia delle Religione*, edited by him.

² *Expository Times*, xxv (1914), 256-257; *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, vii (1914), 396.

Times of Zoroastrianism,' 'Zoroastrianism in Persia and the Achaemenidae,' 'Foreign Domination and the Persian Middle Ages,' 'The Persian Renaissance under the Sassanids,' and 'Zoroastrianism and Islam.' The work is fully documented, and reveals not merely breadth of reading but sound judgement. I accept its conclusions in principle, as I accept those of Dr. Moulton.

Combining these conclusions, so far as the beginnings of Iranism are concerned, we may now see that this system consists of at least five strata. Without pretending to exhaust the components of each, and disregarding doubtful matters, we may hold that to the Persian religion (that is, that of Persis) were due aniconism, animal sacrifice, and nature-worship (that is, essentially, the system described by Herodotus); to extra-persian pre-zoroastrianism, Mithra, Haoma, Yima, and other elements common to the Avesta and the Veda; to Zoroastrianism (that is, the teachings of Zoroaster himself), monotheism and war against evil, in short all the ethical element; to Magianism, dualism, exposure of corpses, marriage with near kin, horror of mountains, and the minute prescriptions of the *Vidēvdāt*; and to Babylonia, oneiromancy, astrology, and certain myths, as for instance that of the attempt of Kāy Kā'ūs to fly to heaven on the back of eagles, which is plainly a reminiscence of an episode in the story of Etana. Further investigations may reveal yet other sources for a system which should, perhaps, be termed 'Iranism' rather than 'Zoroastrianism.'

Pettazzoni, like Moulton,³ is quite right in declaring that Zoroastrianism is monotheistic, not dualistic, and he correctly says:

In reality dualism is not a negation of monotheism; therefore it is monotheism itself in two opposed and contrary aspects. It does not precede monotheism; therefore it is a reflex of it. . . . In dualism all those divine elements are present which monotheism denies and denies again, but they are present in the only form compatible with the concept (also present) of one god. . . . Thus Anrama(i)nyu is not essentially another god beside Ahura Mazda; he is Ahura Mazda himself in the inversion of all his qualities.

³ *Early Zoroastrianism*, pp. 12-16; dualism is a Magian doctrine (*ibid.* pp. 201, 220, 322).

Anrama(i)nyu is the heir and the exponent of all the gods (*daēva*) of the polytheistic paganism; he is not himself a traditional god; he is a new figure who enters with the Reform, substituted for all the divine figures of the tradition, and thus reducing all its representatives to unity.

The Zoroastrian reform took place, Pettazzoni believes, "in the course of the seventh century B.C., in a point of north-western Iran." This implied date for Zoroaster seems indeed the most probable, although Moulton⁴ would set it about 1000 B.C. A matter of much more gravity is the relation between Iranism and Judaism (pp. 76-84). Pettazzoni here takes a step which I have long considered necessary, and here again he is found in virtual agreement with Moulton (pp. 68-73). These two scholars hold that the debt was not that of Judaism to Iranism, but the reverse. It was the Jews who taught Zoroastrianism its monotheism; the messianic concept was borrowed by Iran from Israel; the figure of Satan and the doctrines of immortality and the fall were genuinely Jewish. At the most, Pettazzoni will admit only that dualism was borrowed by the Jews, and Moulton well says: "It seems therefore that in all things that really matter we have no adequate grounds for believing Jewish ideas indebted to any outside source which can be connected with the Avesta." To this list the doctrine of angels and archangels may be added; the concept seems to me too genuinely Hebraic to be explained away merely by *argumenta e silentio*, and מלאכים are mentioned before the exilic period.⁵

On the other hand, Moulton's argument that the Magi were non-iranian⁶ seems preferable to the view that they were Persian. This involves the implication, in spite of Pettazzoni (p. 84), that Zoroaster was not a Magian. A similar theory was advanced in 1908 by Zaborowski in a work which has failed of its deserved recognition among Iranists and which neither Moulton nor Pettazzoni quotes.⁷ Zaborowski lays

⁴ *Treasure of the Magi*, p. 6. "Nothing earlier than the tenth century can be admitted, it would seem, and another century or two may be quite reasonably allowed" (p. 13).

⁵ Cf. also Gaster, 'Parsiism in Judaism,' in *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, ix (1917), 637-640.

⁶ *Early Zoroastrianism*, Lecture vi; cf. his article 'Magi,' in *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, viii (1915), pp. 242-244; *Treasure of the Magi*, *passim*.

⁷ *Les peuples aryens d'Asie et d'Europe*, Paris, 1908, pp. 189-196.

stress on the antipathy between Magi and Persians, and quite correctly writes:

Les mages étaient sûrement, en effet, vis-à-vis des Perses, les dépositaires du savoir, des conceptions, des symboles, des formules, des vieilles civilisations. . . . Ceux-ci ont opéré sur un ensemble de croyances existant en Médie, alors que l'apport des Aryens y était déjà considérable; ou mieux ils ont adapté à quelques formes religieuses, à quelques prescriptions plus anciennes assurant la domination de leur caste, des croyances plus simples que l'hégémonie politique des Perses imposait.

None the less, Pettazzoni (pp. 114-115) also distinguishes between Persians and Medes, the priests of the latter being the Magi; and he carefully and sympathetically outlines Herodotus' account of the religion of the Persians. He makes the interesting political suggestion that the internal struggle between the old religion and the Zoroastrian reform aided Cyrus in his conquest of Media; and as regards the problem of the faith of the early Achaemenians, he declares — most correctly in my opinion — “Dario fu un mazdeista senza essere un zoroastriano.” It was in Persia proper that Zoroastrianism was constrained to become polytheistic (pp. 133-134), and the divergencies between the Persian and Zoroastrian systems are discussed with proper fullness (pp. 133-139), the further distinctions between Zoroastrianism and Magianism being given in the various studies of Moulton.

Alien rule of Iran solidified the union of all these elements, and thus, when foreign sovereignty could be shaken off, the composite religion had become an emblem of nationality. This is the explanation of the great strength of Iranism, in its Zoroastrian form, during the Sassanid period (p. 170); and it was precisely for this reason that Manichaeism was banned as being universalistic and contrary to the nationalistic spirit of the later period (pp. 190-193). The relations between the Sassanian state and the Jews and Christians in Persia are adequately sketched (pp. 193-199, 201-204), but one of the best studies on these matters ⁸ the author seems not to have con-

⁸ Wigram, *An Introduction to the History of the Assyrian Church*, London, 1910; cf. also Gray, ‘Zoroastrian and other Ethnic Religious Material in the *Acta Sanctorum*,’ in *Journal of the Manchester Egyptian and Oriental Society*, 1913-14, pp. 37-55. I have not yet been able to consult Braun’s *Ausgewählte Akten persischer Märtyrer*, Kempten, 1915.

sulted. The curious figure of Mazdak receives attention (pp. 199–200),⁹ as does the difficult question of the religion of the Parthians (p. 171);¹⁰ and Mithraism is discussed (pp. 163–169) as a syncretism of old Iranism, the Babylonian Shamash-cult, and the orgiastic religions of Asia Minor.¹¹ In this connection it is of interest to note that the *Deus Areimanius* of Mithraic inscriptions is confirmed not only by the underworld deity of the Persians mentioned by Herodotus (vii, 114) and Plutarch (*De Isid. et Osir.* 46),¹² but also by the use of the Armenian *Sandaramet*, the Persian form of the Avesta *Spenta Armaiti* (an earth-goddess), to translate γῆ κάτω in Ezechiel 31, 16, and καταχθόνιος in Philippians 2, 10.¹³ To this same period belongs the “Image of Vohuman” in an inscription from Assur,¹⁴ thus confirming the statement of Strabo (p. 733 c) on this subject.

The Sassanian empire, Pettazzoni judiciously remarks (p. 185), “was not a theocratic state, although it was clerical.” This involves a difficult question, which here can only be asked, not answered. How is one to explain such a passage as that contained, for instance, in the Greek and Pahlavi inscription of Ardashīr at Naqs-i-Rustam, where the monarch is ‘divine’ (θεός, *bagī*), ‘of the race of the gods’ (ἐκ γένους θεῶν, *minū chitrī min yastān*), ‘son of the divine Pāpak’? Does this mean what it says? The concept is not Indo-iranian, but it may possibly be a reminiscence of Babylonia.¹⁵ In any event, there is, according to Pettazzoni (pp. 189–190), a distinct trace of Babylon in the concept of Zrvan Akarana (‘Boundless

⁹ See Modi, ‘Mazdak, the Iranian Socialist,’ in *Dastur Hoshang Memorial Volume*, Bombay, 1918, pp. 116–131.

¹⁰ See the recent study by Unvala, ‘The Religion of the Parthians,’ in *Sir Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy Madressa Jubilee Volume*, Bombay, 1914, pp. 1–10.

¹¹ See also Jones, ‘Mithraism,’ in *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, viii (1915), 752–759.

¹² Moulton, *Early Zoroastrianism*, pp. 128–130.

¹³ Meillet, ‘Sur les termes religieux iraniens en Arménien,’ in *Revue des études arméniennes*, i (1921), 233–236.

¹⁴ מר(ד)יא (צלמאי והומן(?)) Jensen, in *Sitzungsberichte der Berliner Akademie der Wissenschaften*, 1919, p. 1018; cf. also Jackson, ‘Images and Idols (Persian),’ in *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, vii (1914), 151–155.

¹⁵ Cf. Gray, ‘King (Indian),’ in *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, vii (1914), 720–721; Casartelli, ‘King (Iranian),’ *ibid.* 721–723; Mercer, “‘Emperor’-Worship in Babylonia,” in *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, xxxvi (1917), 360–380.

Time') as an attempt to solve the problem of Magian dualism. This concept was, I think, far more widely spread than the Avesta texts imply, and I strongly incline to regard Zarvanism as the prevailing sect in the Sassanian period.¹⁶

In his concluding chapter Pettazzoni does not mention two of the chief works on the modern period: Dosabhai Framji Karaka's *History of the Parsis* (2 vols., London, 1884), and Mlle. Menant's *Les Parsis* (part 1, Paris, 1898).¹⁷ We must also bear in mind that there are some interesting survivals of Iranism in remote corners of the Caucasus and the Pamirs. The former are discussed in an article by me on the Thushes and kindred tribes, which will appear in the concluding volume of the *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*; the material concerning the latter is still to be collected and digested.¹⁸

It is not easy for me to write of Moulton's *Treasure of the Magi: A Study of Modern Zoroastrianism*,¹⁹ for its printed pages are the echo of a voice no mortal ears may ever hear again. When one compares this volume with his *Early Zoroastrianism*, one sees the difference between the mere scholar and the man. Deep as is my admiration for the erudition of the *Early Zoroastrianism*, which led me to revise my former outlook upon the Iranian religion, it has not the human touch of the *Treasure*. All the learning is here that adorned the *Hibbert Lectures*; but, in addition, there is the more precious gift of sincere, deep, simple, manly Christian piety.²⁰

¹⁶ *Journal of the Manchester Egyptian and Oriental Society*, 1913-14, p. 39; cf. also Gray, 'Fate (Iranian),' in *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, v (1912), 792-793; Edwards, 'Sects (Zoroastrian),' *ibid.* xi (1920), 345-347; Dhalla, *Zoroastrian Theology*, New York, 1914, pp. 203-205.

¹⁷ See also Mlle. Menant's articles, 'Gabars,' in *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, vi (1913), 147-156; 'Parsis,' *ibid.* ix (1917), 640-650; Jackson, *Persia Past and Present*, New York, 1906, pp. 353-400.

¹⁸ See, *inter alia*, Kovalevsky, 'Survivals of Iranian Culture in the Caucasian Highlands,' in *Archaeological Review*, i (1888), 313-331; De Ujfalvy, *Les Aryens au nord et au sud de l'Hindou-Kouch*, Paris, 1896, pp. 91, 96-97, 329-332, 334, 337-338; Bid-dulph, *Tribes of the Hindu Koosh*, Calcutta, 1880, pp. 75, 108; Olufsen, *Through the Unknown Pamirs*, London, 1904, pp. 197-199, 205-206.

¹⁹ Oxford, 1917 (in the series entitled *The Religious Quest of India*).

²⁰ A touching tribute to my friend is paid by the Reverend Bardsley Brash in his exquisite chapter on 'Another "Verray Gentil Knight"' in *Letters to 'The Happy Warrior'*, pp. 25-30.

I do not wish to review this book; I read it still with too much sorrow for the tragic loss of its author and with too much gladness that such men as he have lived and still live upon this earth. I can add only a few references to studies which he could not see.²¹ Suffice it to say that while the first portion of the volume (pp. 1-118) covers ground similar to that of the *Early Zoroastrianism*, it is written from a wholly different outlook; but the second portion, 'The Parsis' (pp. 119-254), deals with matters which Moulton had not previously discussed in any printed form. Here he has chapters on 'The Community,' 'The Priesthood,' 'Ceremonial Life: Fire-Temples and Towers of Silence,' 'Ceremonial Life: Outside the Fire-Temple,' 'Orthodoxy and Reform,' 'Parsi Piety,' 'The Parsis and Christian Propaganda,' 'The Crown of Zoroastrianism.' Many things are here written which the Parsis would do well to heed: the chill, negative rationalism to which their attempts at reform are but too conducive, and the follies of the pseudo-oriental theosophy wherein many Parsis take refuge, are unsparingly but honestly exposed (pp. 173-193), as is the equally despairing eclecticism where others find a facile but shallow harbor (pp. 207-209). Fully recognizing (p. 211) that "Zoroastrianism differs essentially from all other non-Christian creeds in that its fundamental documents set forth a system which calls for supplement, but nowhere includes what is untrue or unworthy," Moulton could not but direct attention to certain grave deficiencies in this faith. It lacks love and renunciation, it is weak in the doctrines of grace and forgiveness, it stresses works and ignores faith (pp. 194-206, 211); in these respects, I would add, it is inferior, much as I admire it, to Vaiṣṇavism and Northern Buddhism, which, however imperfectly, at least teach love.

²¹ Regarding Mani (p. 113) see now Dhalla, 'Mani's Asceticism from the Zoroastrian Point of View,' in *Madressa Jubilee Volume*, pp. 89-99; on the question of proselytism (pp. 127-131) see Gray, 'Missions (Zoroastrian),' in *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, viii (1915), 749-751, and Mlle. Menant, 'Une évolution sociale chez les Parsis,' in *Revue d'ethnographie et de sociologie*, 1914, pp. 118-130, 168-180, 235-247; on the researches of Dr. Spooner (pp. 63, 74, 81-82, 142) see Modi, 'Ancient Pataliputra,' in his *Asiatic Papers*, ii (Bombay, 1917), 211-286.

From these two volumes one turns to a third only to meet with chilling disappointment. Carl Clemen's *Die griechischen und lateinischen Nachrichten über die persische Religion*²² bears the date of 1920, although its preface states that it was completed some years since. This work is written from the standpoint of a half-century ago. Clemen is quite aware of Moulton's views, but he expressly rejects them (pp. 207-233). His denial of Moulton's (and now, doubtless, of Pettazzoni's) advance seriously affects the worth of his own study. The use of the term 'Persian' as synonymous with Zoroastrian, Magian, and Indo-iranian lands Clemen in difficulties and contradictions among his sources which he seeks to avoid in ways more ingenious than convincing. I can appreciate these difficulties, for I was myself involved in them until Moulton and Pettazzoni set me free.

The entire work is so vitiated by this fundamental error that it is scarcely possible to review it in detail. Fortunately one may, by using the hypothesis of stratifications, build up a very satisfactory account of the Greek and Latin writers on the Iranian systems from the same author's collection of *Fontes historiae religionis Persicae*.²³ Such a compilation was needed as a supplement to my own collection of Greek and Latin data concerning Zoroaster;²⁴ and it is a matter of satisfaction that it has at last appeared. With Clemen's general conclusion regarding the value of these sources (p. 202) I find myself in full agreement:

The picture of the Persian religion that we might make on the basis of the Avesta is enriched in very extraordinary fashion by the Greek and Latin data. Both among the Achaemenians and among the Persian people we have learned an abundance of views and tendencies which the native sources scarcely imply or wholly fail to imply. In many cases, it is true, they had nothing to do with the official religion, yet in part they belonged to it. . . . On the other hand, very much that we read in our present Avesta, especially in the Yasna, Visprat, and Vidēvdāt, is not mentioned by the Greeks and

²² *Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten*, xvii, Heft 1, Giessen, 1920.

²³ *Fontes historiae religionum ex auctoribus Graecis et Latinis collecti*, Fasciculus 1, Bonn, 1920.

²⁴ In Jackson, *Zoroaster*, New York, 1899, pp. 231-273; cf. my supplement, 'Additional Classical Passages Mentioning Zoroaster's Name,' in *Le Muséon*, ix (1908), 311-318.

Latins; but it would be as incorrect to delineate the Persian religion only according to the latter as to regard them so slightly as has heretofore been usual.

On the basis of the classical references, Clemen concludes that Zoroaster flourished about 1000 B.C., or even earlier; and that he was born and labored in Western Iran (pp. 27-28, 42).

Occasionally, quite apart from what I regard as his fatal fundamental error, Clemen appears to me to slip. To see in the 'Agonaces' of Pliny xxx, i [2], 4, a corruption of 'Ἀγοραμά-ζδης, 'Ahura Mazda' (p. 49), seems rather violent; and it is by no means certain that Agradates, the original name of Cyrus (Strabo, p. 729 c), meant 'Ahura-given' (p. 63);²⁵ it may more reasonably be explained as Iranian *Ag(h)radāta, 'First-given.' In connection with the story of Zariadres (p. 42) reference might have been made to the discussion of the legend by Rohde,²⁶ and the statement of Firmicus Maternus (*De errore prof. relig.* 5) regarding a female fire-deity (p. 104) receives support from a passage in the Syriac Acts of the Martyrs.²⁷ Clemen's book can not be pronounced a valuable contribution to our knowledge of Iranism.

²⁵ Justi, *Iranisches Namenbuch*, Marburg, 1895, pp. 6, 48, 491, would read Atradates ('Fire-given').

²⁶ *Griechischer Roman*, 2d ed., Leipzig, 1900, pp. 47-54.

²⁷ Hoffmann, *Auszüge aus syrischen Akten persischer Märtyrer*, Leipzig, 1880, p. 35; Gray, *Journal of the Manchester Egyptian and Oriental Society*, 1913-14, p. 46.

THE PROBLEM OF CHRISTIAN ORIGINS

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Johannes Weiss, *Das Urchristentum*, Göttingen, 1917.

Alfred Loisy, *Les Actes des Apôtres*, Paris, 1920.

F. J. Foakes Jackson and Kirsopp Lake, *The Beginnings of Christianity*, Volume I, London, 1920.

Eduard Meyer, *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, Stuttgart and Berlin, 1921.

Roland Schütz, *Apostel und Jünger, eine quellenkritische und geschichtliche Untersuchung über die Entstehung des Christentums*, Giessen, 1921.

B. H. Streeter, 'Fresh Light on the Synoptic Problem,' *Hibbert Journal*, October, 1921.

THE purpose of this article is not so much to offer a review of the books mentioned above as to indicate briefly their nature and contents, and to discuss the varied yet similar points of view which they represent toward some of the problems in the story of Christian origins as studied today.

Johannes Weiss will always hold a prominent place in the history of research into the meaning of early Christian literature. His treatment of 1 Corinthians, even for those who do not wholly accept his critical dissections, is one of the great commentaries on any single book of the New Testament; though for many his highest achievement will always seem to be his *Die Predigt Jesu vom Reiche Gottes*, especially in the first edition, of which the freshness and vigor were somewhat impaired by the emendations and additions in the second. It was a great loss to theological learning that he died so prematurely in 1914. His last book, *Das Urchristentum*, was left partly unfinished, and owes its final pages to Professor Knopf. It is a large book, but shows with sad clearness a certain hurriedness and lack of proportion due to the race with death which the author was running. The first 510 pages were published before his death, the rest were only partly ready, but were finished by Professor Knopf, and appeared in 1917. The whole

follows what have become the conventional lines for an historical investigation of early Christianity. There is first a description of the primitive church, then of the mission to the Gentiles and of Paul's work, followed by a long discussion of Paul as a Christian and a theologian. These comprise the part published in 1913; the remaining parts now added discuss the spread of Christianity in the first century, and the special characteristics and history of the church in Judaea, Syria, Asia Minor, Macedonia, Achaea, and Rome.

The next two books, *Les Actes des Apôtres* by Professor Loisy, and *The Beginnings of Christianity*, volume I, by Dr. F. J. Foakes Jackson and myself, are specially concerned with the Acts of the Apostles, and discuss it mainly as the chief source of our knowledge about the primitive church. Dr. Jackson and I have issued the historical prolegomena in one volume, reserving the critical prolegomena for a second, and the text and commentary for a third. Volume I appeared in 1920, volume II will come early in 1922, and the volume with the text probably in 1923.

Loisy has published his prolegomena and commentary in one large volume of more than one thousand pages; he devotes the first fifty pages to an account of modern criticism of Acts, ending with a slightly acid discussion of the works of Harnack, from whom he differs sharply. On the other hand he accepts a suggestion of Eduard Norden in *Agnostos Theos* which I admit did not seem to me acceptable, especially in the form in which he made it. Norden argued from the imperfect nature of the preface to Acts that the original work of Luke had been a work in two volumes, which was a complete, consistent, and finished production, but was taken over by a later editor who submitted it to drastic interpolations consistent with themselves but not with the source. Loisy accepts this view and throughout his commentary endeavours to distinguish between the Source and the Interpolator, instead of speculating about the sources used by the final editor whom most earlier critics have held responsible for the preface in spite of its bad grammar. I am still unconvinced that this is right, but Loisy's book combined with the sympathy shown for the same theory

by Eduard Meyer has shown me that the suggestion cannot be ignored as it will be found to be in the second volume of 'The Beginnings of Christianity.' Fortunately there will be opportunity in a later volume to repair this fault.

Loisy goes on in his introduction to work out the consequences of his theory and to reconstruct the true history of events as he conceives it. It is curious to notice that the historical results which he reaches are in many ways similar to those of Dr. Jackson and myself. This is partly due to the fact that both have been influenced by the well-known theories of Eduard Schwartz. The commentary, which covers 964 pages, is charmingly written with a peculiarly French incisiveness and brilliance. To point out that it has the defects of its qualities, and seems sometimes to omit considerations which point against the conclusions adopted, is merely to say that M. Loisy is French. The relative position of his book and my own may be discovered from the judgment of two critics. In reviewing 'The Beginnings of Christianity' the Dean of St. Paul's, Dr. Inge, expressed his kind conviction that we were not so bad as Burkitt or Loisy, and a French writer, whose name was not given but who at least belongs to the circle of M. Loisy, described us as being timorous rather than rash in our criticism. I rejoice at this evidence that we are walking in the middle of the road, — *in medio tutissimus ibis*, — though I admit that a walk between M. Loisy and the Dean of St. Paul's suggests to my mind excitement rather than safety.

The first of three volumes on the Origin and Beginnings of Christianity has just been published by Eduard Meyer, and contains his treatment of the gospels. Like Dr. Jackson and myself he regards the Lucan writings as the correct point at which investigations should begin, but instead of prefixing a superficial analysis of the gospels to the thorough study of Acts he has prefixed a superficial study of Acts to a thorough study of the gospels. Each method has its advantages, and it is, I think, a happy accident that we have gone different ways. Eduard Meyer expressly states that he has not studied much of the literature of the twentieth century, and hardly any of the nineteenth, on the subject which he is treating, and the

professional theologian will occasionally be surprised at the internal evidence of this fact. But it is only very stupid theologians, however learned they may be, who will think that this renders his book unimportant. Eduard Meyer is one of the greatest living students of ancient history, with an extremely wide knowledge of ancient literature. His ignorance of the modern treatment of the subject would debar his work from acceptance as a doctor's thesis in many of our universities, but it does not prevent him from writing a book which ought to be studied by all who are engaged in research into early Christian literature. The fact that both these statements are true may give rise to thought, and suggest that we are apt to pay too much attention to the books described as "secondary authorities," ("second hand" would be better) and to allow the memorized learning of modern books to be a substitute for an intelligent understanding of original sources.

Roland Schütz's book is of a somewhat different character. Its centre is a relatively small point in the literary criticism of Acts, but it spreads out into historical speculation, and the last chapter, though of only twenty-four pages, offers extremely suggestive, if not always convincing, prolegomena to a history of early Christianity. Few will agree with all of it; anyone can read it in a single hour; but it will need many hours of well-spent thought to formulate clearly the reasons for disagreement.

All these books have the value that whether right or wrong they are essentially constructive and are building on a common plan. It is more important to understand that plan and the reason why these books have appeared almost simultaneously than to discuss any of the details. The subject may perhaps best be dealt with, for the present purpose, by an explanation of the genesis of 'The Beginnings of Christianity.'

In the thirty years between 1860 and 1890, English theological scholarship was probably at as high a point as it reached during the nineteenth century. Bishop Lightfoot had achieved a position of leadership in the historical investigation of the documents of early Christianity, and the fame of Hort, Salmon, and Hatch had won recognition throughout Europe. Unfortunately Lightfoot never lived to complete the work which he had

begun, no successors were found to produce any historical commentaries comparable to his, while Hatch died prematurely, and Salmon and Hort produced but few books. Dr. Foakes Jackson and I had often discussed this lacuna in English scholarship, and in 1913 we determined to do what we could to organize an attempt to carry on, however imperfectly, the tradition of Lightfoot, and deal with the beginnings of Christianity in the light of modern knowledge, and with due regard to the problems at present most under discussion by the scholars of all countries.

The critical treatment of the Acts of the Apostles had remained especially backward in English books; it needed to be analyzed, and its evidence as to the growth of early Christian thought added to that derived from the similar treatment of the gospels and epistles. Something, but not enough, had been done on this subject in Germany, hardly anything in England. It therefore seemed obvious in 1913 that the next step called for was an historical commentary on Acts, not so much to disentangle geographical and archaeological riddles, for that had been done with extraordinary skill and success by Sir William Ramsay, but in order to analyze the forms of thought, especially in the earlier chapters, and to establish their relation to the earlier and later parts of the Synoptic tradition. For it is safe to say that the Synoptic tradition represents a process in which varying stages of development can be traced, much as a geologist traces stages by the fossils embedded in the various strata of the earth's surface.

Meanwhile the same conviction seems to have entered the mind of several writers on the Continent, and the books treated in this article are its result. This is not so obviously true of Johannes Weiss as of the others, but speaking generally all of these continental writers have the same object which marks the difference between the point of view of today and of yesterday. They are endeavouring to reconstruct the story of Christian origins, and are engaged in literary criticism merely because that is for the moment the most useful instrument. But it is not historical reconstruction merely in the sense of recovering a sequence of events, but rather what, for lack of an English



word, must be called *religionsgeschichtlich*. None of the group of writers mentioned care much whether Paul visited one place rather than another or whether Peter was put to death under Nero or not. Their real interest is that intertwining of more than one type of religion which produced Catholic Christianity. The documents are important because they represent varieties of religious experience which are as much alive today as they ever were, though the forms which they take are different.

This is of course quite well understood in America because American theology has always been largely influenced by German work, but in England the situation is different. No large contribution of this nature has been made by British scholars or is apparently likely to be made. They are going on in their own way, which has, indeed, many advantages, without appreciating and certainly without sharing in the general methods of continental and American scholarship. This was shown very plainly in the long article of Dr. Headlam in the *Church Quarterly Review* on 'The Beginnings of Christianity.' It calls for no rejoinder from those who are satisfied with the method of modern historical criticism, for he points out no mistakes and deals with no problems, but merely issues a general *non licet esse vos* which has no importance outside of Oxford; but it raises the interesting problem of why English scholarship has taken this turn with regard to New Testament criticism.

The situation cannot be understood without reference to the dispute which raged in the nineteenth century as to the Old Testament. That controversy may be presented thus: the tradition of Judaism stated, on the authority of its sacred book, that the Law had been given by God himself, through Moses; it was inspired and infallible. It had often been disobeyed; at one time it had been lost; but it had always existed, and the prophets had insisted on its tenets. No serious doubt had ever been thrown on this tradition until it occurred to some students of the Old Testament that the early literature of the Jewish church did not confirm it. On examination the Israelites of the time of the monarchy were seen to have lived without the Law in its complete form, and the prophets themselves

were found to have had no knowledge of it. Investigation revealed a long process of growth and accretion, in religious life, in theological thought, and in the extent and teaching of the sacred writings. Religious life had developed and changed from the days of the nomad Hebrews in the time of the patriarchs to those of the commercial Jews after the captivity. Theology had similarly changed; from a dim background of polytheism emerged the 'monolatry' of the ninth century, changing gradually to the monotheism of the sixth. The documents themselves proved to be composite, and the Law to be a compilation covering centuries of accretion. Neither thought nor practice had remained constant: Jewish religion does not tell the story of a faith once delivered to the saints, but of opinion gradually formed by them, with the occasional co-operation of sinners. Moreover the theory proved futile that the religion of Israel was a development of elements always latent. Every day made it plainer that Israel had borrowed not only jewels of silver and jewels of gold from the Egyptians but also less material possessions from Babylonia, Assyria, Persia, and Greece. There was — and is — room for fruitful inquiry as to the extent of the borrowing, none as to its reality.

All this is now the current coin of accepted thought, but since the Jewish tradition had been in the main adopted by the Christian church it is not strange that ecclesiastical opinion at first waxed hot in anger against the critics of the Old Testament. Nevertheless Oxford at least tolerated Driver and Cheyne, and Cambridge provided to Robertson Smith a shelter from the storm. The faithful consoled themselves with the thought that little harm had been done. Though the impregnable rock of the Old Testament had been shattered, the voice of the church declared the New Testament to be safe. A few divines, it is true, like Canon Liddon, who combined real understanding of critical results with tenacious adherence to tradition, maintained that the "Higher Criticism" of the Old Testament must inevitably lead to the abandonment of the Catholic position as to the New Testament and the ministry of Jesus. But in general criticism made its way both in the church and in the universities. It was immensely helped by

the support lent for the time by the rising school of *Lux Mundi*, which regarded with complacency the overthrow of a book cherished by Jews and Protestants, but forgot — like Marcion — that their own church was built on the same foundation.

The results of literary and historical criticism were soon combined. An entirely new version of the history of Israel and its religion was adopted. In accordance, moreover, with a singular peculiarity of theologians, the infallibility formerly claimed for the letter of Holy Scripture was transferred to the new orthodox criticism of the Old Testament. Yet the real revolution was not the replacement of Moses by JE and P — or even by Canon Driver's *Introduction to the Old Testament* — but the recognition that the religion of Israel was a process, partly of accretion, and that its sacred books, being no more infallible than any others, could be used for historical research only in the light of intelligent criticism.

Here, however, a halt was called. Though Dr. Liddon was right in declaring that criticism could not leave the New Testament alone, if it were once allowed to touch the Old, there was for many years a belief that the textual criticism and the literary analysis of the gospels and Acts would have no such disturbing results as the treatment of the pentateuch. Those of us who passed through Dr. Sanday's seminar in the nineties, know how little was ever said by or to any of us as to the reconstruction of history made necessary by the recognition of the Synoptic problem. The theory — which has its attractiveness — was that all dangerous 'subjectivity' could best be avoided by completely accumulating the critical data before considering the difference — in any case unimportant — which they make to the traditional presentation of history.

We who left Oxford long ago have in general abandoned this view. We think that critical investigation and historical presentation ought to be parallel and simultaneous, and that the difference made is great and serious. We regret the increasing gulf between us and our old friends, yet it must be acknowledged that it is we and not they who have made the change, and it is probably good to have a body of scholars like Dr. Headlam, Canon Streeter, Mr. Emmet, and Mr. Major who

perpetuate in the twentieth century the tradition of the nineteenth. No doubt the fruitfulness of those methods is not exhausted, and much can be obtained from the whole-hearted pursuit of them by those whose attention is not distracted by any premature vision of the importance of their results for the history of religion. The essay by Canon Streeter in the *Hibbert Journal* for October is an admirable example of what may still be looked for from the Oxford school. But the wish may be expressed that some of his colleagues would join him in publishing the information which they must have accumulated in these long years of silent study.

The consideration of the books which have been mentioned as representing the continental method shows that Acts has acquired in the development of historical criticism somewhat the same position as the investigation of the prophets of the eighth century played in Old Testament criticism. It is the point at which it is possible to trace the combination of earlier and later elements. Its analysis by literary methods is a real help to the understanding of history. That it should be Acts which claims this position is rather surprising. Twenty years ago it seemed plain that it would be the Fourth Gospel which would be the centre of discussion. Indeed, for a time it was so, but the publication of several remarkable books, among which may be mentioned James Drummond's *The Character and Authorship of the Fourth Gospel*, E. F. Scott's *The Fourth Gospel, its Purpose and Theology*, and Loisy's fascinating *Le Quatrième Évangile* convinced almost everyone that the Fourth Gospel was so clearly 'on the other side' that its study would not answer the question of origin. In England this result was hastened by Sanday's article on Jesus Christ in Hastings's *Dictionary of the Bible*. In this Dr. Sanday endeavoured to use the Fourth Gospel as a source for the life of Christ alongside of the Synoptic tradition, but even his skill, combined as it was with so sincere an appreciation of the difficulties, could not obscure the fact that he had put together mechanically what could not really be combined. It was understood that he was engaged on a Life of Christ for which this article was the first sketch, but to those who understood the problem

it was plain that the first sketch was a prophecy of failure rather than the promise of fulfilment, and it is said that Dr. Sanday lived to realize that this was so, repeating in this respect the experience of Dr. Salmon.¹ Thus it came about that throughout the theological world the conviction has grown almost without discussion that the Fourth Gospel is definitely a document of the Catholic Church. It illustrates and does not explain Christian origins.

It is perhaps worth while to emphasize the nature of this judgment. It is the recognition that by the time the Fourth Gospel was written Christianity was definitely sacramental, or, to use a different phraseology of exactly identical meaning, was a mystery religion. So much, indeed, is obvious to anyone who reads the Fourth Gospel with some knowledge of the other mystery religions. Objection to such a statement comes, however, from two sides. A considerable body of Protestants dislike to admit that the Bible is in any part of it on the side of a Catholic doctrine of the sacraments. They desire, to use a much abused phrase, to spiritualize the sacramental teaching of the Fourth Gospel into closer accord with Protestant principles. Other Protestants, especially in Germany, have endeavoured quite unconsciously to underestimate the importance of the Fourth Gospel, and to interpret the Synoptic gospels as though they were the true foundation of the church. The historian, however, is obliged to realize that from the second century to the sixteenth the Christian church was supported by three pillars, the belief in the Logos-Son, Baptism, and the Mass. These three pillars rest securely on the Fourth Gospel. No one of the three can be fully explained from the Synoptic gospels alone. That is an admirable proof that the Synoptic tradition is in the main historical; but it also shows that it is a problem to be explained rather than the starting-point of everything in Christianity.

But if Protestants for various reasons dislike the attitude represented by Loisy towards the Fourth Gospel and sacramental Christianity, orthodox Catholics equally dislike the

¹ Something of Dr. Sanday's later state of mind may be learned from his book, published in 1920, entitled 'Divine Overruling.'

cleavage between the Synoptic gospels and the Fourth. To bridge the gulf they endeavour to read into the Synoptic gospels the sacramental Christianity which Protestants try to leave out of the Fourth. The historian, not for the first time in the record of the Church, is in the difficult position of pleasing neither ecclesiastical party. Nevertheless I do not doubt but that such historians as Loisy are right. I only doubt what he himself would admit to be debatable, — the extent to which sacramental Christianity was accepted by Paul himself, as distinct from Paul's converts. How near in any case Pauline Christianity was to being a mystery cult can be seen by anyone who, apart from the writings of Loisy, reads the short but epoch-making treatise of Heitmüller and notes how feeble have been the attempts to answer him.

The Johannine writings, then, are 'on the other side,' but the Lucan ones are at the parting of the ways, or, more accurately, at the place where the roads join. What were those roads? Whence do they come? Which of them leads to the historic Jesus? Which of them was travelled by Paul? Why, having come together, do they join and not cross? These are some of the questions which have been discussed by the writers mentioned. They approach them from various angles, but all employ the literary criticism of the Synoptic gospels and Acts as their chief instrument, and all endeavour to translate their critical results into historical statements.

Eduard Meyer and Schütz, though differing on many points, agree in using as a criterion the distinction between the Apostles and the Disciples of Jesus. Though not wholly new this is a point which appears not to have received as much attention as it deserves. Its chief importance is this. It is tolerably plain that the word apostle in its limited meaning of 'one of the Twelve' is Lucan. It is, indeed, found in Matthew and Mark, but so rarely that it is a legitimate hypothesis that it is due to contamination either with the Lucan writings or, more probably, with the traditions which Luke used. It may be connected with the same development which makes the word 'Lord' characteristic of the Lucan writings. Schütz indeed argues that the Twelve were originally the witnesses of the

risen Jesus and that in the gospels their appointment has been dated before the event. The analysis of Acts suggests that the Antiochian source is a 'disciple' source while the Jerusalem sources are 'apostle' sources. Eduard Meyer, somewhat changing the terminology, thinks that this distinction can be traced in Mark. He distinguishes a 'disciple' source in Mark from another which speaks of 'the Twelve,' and shows that if we follow his discrimination we reach an originally purely 'disciple' document and one which was much more consistent and orderly than the present gospel, itself contaminated with the 'Twelve' material. Eduard Meyer and Schütz do not agree as to the details, but it is obvious that behind their two books lies the same general idea that the Twelve, whether called apostles or not, represent the church of Jerusalem, while the 'disciples' represent rather the unbroken tradition of the Galilean teaching of Jesus. Personally I am the more willing to think that this theory is not wholly wrong because it agrees with some observations of my own in *The Stewardship of Faith* pointing in the same direction. I there drew attention to the certainty, as it seems to me, that there were many hearers of Jesus in Galilee who were deeply impressed by his teaching and might fairly claim to be disciples but who never connected him with messianic expectations which he did not encourage during his ministry. His teaching on the kingdom of God, his continuation of the tradition of the prophets in spiritualizing the Law, and his eschatological expectation of imminent catastrophe for the prosperous wicked and rescue for the suffering righteous, — all these remained, but they were not the basis of a church distinct from the synagogue. To such disciples Jesus was the teacher, not the Messiah. That such a group of disciples existed seems to me certain not merely because of the traces found by Meyer and Schütz but on grounds of general probability.

At this stage a very important addition to the picture may be made from Johannes Weiss. By far the most interesting section in the newer part of his 'Urchristentum' is the section on the oldest gospel combined with his remarks in the earlier part of the book on the teaching of Jesus. He shows how the

Gospel of Mark is in one respect essentially not different from the Gospel of John. It is the gospel about Jesus, not the gospel which Jesus preached. It is true that according to Mark the gospel about Jesus is that he was the Messiah, whereas, according to John, it is that he is the Logos-Son, but the fact that the content of the two books is different ought not to obscure their identity of purpose, — to preach Jesus, not to continue his message. On the other hand, if there be any truth at all in most critical reconstructions, Q was the perpetuation of the teaching of Jesus, it was not a gospel concerning him. Johannes Weiss did not combine this result with the ideas defended later by Meyer and Schütz, but the possibility of such a combination is obvious. It would mean that the reason why Q contained no account of the passion and death of Jesus is that this Galilean Christianity followed Jesus as a prophet, not as the Messiah. The death of a prophet does not invalidate, it may be even thought to confirm, his message. It is even possible that they knew nothing of the resurrection. That Jesus was the Messiah, in whatever sense that often misunderstood word may be used, and that he was risen from the dead and seated at the right hand of power, was the special message of the community which, though perhaps of Galilean origin, found itself in Jerusalem. The apostles were witnesses to the resurrection, not the perpetuators of the teaching of Jesus. As time went on, the 'disciples,' that is to say, the Galilean followers of the teaching of Jesus, and the apostles, the preachers of the resurrection, came together and each group learned from the other. The literary counterpart of this synthesis is to be seen in the Gospel of Matthew and the Gospel of Luke, which have each added large sections of the 'disciple' document Q to the apostolic document Mark.

Such would seem to be the general outlines of a theory of Christian origins formed by combining the results of Eduard Meyer, Schütz, and Johannes Weiss. It has the merit at least of explaining some things that otherwise are obscure, and it deserves careful attention. It curiously supplements 'The Beginnings of Christianity' at a point where the treatment in that book has been much condemned by some critics and

certainly caused much trouble to its writers. Starting with the Acts and investigating the gospels in order to see what light they throw on the story of Jesus regarded as the explanation of the origin of the church, the thing which seemed plainest was the little influence the teaching of Jesus had on the early church as represented by Acts. His teaching as distinct from the resurrection is scarcely mentioned. The same thing is true of the Pauline epistles; it is the death and resurrection of Jesus, not his teaching, which inspires Paul. Some of our critics in England, especially Dr. Inge, thought that we were wrong in saying so little about the teaching of Jesus and making it play so small a part in explaining the origin of the church. Nevertheless the facts are so, and if our critics would endeavour to prove out of the Acts and epistles that the teaching of Jesus played a larger part in the story of the origin of the church than we assigned it, they will discover that history is on our side. According to the tradition represented by the sources of Acts i-xv, Peter, Paul, Philip, Stephen, and Barnabas, who represent apostolic Christianity, did not say as much about the teaching of Jesus as we did in 'The Beginnings of Christianity.' When, therefore, such a critic as Mr. Emmet says that our statement is bad history, his accusation really lights on the head of Luke. Is he prepared to admit that Acts is bad history? If not, it would be better for him to join us in trying to understand the problem than to spend time in demolishing his own caricature of what we said.² That problem is not to explain away the facts as given in Acts, but to account for the survival of Q, which must have been the document of an important body of Christians, yet, nevertheless, did not affect Mark³ or the early chapters of Acts. Surely a not improbable answer is to postulate the Galilean origin of

² He states in the *Modern Churchman* that I represent Jesus as a man of second-rate importance who allowed his disciples to call him 'Sir.' It is of course easy to refute this representation. But it is not mine.

³ This would be denied by some critics, but I think that Wellhausen certainly has the better of Harnack on this point. In any case, even if it be not so, the influence of Q on Mark was small. Here too the suggestions of Wellhausen and Eduard Meyer as to the sources of Mark deserve further attention.

Q, thus combining the theories of Johannes Weiss and Schütz. The sequence of literary events would be the production in Jerusalem of the 'apostolic' tradition represented by Mark and by the sources of Acts i-xv and at the same time the production in Galilee of Q, which, in the language of Schütz, is in the main a 'disciple' document. The next stage brought the literary efforts of Matthew and Luke, both of whom united the apostolic tradition of Mark with Q.

The notable article by Canon Streeter in the *Hibbert Journal* presents facts which have to be taken into account in this connection. He argues that the basis of Luke is not really Mark but an already complete gospel into which Luke inserted some parts of Mark. His arguments cannot be reproduced here at length. They seem to me to be as convincing as any hypothesis of the kind can be. His view fits in admirably with that entertained by Harnack, accepted by Eduard Meyer, and I think probably right, to the effect that the writer of Acts made use of two separate Jerusalem traditions which appear dovetailed together in Acts i-v. Even better does it fit in with the view shared by Professor Burkitt and myself that the sounder of these traditions in Acts belongs to the same tradition and perhaps the same document as Mark. If Canon Streeter's view prove right, it is possible that we really have two complete Jerusalem traditions which Luke dovetailed together from the beginning of the Gospel to Acts v. It will then be a question whether it was he or some intermediate editor who made the combination with Q.

Two points remain upon which it does not at present seem to me necessary to go all the way with Meyer and Schütz. I doubt whether Mark ever was anything else than an 'apostolic' document, using the word 'apostolic' to mean emanating from that church which in Jerusalem was connected with the Twelve and especially with Peter. That Mark has a great deal to say about the disciples as distinct from the Twelve proves nothing, for the apostles had in any case been with Jesus in Galilee and had at that time been in the company of many 'disciples' who stayed in Galilee and did not go to Jerusalem. But Meyer's analysis of Mark will need prolonged and careful study.

Another point about which I am inclined to disagree with Schütz is the view which he takes of the relation of the Galilean disciples to Jesus on the one hand and to hellenistic Christianity, including Paul, on the other. His view is that Jesus had preached freedom from the Law in much the same way that Paul did later on. Paul is in this respect the true interpreter of Jesus, and apostolic Christianity is a Judaizing reaction. It is impossible to discuss this point at length. Schütz's suggestion would solve some problems, but at present I am inclined to think that hellenistic Christianity is, as Acts represents it to be, an offshoot of the Jerusalem church transplanted to Antioch in consequence of persecution and thence spreading. I doubt whether Paul can conceivably have been the product of Galilean Christianity, following the disciples of the teacher of Nazareth; for Paul, quite as clearly as Acts i-xv, preaches a crucified and risen Messiah, not a prophet or teacher.

All this question is, of course, intimately connected with the problem of Christology, which for this purpose means the discussion of the exact meaning and the history of the use of such phrases as 'Messiah,' 'Son of Man,' 'Lord,' etc., as applied to Jesus. It is here that 'The Beginnings of Christianity' will perhaps prove a useful supplement to the other books, for it endeavours to distinguish the varieties of christological statement more narrowly than do any of the other works. The general result reached is the same as that assumed by Schütz, namely that Jesus probably did not use the phrase 'Son of Man' (in the messianic sense) of himself, but that the apostles certainly did apply it to him.

All these books are concerned with the translation of critical results into historical statements. The next stage in the natural development of thought on this problem will be a translation into terms of religion. One form which this is likely to take is indicated in the German books, which imply, as though it were self-evident, that the teaching of Jesus is the really important and permanent element and that the apostolic church was a regrettable incident. To accept this position is pure Marcionism, for it means that we can afford to take a whole era of history and condemn it. If these writers be correct, Jesus was a

human being with no essential claim to be regarded as divine in a sense different from other men. He never claimed to be the Messiah or the Logos. He wrought no miracles, but he was a teacher who made a final revelation of spiritual and moral truth which the world had not known before and cannot gain elsewhere. Even if this is not Marcionism, it is surely wrong; for a non-miraculous human being cannot have given teaching sufficient for all ages. Schütz seems to think that this is the tradition of Paul and Luther. One regrets that it is impossible to hear what Luther or Paul would have said on the subject, for even if they had not added to our understanding of theology they would at least have enriched the literature of invective. If Jesus be a teacher and not divine, and there is much to be said for this view, theologians must have the courage of their opinions, place Jesus in the line of teachers and prophets which will never end while the world lasts, and take his teachings as a landmark in history, not as its goal. This position, whether right or wrong, is at least not unreasonable. It is the alternative to traditional orthodox Christianity. What seems to me historically and philosophically absurd is the position expounded by Dr. Rashdall, Dean of Carlisle, who at the meeting of the Modern Churchmen's Union in 1921 explained that of course Jesus did not regard himself as the Messiah or as God, but apparently (he is not very clear) thinks that nevertheless the church was right in giving that rank to him, and that Chalcedonian doctrine, properly understood, is still tenable. It is possible that the church understood the nature of Jesus better than the Lord himself, but the most radical critics and the simplest Christians will probably agree in preferring what each of them in his own way believes to be Jesus' own view.

Those, however, who feel obliged to accept the results of criticism so far as Jesus is concerned, yet who are compelled by the verdict of history, as well as by their own experience, to assert the preëminence of Christianity, and especially of Catholic Christianity, in the history of religion, are forced to give a reason for the faith that is in them. It is a mistake to suppose that they do not appreciate the value of the teaching

of Jesus. On the contrary, they are perfectly well aware that the world has never yet recognized his full importance. That men should love their enemies and do good to their neighbors may sound a simple creed, to be sneered at as commonplace and jejune, but the world would be changed more rapidly if such teaching were followed than by anything else that the mind can conceive, and it was not a critic of the twentieth century but Jesus himself who expressed a preference for those who tried thus to live over those who called him Lord.

Nevertheless the church never has been merely an institution for propagating this or any other form of teaching. It has been a great instrument for the purification of men's minds and souls. It has been, such at least must be the verdict of history, neither infallible nor indefectible in endeavouring to fulfil this mission, but there has never been any institution which has met with so much success. As generation after generation of Catholics went on their way through the world, they endeavoured to follow moral teaching, which was no new thing, (so the historian of religion asserts, and here Eusebius of Caesarea agrees with him), but came from the prophets through Jesus of Nazareth and his disciples. But on their way through the world the friction and the pressure of life brought with it many impurities, the swell of passion, the blindness of temper, and the thrust of desire. Those impurities could not be overcome by the appeal of reason, which had rejected them in advance. The cure was psychological, not intellectual, and it was contributed to the Christian church neither by Jesus nor by the Jews but by the gentiles. It was the sacramental system, the mysteries, which in the main gave men what they needed, purification and strength that they might follow the moral vision which they had seen. Lutheran, and even Calvinistic, Christianity changed the theory but not the practice. It still remains true that the orthodox churches are shown by experience to give purification, though reason may show that they do not give intellectual truth. To explain why this is so is the great problem before the theologians and psychologists of the future.